# Militarism Aff

## 1AC – Final

### Advantage

#### Support for the American military project is tied up and rooted in a domestic culture that resists gun control measures out of a conservative martial ethic.

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Chris Blattman cites a recent estimate that Americans own 42% of the civilian guns in the world. You’ll also see estimates that America accounts for about half of the world’s defense spending. I believe those numbers are a misuse of purchasing power parity comparisons, but with proper adjustments it is not implausible to believe that America accounts for…about 42% of the defense spending. Or thereabouts. I see those two numbers, and their rough similarity, as the most neglected fact in current debates about gun control. I see many people who want to lower or perhaps raise those numbers, but I don’t see enough people analyzing the two as an integrated whole. I don’t myself so often ask “should Americans have fewer guns?”, as that begs the question of how one might ever get there, which indeed has proven daunting by all accounts. But I do often ask myself “should America be a less martial country in in its ideological orientation?” Note that the parts of the country with the most guns, namely the South, are especially prominent in the military and support for the military. More importantly, if America is going to be the world’s policeman, on some scale or another, that has to be backed by a supportive culture among the citizenry. And that culture is not going to be “Hans Morgenthau’s foreign policy realism,” or “George Kennan’s Letter X,” or even Clausewitz’s treatise On War. Believe it or not, those are too intellectual for the American public. And so it must be backed by…a fairly martial culture amongst the American citizenry. And that probably will mean a fairly high level of gun ownership and a fairly high degree of skepticism about gun control. If you think America can sustain its foreign policy interventionism, or threat of such, without a fairly martial culture at home, by all means make your case. But I am skeptical. I think it is far more likely that if you brought about gun control, and the cultural preconditions for successful gun control, America’s world role would fundamentally change and America’s would no longer play a global policeman role, for better or worse. So who’s in this debate? 1. There are the anti-gun modern Democrats, who want Americans to own many fewer firearms, and who maybe favor slight cuts in defense spending, in order to spend more on redistribution. They don’t come to terms with the reality that their vision for America’s international state requires a fairly martial supporting culture at home, including strong attachments to gun ownership. By the way, citations of the Australian gun control experience are a good indicator of this position and its partial naivete; Australian pacifism can to some extent free ride upon American martial interest. Another “warning sign” is if someone is incredulous that the San Bernardino attack is strengthening America’s attachment to a relatively martial internal culture, rather than leading to gun control. That person is out of touch, even if he or she is right about the substance of the issue. 2. There is the radical, anti-war, anti-military-industrial complex, semi-pacifist, anti-gun Left. Their positions on these issues are quite consistent, though this branch of the Left has disappeared almost entirely. 3. There are the libertarians, who hate martial culture on the international scene, but who wish to allow it or maybe even encourage it (personally, not through the government) at home, through the medium of guns. They are inconsistent, and they should consider being more pro-gun control than is currently the case. But I don’t expect them to budge: they will see this issue only through the lens of liberty, rather than through the lens of culture as well. They end up getting a lot of the gun liberties they wish to keep, but losing the broader cultural battle and somehow are perpetually surprised by this mix of outcomes. I except non-American libertarians from these charges, and indeed many of them, albeit under the table, in fact support gun control as a libertarian and indeed pro-peace position. 4. There are the “right-wing conservatives.” They support a martial ethic, they support America’s active foreign policy abroad, and they are anti-gun control for the most part. And they find their greatest strength in the relatively martial American South. Like the old anti-war Left, their positions are consistent, and their positions are rooted in a cultural understanding of the issue. They see the gun control movement as a war on America’s greatness, America’s martial culture and the material embodiments of said culture. They don’t understand why “the world’s greatest nation” should give up its superpower role, and its supporting internal martial culture, all for the sake of limiting the number of suicides and maybe stopping a few shootings too. To them it’s not close to being worth it. OK, now look at who is winning this debate in terms of actual policy changes. It is the conservatives, for the most part. No matter how much you may disagree with them, they have the most coherent cultural and intellectual position, apart from the old anti-war Left. And in a fight between the right-wing conservatives, and the old anti-war Left, for the hearts and minds of the American people, we already know that, for better or worse, the conservatives usually will win. I find that pro-gun control Democrats, and libertarians, are incapable of understanding the issue in these cultural terms. But if you read something by a “really stupid conservative” on gun control, the more emotive and manipulative the text the better, it is often pretty close to the mark on the actual substance of what is at stake here.

#### Domestic gun violence in the US is intimately linked to broader narratives of war, power, and militarism.

Asher 13 [Levi Asher (New York-based writer, blogger and web developer responsible for Literary Kicks, one of the earliest popular literary websites and now the oldest continuously-running literary website on the Internet), "Philosophy Weekend: What Militarism Does To Our Brains," Literary Kicks, 1/10/2013, http://www.litkicks.com/WhatMilitarismDoesToOurBrains] AZ

It can't be a coincidence that the most [weaponed-up](http://www.litkicks.com/MilitarySpendingIsABigProblem) nation in the world also suffers regular epidemics of gun violence in schools, colleges, movie theaters, shopping malls, parking lots. We're talking about gun control and getting nowhere, and this is because we're not discussing the root cause. Domestic gun violence and militarism are co-dependents. They enable each other. A militaristic sensibility permeates our culture, and this is enthusiastically supported by our federal government. How many people do you know who sincerely believe the United States of America is currently at risk of totalitarian invasion or violent civil war? And how many people do you know who are employed by the US military, or are directly or indirectly supported by it? Militarism permeates our lives, at many levels, in many ways. Militarism permeates our brains. We soak in it. The current debate in the USA over gun control should be about how Americans co-exist in cities and towns and neighborhoods and communities. Gun control is, or should be, a domestic issue. It's really not about war. And yet, the popular arguments against gun control often rely on military scenarios -- mainly, the "Red Dawn" scenario in which honest Romney-voting American citizens are forced to take their Bushmasters and Tec-9s to the streets to fend off swarms of would-be tyrants. It's all too easy to mock these apocalyptic scenarios ... but, unfortunately the hyper-charged ethnic, financial and economic tensions between the USA and various other nations around the world makes these scenarios appear all too normal. Our foreign policy is awash in manic paranoia -- how can we expect our domestic society to not reflect the same manic paranoia, and amplify it? The dimensions of this problem occurred to me when I read a letter written to California Senator and gun control advocate Dianne Feinstein by a retired US Marine named [Joshua Boston](http://wonkette.com/496150/marine-will-not-allow-senatorsome-woman-to-legislate-his-personal-assault-rifles): Senator Dianne Feinstein, I will not register my weapons should this bill be passed, as I do not believe it is the government’s right to know what I own. Nor do I think it prudent to tell you what I own so that it may be taken from me by a group of people who enjoy armed protection yet decry me having the same a crime. You ma’am have overstepped a line that is not your domain. I am a Marine Corps Veteran of 8 years, and I will not have some woman who proclaims the evil of an inanimate object, yet carries one, tell me I may not have one. I am not your subject. I am the man who keeps you free. I am not your servant. I am the person whom you serve. I am not your peasant. I am the flesh and blood of America. I am the man who fought for my country. I am the man who learned. I am an American. You will not tell me that I must register my semi-automatic AR-15 because of the actions of some evil man. I will not be disarmed to suit the fear that has been established by the media and your misinformation campaign against the American public. We, the people, deserve better than you. Respectfully Submitted, Joshua Boston Cpl, United States Marine Corps 2004-2012 Unfortunately, the public dialogue over this letter hasn't resulted in any epiphanies. Wonkette treats Joshua Boston snidely in the article linked above -- but gun control advocates like me must realize that Joshua Boston is not the problem. It's the revolting level of militarization that dominates American society from the top down -- from the federal government down -- that makes letters like this one possible. I'm glad the United States of America is currently talking about gun control, and I'm even glad that Corporal Joshua Boston is speaking up. I disagree with him, but every voice deserves to be heard. We all need to start drawing down, but let's face facts: it's not going to be Corporal Joshua Boston who puts his weapons down first. Not in this paranoid nation. The draw-down is going to have to start from the top, and it needs to start now.

#### Militaristic interests drive the narrative that gun ownership is the only notion of safety in which people can believe. The impact is tens of thousands of lives annually and a politics of fear.

Giroux 15 [Henry A. Giroux (social critic and educator, and the author of many books, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University), "Murder, Incorporated: Guns and the Growing Culture of Violence in the US," Truth-Out, 10/7/2015] AZ

Many Americans are obsessed with violence. They not only own nearly 300 million firearms, but also have a love affair with powerful weaponry such as 9mm Glock semiautomatic pistols and AR-15 assault rifles. Collective anger, frustration, fear and resentment increasingly characterize a society in which people are out of work, young people cannot imagine a decent future, everyday behaviors are criminalized, inequality in wealth and income are soaring and the police are viewed as occupying armies. This is not only a recipe for both random violence and mass shootings; it makes such acts appear routine and commonplace. Fear has become a public relations strategy used not only by the national security state but also by the gun industry. When you live in a country in which you are constantly bombarded by the assumption that the government is the enemy of democracy and you are told that nobody can be trusted, and the discourse of hate, particularly against Black youth, immigrants and gun control advocates, spews out daily from thousands of conservative radio stations and major TV networks, a climate of fear engulfs the country reinforcing the belief that gun ownership is the only notion of safety in which people can believe in order to live as free human beings. Under such circumstances, genuine fears and concerns for safety are undermined. These include the fear of poverty, lack of meaningful employment, the absence of decent health care, poor schools, police violence and the militarization of society, all of which further legitimate and fuel the machinery of insecurity, violence and death. Fear degenerates into willful ignorance while any semblance of rationality is erased, especially around the logic of gun control. As Adam Gopnik observes: Gun control ends gun violence as surely an antibiotics end bacterial infections, as surely as vaccines end childhood measles - not perfectly and in every case, but overwhelmingly and everywhere that it's been taken seriously and tried at length. These lives can be saved. Kids continue to die en masse because one political party won't allow that to change, and the party won't allow it to change because of the irrational and often paranoid fixations that make the massacre of students and children an acceptable cost of fetishizing guns. [(4)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a4) President Obama is right in stating that the violence we see in the United States is "a political choice we make that allows this to happen." While taking aim at the gun lobby, especially the NRA, what Obama fails to address is that extreme violence is systemic in US society, has become the foundation of politics and must be understood within a broader historical, economic, cultural and political context. To be precise, politics has become an extension of violence driven by a culture of fear, cruelty and hatred legitimated by the politicians bought and sold by the gun lobby and other related militaristic interests. Moreover, violence is now treated as a sport, a pleasure-producing form of commerce, a source of major profits for the defense industries and a corrosive influence upon US democracy. And as such it is an expression of a deeper political and ethical corruption in US society. As Rich Broderick insists, US society "embraces a soulless free-market idolatry in which the value of everything, including human beings, is determined by the bottom line" and in doing so this market fundamentalism and its theater of cruelty and greed perpetuate a spectacle of violence fed by an echo chamber "of paranoia, racism, and apocalyptic fantasies rampant in the gun culture." [(5)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a5) The lesson here is that the culture of violence cannot be abstracted from the business of violence. Murdering children in schools, the streets, in jails, detention centers and other places increasingly deemed unsafe has become something of a national pastime. One wonders how many innocent children have to die in the United States before it becomes clear that the revenue made by the $13.5 billion gun industry, with a $1.5 billion profit, are fueling a national bloodbath by using lobbyists to pay off politicians, wage a mammoth propaganda campaign and induct young children into the culture of violence. [(6)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a6) What is clear is that as more guns are on the streets and in the hands of people a savage killing machine is unleashed on those who are largely poor, Black and vulnerable. The widespread availability of guns is the reason for the shooting and killing of children and adults in Chicago, Boston, Ferguson, New York City and in other major cities. The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence reports that "in 2010, guns took the lives of 31,076 Americans in homicides, suicides and unintentional shootings. This is the equivalent of more than 85 deaths each day and more than three deaths each hour. [In addition], 73,505 Americans were treated in hospital emergency departments for non-fatal gunshot wounds in 2010." [(7)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a7) And the toll of gun violence on young people is truly heartbreaking with almost 30,000 young people killed in a 10-year period, which amounts "to nearly 3,000 kids shot to death in a typical year."[(8)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a8) According to a Carnegie-Knight News21 program investigation, For every US soldier killed in Afghanistan during 11 years of war, at least 13 children were shot and killed in the United States. More than 450 kids didn't make it to kindergarten. Another 2,700 or more were killed by a firearm before they could sit behind the wheel of a car. Every day, on average, seven children were shot dead. A News21 investigation of child and youth deaths in the United States between 2002 and 2012 found that at least 28,000 children and teens 19-years-old and younger were killed with guns. Teenagers between the ages of 15 and 19 made up over two-thirds of all youth gun deaths in the United States. [(9)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a9) Even worse, the firearms industry is pouring millions into recruiting and educational campaigns designed to both expose children to guns at an early age and to recruit them as lifelong gun enthusiasts. Reporting on such efforts for The New York Times, Mike McIntire writes: The industry's strategies include giving firearms, ammunition and cash to youth groups; weakening state restrictions on hunting by young children; marketing an affordable military-style rifle for "junior shooters" and sponsoring semiautomatic-handgun competitions for youths; and developing a target-shooting video game that promotes brand-name weapons, with links to the Web sites of their makers.... Newer initiatives by other organizations go further, seeking to introduce children to high-powered rifles and handguns while invoking the same rationale of those older, more traditional programs: that firearms can teach "life skills" like responsibility, ethics and citizenship. [(10)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a10) As the United States moves from a welfare state to a warfare state, state violence becomes normalized. The United States' moral compass and its highest democratic ideals have begun to wither, and the institutions that were once designed to help people now serve to largely suppress them. Gun laws, social responsibility and a government responsive to its people matter. We must end the dominance of gun lobbyists, the reign of money-controlled politics, the proliferation of high levels of violence in popular culture and the ongoing militarization of US society. At the same time, it is crucial, as many in the movement for Black lives have stated, that we refuse to endorse the kind of gun control that criminalizes young people of color. Gun violence in the United States is inextricably tied to economic violence as when hedge fund managers invest heavily in companies that make high-powered automatic rifles, 44-40 Colt revolvers, laser scopes for semiautomatic handguns and expanded magazine clips. [(11)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a11) The same mentality that trades in profits at the expense of human life gives the United States the shameful title of being the world's largest arms exporter. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Washington sold 31% of all global imports during the 2010-2014 period."[(12)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a12) This epidemic of violence connects the spreading of violence abroad with the violence waged at home. It also points to the violence reproduced by politicians who would rather support the military-industrial-gun complex and arms industries than address the most basic needs and social problems faced by Americans.

#### Security and fear-driven politics create the enabling conditions for violence.

Vivienne Jabri 6, Director of the Centre for International Relations and Senior Lecturer at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, War, “Security and the Liberal State,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2006), p. 47-55,

LATE MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS are often conceived in terms of the sociopolitical and economic manifestations of change emergent from a globalized arena. What is less apparent is how late modernity as a distinct era has impacted upon our conceptions of the social sphere, our lived experience, and our reflections upon the discourses and institutions that form the taken-for-granted backdrop of the known and the knowable. The paradigmatic certainties of modernity – the state, citizenship, democratic space, humanity’s infinite capacity for progress, the defeat of dogma and the culmination of modernity’s apotheosis in the free-wheeling market place – have in the late modern era come face to face with uncertainty, unpredictability and the gradual erosion of the modern belief that we could indeed simply move on, assisted by science and technology, towards a condition where instrumental rationality would become the linchpin of government and human interaction irrespective of difference. Progress came to be associated with peace, and both were constitutively linked to the universal, the global, the human, and therefore the cosmopolitan. What shatters such illusions is the recollection of the 20th century as the ‘age of extremes’ (Hobsbawm, 1995), and the 21st as the age of the ever-present condition of war. While we might prefer a forgetting of things past, a therapeutic anamnesis that manages to reconfigure history, it is perhaps the continuities with the past that act as antidote to such righteous comforts.

How, then, do we begin to conceptualize war in conditions where distinctions disappear, where war is conceived, or indeed articulated in political discourse, in terms of peace and security, so that the political is somehow banished in the name of governmentalizing practices whose purview knows no bounds, whose remit is precisely the banishment of limits, of boundaries and distinctions. Boundaries, however, do not disappear. Rather, they become manifest in every instance of violence, every instance of control, every instance of practices targeted against a constructed other, the enemy within and without, the all-pervasive presence, the defences against which come to form the legitimizing tool of war.

Any scholarly take on the present juncture of history, any analysis of the dynamics of the present, must somehow render the narrative in measured tones, taking all factors into account, lest the narrator is accused of exaggeration at best and particular political affiliations at worst. When the late modern condition of the West, of the European arena, is one of camps, one of the detention of groups of people irrespective of their individual needs as migrants, one of the incarceration without due process of suspects, one of overwhelming police powers to stop, search and detain, one of indefinite detention in locations beyond law, one of invasion and occupation, then language itself is challenged in its efforts to contain the description of what is. The critical scholarly take on the present is then precisely to reveal the conditions of possibility in relation to how we got here, to unravel the enabling dynamics that led to the disappearance of distinctions between war and criminality, war and peace, war and security. When such distinctions disappear, impunity is the result, accountability shifts beyond sight, and violence comes to form the linchpin of control. We can reveal the operations of violence, but far more critical is the revelation of power and how power operates in the present. As the article argues, such an exploration raises fundamental questions relating to the relationship of power and violence, and their mutual interconnection in the complex interstices of disrupted time and space locations. Power and violence are hence separable analytical categories, separable practices; they are at the same time connected in ways that work on populations and on bodies – with violence often targeted against the latter so that the former are reigned in, governed. Where Michel Foucault sought, in his later writings, to distinguish between power and violence, to reveal the subtle workings of power, now, in the present, this article will venture, perhaps the distinction is no longer viable when we witness the indistinctions I highlight above.

The article provides an analysis of the place of war in late modern politics. In particular, it concentrates on the implications of war for our conceptions of the liberty–security problematique in the context of the modern liberal state. The first section of the article argues the case for the figure of war as analyser of the present. The second section of the article reveals the conditions of possibility for a distinctly late modern mode of war and its imbrications in politics. The final section of the article concentrates on the political implications of the primacy of war in late modernity, and in particular on possibilities of dissent and articulations of political agency. The aim throughout is to provide the theoretical and conceptual tools that might begin to meet the challenges of the present and to open an agenda of research that concentrates on the politics of the present, the capacities or otherwise of contestation and accountability, and the institutional locations wherein such political agency might emerge.

The Figure of War and the Spectre of Security

The so-called war against terrorism is constructed as a global war, transcending space and seemingly defiant of international conventions. It is distinguished from previous global wars, including the first and the second world wars, in that the latter two have, in historiography, always been analysed as interstate confrontations, albeit ones that at certain times and in particular locations peripherally involved non-state militias. Such distinctions from the old, of course, will be subject to future historical narratives on the present confrontation and its various parameters. What is of interest in the present discussion is the distinctly global aspect of this war, for it is the globality1 of the war against terrorism that renders it particularly relevant and pertinent to investigations that are primarily interested in the relationship between war and politics, war and the political processes defining the modern state. The initial premise of the present article is that war, rather than being confined to its own time and space, permeates the normality of the political process, has, in other words, a defining influence on elements considered to be constitutive of liberal democratic politics, including executive answerability, legislative scrutiny, a public sphere of discourse and interaction, equal citizenship under the law and, to follow liberal thinkers such as Habermas, political legitimacy based on free and equal communicative practices underpinning social solidarity (Habermas, 1997). War disrupts these elements and is a time of crisis and emergency. A war that has a permanence to it clearly normalizes the exceptional, inscribing emergency into the daily routines of social and political life. While the elements of war – conflict, social fragmentation, exclusion – may run silently through the assemblages of control in liberal society (Deleuze, 1986), nevertheless the persistent iteration of war into politics brings these practices to the fore, and with them a call for a rethinking of war’s relationship to politics.

The distinctly global spatiality of this war suggests particular challenges that have direct impact on the liberal state, its obligations towards its citizenry, and the extent to which it is implicated in undermining its own political institutions. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the practices involved in this global war are in any way anathema to the liberal state. The analysis provided here would argue that while it is crucial to acknowledge the transformative impact of the war against terrorism, it is equally as important to appreciate the continuities in social and political life that are the enabling conditions of this global war, forming its conditions of possibility. These enabling conditions are not just present or apparent at global level, but incorporate local practices that are deep-rooted and institutionalized. The mutually reinforcing relationship between global and local conditions renders this particular war distinctly all-pervasive, and potentially, in terms of implications, far more threatening to the spaces available for political contestation and dissent.

Contemporary global politics is dominated by what might be called a ‘matrix of war’2 constituted by a series of transnational practices that variously target states, communities and individuals. These practices involve states as agents, bureaucracies of states and supranational organizations, quasi-official and private organizations recruited in the service of a global machine that is highly militarized and hence led by the United States, but that nevertheless incorporates within its workings various alliances that are always in flux. The crucial element in understanding the matrix of war is the notion of ‘practice’, for this captures the idea that any practice is not just situated in a system of enablements and constraints, but is itself constitutive of structural continuities, both discursive and institutional. As Paul Veyne (1997: 157) writes in relation to Foucault’s use of the term, ‘practice is not an agency (like the Freudian id) or a prime mover (like the relation of production), and moreover for Foucault, there is no agency nor any prime mover’. It is in this recursive sense that practices (of violence, exclusion, intimidation, control and so on) become structurated in the routines of institutions as well as lived experience (Jabri, 1996). To label the contemporary global war as a ‘war against terrorism’ confers upon these practices a certain legitimacy, suggesting that they are geared towards the elimination of a direct threat. While the threat of violence perpetrated by clandestine networks against civilians is all too real and requires state responses, many of these responses appear to assume a wide remit of operations – so wide that anyone interested in the liberties associated with the democratic state, or indeed the rights of individuals and communities, is called upon to unravel the implications of such practices.

When security becomes the overwhelming imperative of the democratic state, its legitimization is achieved both through a discourse of ‘balance’ between security and liberty and in terms of the ‘protection’ of liberty.3 The implications of the juxtaposition of security and liberty may be investigated either in terms of a discourse of ‘securitization’ (the power of speech acts to construct a threat juxtaposed with the power of professionals precisely to so construct)4 or, as argued in this article, in terms of a discourse of war. The grammars involved are closely related, and yet that of the latter is, paradoxically, the critical grammar, the grammar that highlights the workings of power and their imbrications with violence. What is missing from the securitization literature is an analytic of war, and it is this analytic that I want to foreground in this article.

The practices that I highlight above seem at first hand to constitute different response mechanisms in the face of what is deemed to be an emergency situation in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. The invasion and occupation of Iraq, the incarceration without due process of prisoners in camps from Afghanistan to Guantánamo and other places as yet unidentified, the use of torture against detainees, extra-judicial assassination, the detention and deportation – again without due process – of foreign nationals deemed a threat, increasing restrictions on refugees, their confinement in camps and detention centres, the construction of the movement of peoples in security terms, and restrictions on civil liberties through domestic legislation in the UK, the USA and other European states are all represented in political discourse as necessary security measures geared towards the protection of society. All are at the same time institutional measures targeted against a particular other as enemy and source of danger.

It could be argued that the above practices remain unrelated and must hence be subject to different modes of analysis. To begin with, these practices involve different agents and are framed around different issues. Afghanistan and Iraq may be described as situations of war, and the incarceration of refugees as encompassing practices of security. However, what links these elements is not so much that they constitute a constructed taxonomy of differentiated practices. Rather, what links them is the element of antagonism directed against distinct and particular others. Such a perspective suggests that the politics of security, including the production of fear and a whole array of exclusionary measures, comes to service practices that constitute war and locates the discourse of war at the heart of politics, not just domestically, but, more crucially in the present context, globally. The implications for the late modern state and the distinctly liberal state are monumental, for a perpetual war on a global scale has implications for political structures and political agency, for our conceptions of citizenship and the role of the state in meeting the claims of its citizens,5 and for the workings of a public sphere that is increasingly global and hence increasingly multicultural.

The matrix of war is centrally constituted around the element of antagonism, having an association with existential threat: the idea that the continued presence of the other constitutes a danger not just to the well-being of society but to its continued existence in the form familiar to its members, hence the relative ease with which European politicians speak of migrants of particular origins as forming a threat to the ‘idea of Europe’ and its Christian origins.6 Herein lies a discourse of cultural and racial exclusion based on a certain fear of the other. While the war against specific clandestine organizations7 involves operations on both sides that may be conceptualized as a classical war of attrition, what I am referring to as the matrix of war is far more complex, for here we have a set of diffuse practices, violence, disciplinarity and control that at one and same time target the other typified in cultural and racial terms and instantiate a wider remit of operations that impact upon society as a whole.

The practices of warfare taking place in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 combine with societal processes, reflected in media representations and in the wider public sphere, where increasingly the source of threat, indeed the source of terror, is perceived as the cultural other, and specifically the other associated variously with Islam, the Middle East and South Asia. There is, then, a particularity to what Agamben (1995, 2004) calls the ‘state of exception’, a state not so much generalized and generalizable, but one that is experienced differently by different sectors of the global population. It is precisely this differential experience of the exception that draws attention to practices as diverse as the formulation of interrogation techniques by military intelligence in the Pentagon, to the recent provisions of counter-terrorism measures in the UK,8 to the legitimizing discourses surrounding the invasion of Iraq. All are practices that draw upon a discourse of legitimization based on prevention and pre-emption. Enemies constructed in the discourses of war are hence always potential, always abstract even when identified, and, in being so, always drawn widely and, in consequence, communally. There is, hence, a ‘profile’ to the state of exception and its experience. Practices that profile particular communities, including the citizens of European states, create particular challenges to the self-understanding of the liberal democratic state and its capacity, in the 21st century, to deal with difference.

While a number of measures undertaken in the name of security, such as proposals for the introduction of identity cards in the UK or increasing surveillance of financial transactions in the USA, might encompass the population as a whole, the politics of exception is marked by racial and cultural signification. Those targeted by exceptional measures are members of particular racial and cultural communities. The assumed threat that underpins the measures highlighted above is one that is now openly associated variously with Islam as an ideology, Islam as a mode of religious identification, Islam as a distinct mode of lifestyle and practice, and Islam as a particular brand associated with particular organizations that espouse some form of a return to an Islamic Caliphate. When practices are informed by a discourse of antagonism, no distinctions are made between these various forms of individual and communal identification. When communal profiling takes place, the distinction between, for example, the choice of a particular lifestyle and the choice of a particular organization disappears, and diversity within the profiled community is sacrificed in the name of some ‘precautionary’ practice that targets all in the name of security.9 The practices and language of antagonism, when racially and culturally inscribed, place the onus of guilt onto the entire community so identified, so that its individual members can no longer simply be citizens of a secular, multicultural state, but are constituted in discourse as particular citizens, subjected to particular and hence exceptional practices. When the Minister of State for the UK Home Office states that members of the Muslim community should expect to be stopped by the police, she is simply expressing the condition of the present, which is that the Muslim community is particularly vulnerable to state scrutiny and invasive measures that do not apply to the rest of the citizenry.10 We know, too, that a distinctly racial profiling is taking place, so that those who are physically profiled are subjected to exceptional measures.

Even as the so-called war against terrorism recognizes no boundaries as limits to its practices – indeed, many of its practices occur at transnational, often indefinable, spaces – what is crucial to understand, however, is that this does not mean that boundaries are no longer constructed or that they do not impinge on the sphere of the political. The paradox of the current context is that while the war against terrorism in all its manifestations assumes a boundless arena, borders and boundaries are at the heart of its operations. The point to stress is that these boundaries and the exclusionist practices that sustain them are not coterminous with those of the state; rather, they could be said to be located and perpetually constructed upon the corporeality of those constructed as enemies, as threats to security. It is indeed the corporeal removal of such subjects that lies at the heart of what are constructed as counter-terrorist measures, typified in practices of direct war, in the use of torture, in extra-judicial incarceration and in judicially sanctioned detention. We might, then, ask if such measures constitute violence or relations of power, where, following Foucault, we assume that the former acts upon bodies with a view to injury, while the latter acts upon the actions of subjects and assumes, as Deleuze (1986: 70–93) suggests, a relation of forces and hence a subject who can act. What I want to argue here is that violence is imbricated in relations of power, is a mode of control, a technology of governmentality. When the population of Iraq is targeted through aerial bombardment, the consequence goes beyond injury and seeks the pacification of the Middle East as a political region.

When legislative and bureaucratic measures are put in place in the name of security, those targeted are categories of population. At the same time, the war against terrorism and the security discourses utilized in its legitimization are conducted and constructed in terms that imply the defence or protection of populations. One option is to limit policing, military and intelligence efforts through the targeting of particular organizations. However, it is the limitless construction of the war against terrorism, its targeting of particular racial and cultural communities, that is the source of the challenge presented to the liberal democratic state. In conditions constructed in terms of emergency, war permeates discourses on politics, so that these come to be subject to the restraints and imperatives of war and practices constituted in terms of the demands of security against an existential threat. The implications for liberal democratic politics and our conceptions of the modern state and its institutions are far-reaching,11 for the liberal democratic polity that considers itself in a state of perpetual war is also a state that is in a permanent state of mobilization, where every aspect of public life is geared towards combat against potential enemies, internal and external.

One of the most significant lessons we learn from Michel Foucault’s writings is that war, or ‘the distant roar of battle’ (Foucault, 1977: 308), is never quite so distant from liberal governmentality. Conceived in Foucaultian terms, war and counter-terrorist measures come to be seen not as discontinuity from liberal government, but as emergent from the enabling conditions that liberal government and the modern state has historically set in place. On reading Foucault’s renditions on the emergence of the disciplinary society, what we see is the continuation of war in society and not, as in Hobbes and elsewhere in the history of thought, the idea that wars happen at the outskirts of society and its civil order. The disciplinary society is not simply an accumulation of institutional and bureaucratic procedures that permeate the everyday and the routine; rather, it has running through its interstices the constitutive elements of war as continuity, including confrontation, struggle and the corporeal removal of those deemed enemies of society. In Society Must Be Defended (Foucault, 2003) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1998), we see reference to the discursive and institutional continuities that structurate war in society. Reference to the ‘distant roar of battle’ suggests confrontation and struggle; it suggests the ever-present construction of threat accrued to the particular other; it suggests the immediacy of threat and the construction of fear of the enemy; and ultimately it calls for the corporeal removal of the enemy as source of threat. The analytic of war also encompasses the techniques of the military and their presence in the social sphere – in particular, the control and regulation of bodies, timed precision and instrumentality that turn a war machine into an active and live killing machine. In the matrix of war, there is hence the level of discourse and the level of institutional practices; both are mutually implicating and mutually enabling. There is also the level of bodies and the level of population. In Foucault’s (1998: 152) terms: ‘the biological and the historical are not consecutive to one another . . . but are bound together in an increasingly complex fashion in accordance with the development of the modern technologies of power that take life as their objective’.

What the above suggests is the idea of war as a continuity in social and political life. The matrix of war suggests both discursive and institutional practices, technologies that target bodies and populations, enacted in a complex array of locations. The critical moment of this form of analysis is to point out that war is not simply an isolated occurrence taking place as some form of interruption to an existing peaceful order. Rather, this peaceful order is imbricated with the elements of war, present as continuities in social and political life, elements that are deeply rooted and enabling of the actuality of war in its traditional battlefield sense. This implies a continuity of sorts between the disciplinary, the carceral and the violent manifestations of government.

#### Maintaining hegemony accelerates paranoid imperial violence – their obsession manufactures threats and conceals the US’ role in enemy construction – the aff makes visible power relationships that enable endless warfare

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[Anne, "Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib," Muse]

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5 Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6 Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8 Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty? A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11 The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution. —C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians” The barbarians have declared war. —President George W. Bush C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism, Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. Where were the enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus? “And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?” By rights, the thawing of the cold war should have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military; any plausible external threat had simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army, bemoaned the enemy deficit: “It’s no use having an army that did nothing but train,” he said. “There’s got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for.” Dick Cheney likewise complained: “The threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain.” Colin Powell agreed: “Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that—the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain.” Before becoming president, George W. Bush likewise fretted over the post–cold war dearth of a visible enemy: “We do not know who the enemy is, but we know they are out there.” It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require “a catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.” 12

#### Teaching fear is the infusion point of militarism–security discourse in academia justifies perpetual war and colonialism–we must destabilize the foundations of interventionism.

Nguyen 14 [Nicole, Department of Cultural Foundations of Education at Syracuse University, January 21, “Education as Warfare?: Mapping Securitised Education Interventions as War on Terror Strategy,” Vol. 1 No. 1, pg. 20-6]

Since September 11, the US has renewed its focus on domestic education as a critical component of protecting national and economic security. This focus includes shifting instruction and curricula toward preparing students for the military and security industry, infusing ideas of security and safety into school culture, militarising school space through the implementation of techniques like zero tolerance policies and surveillance cameras, and teaching students these dominant representations of the brown Other. In this articulation of the role of schools, ﬁghting the war on terror begins at home in our public schools, which conscript students into the war effort by educating them for war and perpetuating fear and anxiety. Such measures are not new in the post-9 / 11 US security state. Jackson reminds us that “educational policies in the United States have been integrally related to social and economic policies, with domestic and foreign interests linked inextricably.” 112 Following Sputnik , “there was a massive infusion of money to enhance the curriculum of high schools, with a greater emphasis on math and the sciences as well as foreign language instruction” in order to globally compete economically and militarily. 113 Means offers that “connections between public education, crisis, and national security are nothing new in the United States. Cold War anxieties and concerns over national security provided inspiration for Dwight Eisenhower’s National Education Defense Act (NDEA) in 1958 . . . ” 114 Three years later the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 promised to bolster language and area studies expertise of American students and faculty and to “increase understanding and mutual cooperation between the people of the United States and the people of other countries” and to “strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations” in order to “assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.” 115 In other words, by sending US educators abroad, Fulbright-Hays operated as both a diplomacy project and an effort in spreading American ideals, values, market economy and epistemologies. David Austell, while supporting this assertion, argues that these education initiatives work more insidiously in relation to the US war agenda: “International education in the United States has its roots ﬁrmly planted in views of homeland security stemming from the Cold War, and its role and effectiveness as a foil to a purely militaristic foreign policy has changed very little in the intervening sixty years.” 116 Further, Webber, in tracing the genealogy of the use of US domestic public education as a means to warehouse and re-socialise immigrants, argues that “the democratic school [in the US] has always been as instrument of the security state. This is by no means a new idea, pace 9 / 11 . . . . Schools have always been a hegemonic tool of the security state as ‘schooling’ by which Ivan Illich understood it to be a process of training people to believe in the legitimacy of the state’s orders.” 117 The late nineteenth-century warehousing of Native Americans in white boarding schools in the United States also served to assimilate populations wholesale to defuse the threat they putatively posed. In present day, such historical efforts an esthetise contemporary educational projects abroad as purely apolitical aid, and provide the humanitarian veneer necessary to continue such efforts. Following this history, recent domestic school reforms rely on fear and insecurity to justify and legitimise reforms that situate schools squarely in line with the war agenda. Former Chancellor of New York City’s Department of Education Joel Klein and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explain in their 2012 U.S. Education Reform and National Security com-missioned report that “far too many U.S. schools are failing to teach students the academic skills . . . they need to succeed” and, as such, “ . . . America’s failure to educate is affecting national security .” 118 The Report speciﬁcally calls for a focus on job training in math and science – human capital development – in order to continue to protect and defend the US homeland and economy. This follows The U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century report (Phase III: Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change, Journeys through the Teacher Pipeline addendum, 2001). 119 This report names education as a “national security imperative” where “[US] education in science, mathematics, and engineering has special relevance for the future of U.S. national security, for America’s ability to lead . . . ” 120 Such discourses around national and economic in/security, risk, and education do much work to continue to authorise and justify particular school reform efforts intended to train and recruit students for war and work in the multi-billion dollar security industry. Following this logic, schools are transformed from a “public good to a security risk.” 121 Such preparation contributes to the warmachine. 122 Since the Cold War, the US has increasingly militarised schools, reﬂective of the larger push of militarisation – the privileging of the military and military logics in everyday day life – in the US. Militarising and securitising education means that schools adopt harsh disciplinary policies, regulate student movement and mobility, and teach students to value and privilege military doctrine. While fear of nuclear warfare dotted US school curriculum and pedagogy during the Cold War, the global war on terrorism has continued to reshape US public education. Indeed, since the Cold War, US cities increasingly militarise, police, and fortify schools and children. 123 In 2008, several greater-DC area counties and their school districts formed the Mid-Atlantic Homeland Security Network of Educators (MHSNE) in order to respond to the region’s critical shortage of skilled homeland security workers by working to create a kindergarten to career pipeline aimed at training young people to work in the homeland security industry in public high schools re-designed to meet security industry needs. The Network does so by partnering homeland security and emergency preparedness professionals with educators to develop curriculum together. Such school-industry partnerships engender a neoliberal militarised and securitised form of education aimed at training future workers to defend and protect the homeland from the brown Other. Based on preliminary ﬁeldwork I conducted atone such high school, students built rockets with representatives from NASA, learned to protect nuclear reactors from a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineer, and discussed important military weaponry – from AR 15s to Desert Eagles to Remotely Operated Weapons Systems (ROWS). A local base commander congratulated students for their participation in the homeland security programme, citing this passage from Heinlein’s military-science novel Starship Troopers delineating the differences between mere civilian and citizen: “The difference lies in the ﬁeld of civic virtue. A citizen accepts personal responsibility for the safety of the body politic, of which he is a member, defending it, if need be, with his life. The civilian does not.” The commander applauded students: “You are taking a very large step from walking down the road as a civilian in the greatest country in the world to a citizen making a difference.” 124 In this way public schools and staff communicate to students certain versions of militarised citizenship, security, and terrorism that both perpetuate fear and representations of the brown Other and call them to action as “citizen[s] making a difference” by learning to defend the “greatest country in the world” with their lives. Perhaps less noticeably, students learned to valorise the military with the JROTC Color Guard opening meetings, military and security industry banners hanging in the hallway, the encouragement of teachers to discuss guns and weaponry, the presence of military ﬁgures in their school, the valuing of hyper-masculinities noted by a knowledge of weapons and military war history, the continual reference to America as the “greatest” and “freest” nation in the country, the perpetual suggestion of “bad guys” “out there” threatening the US, and the framing of military action as the only means to security. US students in these types of schools are not only drafted as foot soldiers in the war on terror, they are also taught to view the world according to these hegemonic imaginative geographies. For example, while watching a ﬁlm on teen violence, students remarked, “Well, that explains it!” when a young brown boy opened a Qur’an to pray. Students articulated what they had learned in class and in everyday life in the US: Islam and brown skin communicated danger and violence. Nationally, the greater DC area’s public schools are not alone in their current efforts to supply the security industry with skilled workers and, historically, such school reforms merely serve as another node on the longer genealogy of US education’s role in supporting military agendas. While these programmes intend to (and do) engage students with hands-on lessons, ﬁeld trips, and guest lecturers as well as make them marketable for the booming US security industry, the inﬂuence of neoliberal and securitised logic is readily apparent. Students, for example, learned about parabolas by pretending to be snipers needing to ﬁnd and hit their target, North Korea. They shadowed workers at the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and secured internships at the National Security Agency (NSA). This type of education excited students through these hands-on opportunities and lessons seemingly readily applicable to everyday life and future job opportunities. The heightened attention toward security that has shaped US school reform projects means that children develop securitized subjectivities as they are prepared for the long war. In other words, young people enrolled in these programmes develop a sense of self deﬁned by heightened fear, anxiety, and uncertainty of an unknown threat. This normalised apprehension and subsequent practices of militarism are justiﬁed in the name of US and personal safety and security. 125 Building US public schools around a militarised interpretation of homeland security relies on the aforementioned scenes of legibility that map terror and threat onto brown bodies. Given this putative threat, students must arm and prepare to enter the homeland security workforce. These priorities shift the purpose of education away from fostering critical thinking for democratic participation to training young people for the war on terror. Corporations partner with public high schools, donating dollars and expertise in order to “ensure a pipeline of diverse talent needed for our future workforce.” 126 Northrop Grumman allocated $20.9 of its $28.2 mil-lion philanthropic donations toward the development of STEM education across the nation, its core philanthropic focus according to its 2011 Corporate Responsibility Report. Northrop Grumman argues that “supporting STEM initiatives is critical for our business and for U.S. competitiveness, so we’ve embraced programs that we think will help build a diverse employee pipeline”. 127 For Northrop Grumman, the development of and investment in STEM K-16 education programmes ensure the health and life of the business and the security of the homeland. Such school reform projects follow calls from the US state to improve STEM education. The U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century outlines, for instance that “to ensure the vitality of all its core institutions, the United States must make it a priority of national policy to improve the quality of primary and secondary education, particularly in mathematics and the sciences. Moreover, in an era when private research and development efforts far outstrip those of government, the United States must create more advanced and effective forms of public / private partnerships to promote public beneﬁt from scientiﬁc-technological innovation.” 128 In this way, homeland security programmes and schools typify how securitised neoliberal logic, fuelled by corporate dollars, is infused into school reform, curriculum, and everyday (normalised) neoliberal and securitised school subjectivities. While the Obama administration ended the war in Iraq, promised troop reduction in Afghanistan, and increased its use of drones, much of my time in the homeland security high school revolved around talk of the growing “pipeline initiative” to continue to grow the programme throughout the state and to extend it through all grade levels in order to meet the nation’s growing security needs. In a meeting with school administrators and representatives of the defence corporations, students from local elementary, middle, and high schools as well as current college students presented how the homeland security programme was useful to them, how the corporations might get more young people interested in working in the industry, and what they found exciting in the programme. The school also holds several recruiting events at the elementary schools, simulated cyber-security battle labs, and homeland security fairs to spur local interest. The mushrooming number of regional and national initiatives aimed at further institutionalising homeland security education in US public schools indicates that this form of securitised education has drastically shifted public schooling in the United States even as the war on terror strategy continues to morph under the Obama administration. The continued portrayed need to secure US borders, cyber space, and the homeland authorised this emphasis on homeland security in US public schools. The fears of the dangerous brown Other and of ungoverned school space dramatically altered the architecture of school discipline at Wellington. These changes highlight how this fear and anxiety can be used to mobilise school reforms intending to fortify US public schools and control brown bodies, and borrow from the scripts used to make sense of US interventions in Iraq. Further, the US state portrays a lack of skilled workers as a national security risk, demanding US public schools reform their schools in order to meet the needs of the security industry. As the reverberations of September 11 and the long war continue to structure US public schools, children educated in these schools learn to interpret the world and their place in it through a lens of homeland security and war. In this way, US public schools become yet another site of war on terror strategy. Taken together, these militarised and securitised US public school reforms instituting homeland security studies programmes, tactical US engagements with madrassas, and the emphasis on girls’ education as empowerment highlight the critical role education plays in supporting and furthering war on terror strategy both materially and discursively. Though disparately located, these sites of education are connected by larger social processes invested in the reproduction of difference and inequality, the advancement of capitalist imperialism, and the furthering of US warfare through the circulation of speciﬁc geographic imaginaries of ‘here’ and ‘there’ and ‘us’ and ‘them.’ DISRUPTIONS Through this analysis, we can see how the US constructs and mobilises convenient scripts and imaginative geographies in order to perpetuate hegemony, justify war, and humanise US military intervention while refuelling a sense of imminent danger and fear across the US homeland. We see this in looking speciﬁcally at three distinct sites of education: Framed by Orientalist understandings of brown women as oppressed by brown men, girls’ education initiatives mobilised by the United States work to humanise and justify war under the guise of advancing human rights and feminism. The representation of madrassas as incubators of terrorism authorises the implementation of US-style education programmes and military intervention. Lastly, US public schools organise their schools to abate the threat posed by brown bodies and the spaces they occupy, and to prepare young people to defend the homeland either militarily or through their work in the security industry. Gregory proposes that “for us to cease turning on the treadmill of the colonial present – it will be necessary to explore other spatializations and other topologies, and to turn our imaginative geographies into geographical imaginations that can enlarge and enhance our sense of the world and enable us to situate ourselves within it with care, concern, and humility.” 129 As the US continues to invent and invest in new forms of education to service the war industry, the challenge posed by critical geopolitics is to work to disrupt the geographies that enable these education and military practices. Throughout this work, we have seen how the ‘architecture of enmity’ animated through various Orientalist and patriarchal discourses shapes and justiﬁes US engagements with education to buttress war on terror efforts and to revivify the US’s standing as the world’s moral compass. Informed by a longer colonial genealogy long before September 11 noted by various inﬂection points during the Cold War, this analysis recognises that these operative hegemonic discourses and ideologies appear and reappear across time and space – their traces always and everywhere superimposed – and enable seemingly unconnected practices to work together to maintain and extend patriarchal and colonial dominance. 130 Plotting the ideological and discursive routes that link various sites that make up the topography of imperial, securitised education can help us map and, in turn, challenge the contours of US interventions with education. A re-scripting of the Middle East as well as of the United States’ role in putatively promoting global security while risking the human security of millions of brown bodies across the globe acts as one step toward dismantling the prevailing geopolitical imagination(s) that operates on and through brown bodies in dangerous and violent ways. By exposing the patriarchal and imperial investments of dominant geopolitical scripts, this analysis has worked to provide some entry points for reframing the conversation around in/security and education in ways that might de-centre and destabilise US hegemonic imaginings and, in turn, privilege Other ways of knowing.

#### The pervasiveness of our gun-permissive culture forces us to debate vanilla gun control measures or worse, draconian punishment and policing when faced with the prospect of violence.

Amitai Etzioni and Steven Hellend 91 [Amitai Etzioni and Steven Hellend, is an Israeli-American sociologist, best known for his work on socioeconomics and communitarianism. Etzioni is currently the Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University. “The Case for Domestic Disarmament” The Communitarian Network, 11-18-1991, Accessible Online at http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/pop\_disarm.html] SW 1-16-2016

Recent homicides in Washington, D.C., gang warfare in Los Angeles, and unusually senseless killings in New York City have again focused media attention on the high level of crime in the United States. The public frustration with the inability of authorities to provide elementary protection, even for infants who must sleep on floors in some parts, seeking to dodge the bullets of drug dealers is growing to such an extent that the public is increasingly receptive to extreme measures. There seems to be a significant increase in the number of people who are arming themselves, who favor hanging drug dealers randomly or shooting them on sight (as has been urged by the police chief of Los Angeles), even suspending the Constitution until the war on drugs is won.

Meanwhile, the experts continue debating each other over what measures might be taken that will be both effective and well within the constitutional framework. Some favor more expenditures on drug treatment programs; others favor more cops on the beat, longer jail sentences, no parole, and greater certitude of punishment. Still others insist on `reclaiming the streets' by re-institutionalizing many of the homeless, and so on. Each of these steps has its problems and a sizeable price tag, and even if implemented is unlikely to reduce crime significantly in the immediate future.

There is, however, one measure sure to gain monumental benefits in the short run. It is politically nearly impossible to take, otherwise low-cost and very effective. It is not discussed in politically polite company, nor is it found in the lists of measures typically debated by experts. The closest most liberal groups come to it is to suggest gun registration. Cautious not to enrage the powerful National Rifle Association or to put elected officials in an untenable position, the call is out for gun purchases to be registered, to institute waiting periods of few days before allowing such purchases, and perhaps even to mandate checks of the police record of potential purchasers. Recently, some have even dared to suggest prohibiting to sale of assault rifles.

These vanilla-pale measures have not been enacted because the opposition, spearheaded by the NRA, is following a typical hard-line strategy of opposing any and all limitations on arms, however reasonable, measured, or mild. They oppose limitations on the sale of machine guns, armor-piercing bullets (used to penetrate the bullet-proof vests an increasing number of police are wearing, as are various heads of state and the Pope), not to mention gun registration. In short, pulling punches in an attempt not to provoke the opposition is useless. Nor have most politicos found that they can endorse even the most innocuous measures.

On the other hand, the electorate, which is mainly in favor of gun control, cannot be truly rallied to support these vanilla measures. The public correctly senses that even if these steps were fully implemented, they would at best trim the problem rather than make significant inroads into the world of violent crime. The thousands killed each year, mainly children, because of the accidental discharge of guns, will not be saved if guns are first registered. The thousands killed because of impulsive use of guns by family members against each other, former girl or boyfriends, and former employers will not live if the gun purchases are delayed seven, thirty, or even ninety days. And criminals, given the ease with which one can obtain false documents in the country, will continue to buy about as many guns as they did before.

#### Thus I advocate that private ownership of handguns be banned in the United States.

Amitai Etzioni and Steven Hellend 91 [Amitai Etzioni and Steven Hellend, is an Israeli-American sociologist, best known for his work on socioeconomics and communitarianism. Etzioni is currently the Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University. “The Case for Domestic Disarmament” The Communitarian Network, 11-18-1991, Accessible Online at http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/pop\_disarm.html] SW 1-16-2016

What is needed is domestic disarmament. This is the policy of practically all other Western democracies, from Canada to Britain to Germany, from France to Scandinavia. Domestic disarmament entails the removal of arms from private hands and, ultimately, from much of the police force. Once guns are hard to obtain and the very possession and sale of them are offenses, the level of violent crime will fall significantly.

Americans who have grown up in a gun-permissive culture have a hard time recognizing the effectiveness of domestic disarmament. Persons who seek to commit an armed crime in other countries, and thus try to purchase a gun on the sly, are often apprehended in committing this offense long before they can hurt anyone. True, some hardened criminals will use knifes or obtain guns anyhow, but statistically, the unavailability of guns makes violent crime simply yes, it is simply much less likely . . . .

Moreover, unlike drug rehabilitation, prison construction, and the training of more cops, domestic disarmament can be rapidly implemented. While the initial cost may be high especially if one is to buy out all existing arms manufacturers and arms now in private hands at some publicly set price, rather than confiscate them this is a one-time cost. In contrast, expanding prisons and police forces involves recurring costs that in accumulation are much higher. Politically, the National Rifle Association and its allies could not be more opposed to domestic disarmament than they are to the vanilla measures favored by cautious politicians and experts. More importantly, the public at large could truly rally for a program that would have a major effect on violent crime. This public support would lend the program the kind of strong support at the ballot box which is lacking for gun "control" measures.

One might take into account that the gun lobby has three subconstituencies. Gun collectors may be accommodated by provisions allowing them to keep their collection, but rendering them inoperative (cement in the barrel is my favorite technique). Hunters might be allowed (if one feels this "sport" must be tolerated) to use long guns that cannot be concealed, without sights or powerful bullets, making the event much more "sporting." Finally, super-patriots, who still believe they need their right to bear arms to protect us from the Commies, might be deputized and invited to participate in the National Guard, as long as the weapons with which they are trained are kept in state controlled armories. All this is acceptable, as long as all other guns and bullets are removed from private hands.

#### The plan counters the logic of individual "arms races,"—reducing homicide and societal violence.

McMahan 12 [Jeff McMahan (professor of philosophy at Rutgers University), "Why Gun ‘Control’ Is Not Enough," New York Times, 12/19/2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/why-gun-control-is-not-enough/?\_r=0] AZ

The logic is inexorable: as more private individuals acquire guns, the power of the police declines, personal security becomes more a matter of self-help, and the unarmed have an increasing incentive to get guns, until everyone is armed. When most citizens then have the ability to kill anyone in their vicinity in an instant, everyone is less secure than they would be if no one had guns other than the members of a democratically accountable police force. The logic of private gun possession is thus similar to that of the nuclear arms race. When only one state gets nuclear weapons, it enhances its own security but reduces that of others, which have become more vulnerable. The other states then have an incentive to get nuclear weapons to try to restore their security. As more states get them, the incentives for others increase. If eventually all get them, the potential for catastrophe — whether through irrationality, misperception, or accident — is great. Each state’s security is then much lower than it would be if none had nuclear weapons. Gun advocates and criminals are allies in demanding that guns remain in private hands. They differ in how they want them distributed. Criminals want guns for themselves but not for their potential victims. Others want them for themselves but not for criminals. But while gun control can do a little to restrict access to guns by potential criminals, it can’t do much when guns are to be found in every other household. Either criminals and non-criminals will have them or neither will. Gun advocates prefer for both rather than neither to have them. But, as with nuclear weapons, we would all be safer if no one had guns — or, rather, no one other than trained and legally constrained police officers. Domestic defense would then be conducted the way we conduct national defense. We no longer accept, as the authors of the now obsolete Second Amendment did, that “a well-regulated militia” is “necessary to the security of a free state.” Rather than leaving national defense to citizens’ militias, we now, for a variety of compelling reasons, cede the right of national defense to certain state-authorized professional institutions: the Army, Navy, and so on. We rightly trust these forces to protect us from external threats and not to become instruments of domestic repression. We could have the same trust in a police force designed to protect us from domestic threats. A prohibition of private ownership would not mean that no one could shoot guns. Guns for target shooting could be rented under security arrangements at the range. And there’s perhaps scope for debate about private possession of single chamber shotguns for hunting. Gun advocates will object that a prohibition of private gun ownership is an impossibility in the United States. But this is not an objection they can press in good faith, for the only reason that a legal prohibition could be impossible in a democratic state is that a majority oppose it. If gun advocates ceased to oppose it, a prohibition would be possible. They will next argue that even if there were a legal prohibition, it could not be enforced with anything approaching complete effectiveness. This is true. As long as some people somewhere have guns, some people here can get them. Similarly, the legal prohibition of murder cannot eliminate murder. But the prohibition of murder is more effective than a policy of “murder control” would be. Guns are not like alcohol and drugs, both of which we have tried unsuccessfully to prohibit. Many people have an intense desire for alcohol or drugs that is independent of what other people may do. But the need for a gun for self-defense depends on whether other people have them and how effective the protection and deterrence provided by the state are. Thus, in other Western countries in which there are fewer guns, there are correspondingly fewer instances in which people need guns for effective self-defense.

#### Our opposition to gun violence alters the value system of American culture and endorses a nonviolent approach to politics that counters the dominant narrative of militarism.

May 13 [Todd May (political philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University), "Is American Nonviolence Possible?," New York Times, 4/21/2013] AZ

(9) What would the alternative, nonviolence, look like? And what does it require of us? We must understand first that nonviolence is not passivity. It is instead creative activity. That activity takes place within particular limits. To put the point a bit simply, those limits are the recognition of others as fellow human beings, even when they are our adversaries. That recognition does not require that we acquiesce to the demands of others when we disagree. Rather, it requires that our action, even when it coerces the other (as boycotts, strikes, sit-ins and human blockades often do), does not aim to destroy that other in his or her humanity. It requires that we recognize others as fellow human beings, even when they are on the other side of the barricades. (10) This recognition limits what we can do, but at the same time it forces us to be inventive. No longer is it a matter of bringing superior firepower to bear. Now we must think more rigorously about how to respond, how to make our voices heard and our aims prevail. In a way it is like writing a Shakespearean sonnet, where the 14-line structure and iambic pentameter require thoughtful and creative work rather than immediate and overwhelming response. (11) To recognize someone’s humanity is, in perhaps the most important way, to recognize him or her as an equal. Each of us, nonviolence teaches, carries our humanity within us. That humanity cannot always be appealed to. In some cases, as with the tragedy at Sandy Hook, it can even become nearly irrelevant. However, in all but the most extreme cases nonviolence summons us to recognize that humanity even when it cannot serve as the basis for negotiation or resolution. It demands that we who act do so with a firm gaze upon the face of the other. It demands the acknowledgment that we are all fragile beings, nexuses of hope and fear, children of some mother and perhaps parents to others: that is, no more and no less than fellow human beings in a world fraught with imponderables. (12) Can we do this? Are we capable at this moment of taking on the mantle of nonviolence? (13) The lessons are already there in our history. The civil rights movement is perhaps the most shining example of nonviolence in our human legacy. After 9/11, after Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, and now, in the immediate on-the-ground responses to the Boston bombing, Americans pulled together with those they did not know in order to restore the web of our common existence. We are indeed violent, but we have shown flashes of nonviolence, that is to say moments where our competitive individualism, our insecurity, our desire for the highest return on our investment of time and money, has been trumped by the vividness of the likeness of others. Granted, these are only moments. They have not lasted. But they teach us that when it comes to nonviolent relations with others, we are not entirely bereft. (14) What would it require for these lessons to be become sedimented in our collective soul? There is much work to be done. We must begin to see our fellow human beings as precisely that: fellows. They need not be friends, but they must be counted as worthy of our respect, bearers of dignity in their own right. Those who struggle must no longer be seen as failures, but more often as unlucky, and perhaps worthy of our extending a hand. Those who come to our shores, whatever our policy toward them, must be seen as human beings seeking to stitch together a decent life rather than as mere parasites upon our riches. Those who are unhealthy must be seen as more than drains upon our taxes but instead as peers that, but for good fortune, might have been us. (15) None of this requires that we allow others to abdicate responsibility for their lives. Nor does it require that we refuse, when no other means are available, to defend ourselves with force. Instead it calls upon us to recognize that we, too, have a responsibility to more than our own security and contentment. It commands us to look to ourselves and at others before we start casting stones. (16) Would this end all senseless killing? No, it would not. Would it substitute for the limits on guns that are so urgently needed? Of course not. While the recently rejected limits on guns, however timid, might have provided a first public step toward the recognition of the requirements of our situation, our task would remain: to create a culture where violence is seen not as the first option but as the last, one that would allow us to gaze upon the breadth of space that lies between an unjust act and a violent response.

### Framing

#### Technical debates about national security only insulate and entrench the national security apparatus. Rigorous democratic scrutiny is key.

Aziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law at Cornell University Law School, “Who Decides on Security?,” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 5, p. 1489-90,

If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of "expertise."320 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modem security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate.321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.

But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information generally is treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm—the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed,322 its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more Hobbesian—marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact—than policymakers admit.

If the objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars—emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness—is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants—danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently—it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that it remains unclear which popular base exists in society to raise these questions. Unless such a base fully emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

#### Preventing our slide into a deeply violent and antidemocratic state requires rethinking the role of educators as engaged citizens and public intellectuals. The judge has an ethical obligation to resist the militarization of reason.

Giroux 13 [Henry A. Giroux, Department of English and Cultural Studies, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Neoliberalism’s War Against Teachers in Dark Times. Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 13(6) 458– 468. © 2013 SAGE Publications Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1532708613503769 csc.sagepub.com] SW 12/14/15

The tragic deaths of 26 people shot and killed at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, CT, included 20 young children and 6 educators. All of the children were shot multiple times. Many more children might have been killed or injured had it not been for the brave and decisive actions of the teachers in the school. The mainstream media was quick to call them heroes, and there is little doubt that what they did under horrific circumstances reveals not only how important educators are in shielding children from immanent threat but also how demanding their roles have become in preparing them to negotiate a world that is becoming more precarious, more dangerous—and infinitely more divisive. In this case, teachers not only saved the lives of many young people, but they also gave their lives in doing so. Teachers are one of the most important resources a nation has for providing the skills, values, and knowledge that prepare young people for productive citizenship—but more than this, to give sanctuary to their dreams and aspirations for a future of hope, dignity, and justice. It is indeed ironic, in the unfolding nightmare in Newtown, that only in the midst of such a shocking tragedy are teachers celebrated in ways that justly acknowledge—albeit briefly and inadequately—the vital role they play every day in both protecting and educating our children. What is repressed in these jarring historical moments is that teachers have been under vicious and sustained attack by right-wing conservatives, religious fundamentalists, and centrist democrats since the beginning of the 1980s. Depicted as the new “welfare queens,” their labor and their care has been instrumentalized and infantilized (Bessie, 2011); they have been fired en masse under calls for austerity; they have seen roll backs in their pensions, and have been derided because they teach in so-called “government schools.” Public school teachers too readily and far too pervasively have been relegated to zones of humiliation and denigration.1 The importance of what teachers actually do, the crucial and highly differentiated nature of the work they perform, and their value as guardians, role models and trustees only appears in the midst of such a tragic event. If the United States is to prevent its slide into a deeply violent and antidemocratic state, it will, among other things, be required fundamentally to rethink not merely the relationship between education and democracy but also the very nature of teaching, the role of teachers as engaged citizens and public intellectuals, and the relationship between teaching and social responsibility. This essay makes one small contribution to that effort.

The War Against Public School Teachers

Right-wing fundamentalists and corporate ideologues are not just waging a war against the rights of unions, workers, students, women, the disabled, low income groups, and poor minorities but also against those public spheres that provide a vocabulary for connecting values, desires, identities, social relations, and institutions to the discourse of social responsibility, ethics, and democracy, if not thinking itself. Neoliberalism or unbridled free-market fundamentalism employs modes of governance, discipline, and regulation that are totalizing in their insistence that all aspects of social life be determined, shaped, and weighted through market-driven measures (Giroux, 2008; Harvey, 2005; Steger & Roy, 2010). Neoliberalism is not merely an economic doctrine that prioritizes buying and selling, makes the supermarket and mall the temples of public life, and defines the obligations of citizenship in strictly consumerist terms. It is also a mode of pedagogy and set of social arrangements that uses education to win consent, produce consumer-based notions of agency, and militarize reason in the service of war, profits, power, and violence while simultaneously instrumentalizing all forms of knowledge.

The increasing militarization of reason and growing expansion of forms of militarized discipline are most visible in policies currently promoted by wealthy conservative foundations such as the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute along with the high profile presence and advocacy of corporate reform spokespersons such as Joel Klein and Michelle Rhee and billionaire financers such as Michael Milken (Ravitch, 2012; Saltman, 2010). As Ken Saltman, Diane Ravitch, Alex Means, and others have pointed out, wealthy billionaires such as Bill Gates are financing educational reforms that promote privatization, deprofessionalization, online classes, and high-stakes testing, while at the same time impugning the character and autonomy of teachers and the unions that support them (see Giroux, 2012; Kovacs, 2010; Means, 2013; Ravitch, 2011; Saltman, 2012). Consequently, public school teachers have become the new class of government dependent moochers and the disparaged culture of Wall Street has emerged as the only model or resource from which to develop theories of educational leadership and reform.2 The same people who gave us the economic recession of 2008, lost billions in corrupt trading practices, and sold fraudulent mortgages to millions of homeowners have ironically become sources of wisdom and insight regarding how young people should be educated.

Attesting to the hard to miss fact that political culture has become an adjunct of the culture of finance, politicians at the state and federal levels, irrespective of their political affiliation, advocate reforms that amount to selling off or giving away public schools to the apostles of casino capitalism. 3 More importantly, the hysterical fury now being waged by the new educational reformists against public education exhibits no interest in modes of education that invest in an “educated public for the culture of the present and future” (Marruchi, 2006, p. 176). On the contrary, their relevance and power can be measured by the speed with which any notion of civic responsibilities is evaded.

What these individuals and institutions all share is an utter disregard for public values, critical thinking, and any notion of education as a moral and political practice (Robinson, 2012). The wealthy hedge fund managers, think-tank operatives, and increasingly corrupt corporate CEOs are panicked by the possibility that teachers and public schools might provide the conditions for the cultivation of an informed and critical citizenry capable of actively and critically participating in the governance of a democratic society. In the name of educational reform, reason is gutted of its critical potential and reduced to a deadening pedagogy of memorization, teaching to the test, and classroom practices that celebrate mindless repetition and conformity. Rather than embraced as central to what it means to be an engaged and thoughtful citizen, the capacity for critical thinking, imagining, and reflection are derided as crucial pedagogical values necessary for “both the health of democracy and to the creation of a decent world culture and a robust type of global citizenship” (Nussbaum, 2009; also see, Nussbaum, 2010).

## **1AC – Draft**

### 1AC – Militarism

#### Tens of thousands of people are casualties of the "right" to own guns – each killing spree is followed by another gun control debate and a wave of outrage and promises to act – but nothing happens – after seeing so many political charades, we should ask ourselves why this is allowed to continue – politics is an insufficient explanation – gun violence is the product of a militaristic American culture the gun industry has produced that fetishizes violence and spreads fear

Giroux 15 [Henry A. Giroux (social critic and educator, and the author of many books, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University), "Murder, Incorporated: Guns and the Growing Culture of Violence in the US," Truth-Out, 10/7/2015] AZ

Many Americans are obsessed with violence. They not only own nearly 300 million firearms, but also have a love affair with powerful weaponry such as 9mm Glock semiautomatic pistols and AR-15 assault rifles. Collective anger, frustration, fear and resentment increasingly characterize a society in which people are out of work, young people cannot imagine a decent future, everyday behaviors are criminalized, inequality in wealth and income are soaring and the police are viewed as occupying armies. This is not only a recipe for both random violence and mass shootings; it makes such acts appear routine and commonplace. Fear has become a public relations strategy used not only by the national security state but also by the gun industry. When you live in a country in which you are constantly bombarded by the assumption that the government is the enemy of democracy and you are told that nobody can be trusted, and the discourse of hate, particularly against Black youth, immigrants and gun control advocates, spews out daily from thousands of conservative radio stations and major TV networks, a climate of fear engulfs the country reinforcing the belief that gun ownership is the only notion of safety in which people can believe in order to live as free human beings. Under such circumstances, genuine fears and concerns for safety are undermined. These include the fear of poverty, lack of meaningful employment, the absence of decent health care, poor schools, police violence and the militarization of society, all of which further legitimate and fuel the machinery of insecurity, violence and death. Fear degenerates into willful ignorance while any semblance of rationality is erased, especially around the logic of gun control. As Adam Gopnik observes: Gun control ends gun violence as surely an antibiotics end bacterial infections, as surely as vaccines end childhood measles - not perfectly and in every case, but overwhelmingly and everywhere that it's been taken seriously and tried at length. These lives can be saved. Kids continue to die en masse because one political party won't allow that to change, and the party won't allow it to change because of the irrational and often paranoid fixations that make the massacre of students and children an acceptable cost of fetishizing guns. [(4)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a4) President Obama is right in stating that the violence we see in the United States is "a political choice we make that allows this to happen." While taking aim at the gun lobby, especially the NRA, what Obama fails to address is that extreme violence is systemic in US society, has become the foundation of politics and must be understood within a broader historical, economic, cultural and political context. To be precise, politics has become an extension of violence driven by a culture of fear, cruelty and hatred legitimated by the politicians bought and sold by the gun lobby and other related militaristic interests. Moreover, violence is now treated as a sport, a pleasure-producing form of commerce, a source of major profits for the defense industries and a corrosive influence upon US democracy. And as such it is an expression of a deeper political and ethical corruption in US society. As Rich Broderick insists, US society "embraces a soulless free-market idolatry in which the value of everything, including human beings, is determined by the bottom line" and in doing so this market fundamentalism and its theater of cruelty and greed perpetuate a spectacle of violence fed by an echo chamber "of paranoia, racism, and apocalyptic fantasies rampant in the gun culture." [(5)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a5) The lesson here is that the culture of violence cannot be abstracted from the business of violence. Murdering children in schools, the streets, in jails, detention centers and other places increasingly deemed unsafe has become something of a national pastime. One wonders how many innocent children have to die in the United States before it becomes clear that the revenue made by the $13.5 billion gun industry, with a $1.5 billion profit, are fueling a national bloodbath by using lobbyists to pay off politicians, wage a mammoth propaganda campaign and induct young children into the culture of violence. [(6)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a6) What is clear is that as more guns are on the streets and in the hands of people a savage killing machine is unleashed on those who are largely poor, Black and vulnerable. The widespread availability of guns is the reason for the shooting and killing of children and adults in Chicago, Boston, Ferguson, New York City and in other major cities. The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence reports that "in 2010, guns took the lives of 31,076 Americans in homicides, suicides and unintentional shootings. This is the equivalent of more than 85 deaths each day and more than three deaths each hour. [In addition], 73,505 Americans were treated in hospital emergency departments for non-fatal gunshot wounds in 2010." [(7)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a7) And the toll of gun violence on young people is truly heartbreaking with almost 30,000 young people killed in a 10-year period, which amounts "to nearly 3,000 kids shot to death in a typical year."[(8)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a8) According to a Carnegie-Knight News21 program investigation, For every US soldier killed in Afghanistan during 11 years of war, at least 13 children were shot and killed in the United States. More than 450 kids didn't make it to kindergarten. Another 2,700 or more were killed by a firearm before they could sit behind the wheel of a car. Every day, on average, seven children were shot dead. A News21 investigation of child and youth deaths in the United States between 2002 and 2012 found that at least 28,000 children and teens 19-years-old and younger were killed with guns. Teenagers between the ages of 15 and 19 made up over two-thirds of all youth gun deaths in the United States. [(9)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a9) Even worse, the firearms industry is pouring millions into recruiting and educational campaigns designed to both expose children to guns at an early age and to recruit them as lifelong gun enthusiasts. Reporting on such efforts for The New York Times, Mike McIntire writes: The industry's strategies include giving firearms, ammunition and cash to youth groups; weakening state restrictions on hunting by young children; marketing an affordable military-style rifle for "junior shooters" and sponsoring semiautomatic-handgun competitions for youths; and developing a target-shooting video game that promotes brand-name weapons, with links to the Web sites of their makers.... Newer initiatives by other organizations go further, seeking to introduce children to high-powered rifles and handguns while invoking the same rationale of those older, more traditional programs: that firearms can teach "life skills" like responsibility, ethics and citizenship. [(10)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a10) As the United States moves from a welfare state to a warfare state, state violence becomes normalized. The United States' moral compass and its highest democratic ideals have begun to wither, and the institutions that were once designed to help people now serve to largely suppress them. Gun laws, social responsibility and a government responsive to its people matter. We must end the dominance of gun lobbyists, the reign of money-controlled politics, the proliferation of high levels of violence in popular culture and the ongoing militarization of US society. At the same time, it is crucial, as many in the movement for Black lives have stated, that we refuse to endorse the kind of gun control that criminalizes young people of color. Gun violence in the United States is inextricably tied to economic violence as when hedge fund managers invest heavily in companies that make high-powered automatic rifles, 44-40 Colt revolvers, laser scopes for semiautomatic handguns and expanded magazine clips. [(11)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a11) The same mentality that trades in profits at the expense of human life gives the United States the shameful title of being the world's largest arms exporter. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Washington sold 31% of all global imports during the 2010-2014 period."[(12)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a12) This epidemic of violence connects the spreading of violence abroad with the violence waged at home. It also points to the violence reproduced by politicians who would rather support the military-industrial-gun complex and arms industries than address the most basic needs and social problems faced by Americans.

#### Domestic gun violence in the US is intimately linked to broader narratives of war, power, and militarism – gun control must be combined with critique of this overarching ideology

Asher 13 [Levi Asher (New York-based writer, blogger and web developer responsible for Literary Kicks, one of the earliest popular literary websites and now the oldest continuously-running literary website on the Internet), "Philosophy Weekend: What Militarism Does To Our Brains," Literary Kicks, 1/10/2013, http://www.litkicks.com/WhatMilitarismDoesToOurBrains] AZ

It can't be a coincidence that the most [weaponed-up](http://www.litkicks.com/MilitarySpendingIsABigProblem) nation in the world also suffers regular epidemics of gun violence in schools, colleges, movie theaters, shopping malls, parking lots. We're talking about gun control and getting nowhere, and this is because we're not discussing the root cause. Domestic gun violence and militarism are co-dependents. They enable each other. A militaristic sensibility permeates our culture, and this is enthusiastically supported by our federal government. How many people do you know who sincerely believe the United States of America is currently at risk of totalitarian invasion or violent civil war? And how many people do you know who are employed by the US military, or are directly or indirectly supported by it? Militarism permeates our lives, at many levels, in many ways. Militarism permeates our brains. We soak in it. The current debate in the USA over gun control should be about how Americans co-exist in cities and towns and neighborhoods and communities. Gun control is, or should be, a domestic issue. It's really not about war. And yet, the popular arguments against gun control often rely on military scenarios -- mainly, the "Red Dawn" scenario in which honest Romney-voting American citizens are forced to take their Bushmasters and Tec-9s to the streets to fend off swarms of would-be tyrants. It's all too easy to mock these apocalyptic scenarios ... but, unfortunately the hyper-charged ethnic, financial and economic tensions between the USA and various other nations around the world makes these scenarios appear all too normal. Our foreign policy is awash in manic paranoia -- how can we expect our domestic society to not reflect the same manic paranoia, and amplify it? The dimensions of this problem occurred to me when I read a letter written to California Senator and gun control advocate Dianne Feinstein by a retired US Marine named [Joshua Boston](http://wonkette.com/496150/marine-will-not-allow-senatorsome-woman-to-legislate-his-personal-assault-rifles): Senator Dianne Feinstein, I will not register my weapons should this bill be passed, as I do not believe it is the government’s right to know what I own. Nor do I think it prudent to tell you what I own so that it may be taken from me by a group of people who enjoy armed protection yet decry me having the same a crime. You ma’am have overstepped a line that is not your domain. I am a Marine Corps Veteran of 8 years, and I will not have some woman who proclaims the evil of an inanimate object, yet carries one, tell me I may not have one. I am not your subject. I am the man who keeps you free. I am not your servant. I am the person whom you serve. I am not your peasant. I am the flesh and blood of America. I am the man who fought for my country. I am the man who learned. I am an American. You will not tell me that I must register my semi-automatic AR-15 because of the actions of some evil man. I will not be disarmed to suit the fear that has been established by the media and your misinformation campaign against the American public. We, the people, deserve better than you. Respectfully Submitted, Joshua Boston Cpl, United States Marine Corps 2004-2012 Unfortunately, the public dialogue over this letter hasn't resulted in any epiphanies. Wonkette treats Joshua Boston snidely in the article linked above -- but gun control advocates like me must realize that Joshua Boston is not the problem. It's the revolting level of militarization that dominates American society from the top down -- from the federal government down -- that makes letters like this one possible. I'm glad the United States of America is currently talking about gun control, and I'm even glad that Corporal Joshua Boston is speaking up. I disagree with him, but every voice deserves to be heard. We all need to start drawing down, but let's face facts: it's not going to be Corporal Joshua Boston who puts his weapons down first. Not in this paranoid nation. The draw-down is going to have to start from the top, and it needs to start now.

#### Thus the plan –

#### Resolved: The 50 States and Washington D.C. should ban the private ownership of handguns.

#### Only total prohibition can solve – the plan counters the logic of individual "arms races," reduces homicide rates and societal violence

McMahan 12 [Jeff McMahan (professor of philosophy at Rutgers University), "Why Gun ‘Control’ Is Not Enough," New York Times, 12/19/2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/why-gun-control-is-not-enough/?\_r=0] AZ

The logic is inexorable: as more private individuals acquire guns, the power of the police declines, personal security becomes more a matter of self-help, and the unarmed have an increasing incentive to get guns, until everyone is armed. When most citizens then have the ability to kill anyone in their vicinity in an instant, everyone is less secure than they would be if no one had guns other than the members of a democratically accountable police force. The logic of private gun possession is thus similar to that of the nuclear arms race. When only one state gets nuclear weapons, it enhances its own security but reduces that of others, which have become more vulnerable. The other states then have an incentive to get nuclear weapons to try to restore their security. As more states get them, the incentives for others increase. If eventually all get them, the potential for catastrophe — whether through irrationality, misperception, or accident — is great. Each state’s security is then much lower than it would be if none had nuclear weapons. Gun advocates and criminals are allies in demanding that guns remain in private hands. They differ in how they want them distributed. Criminals want guns for themselves but not for their potential victims. Others want them for themselves but not for criminals. But while gun control can do a little to restrict access to guns by potential criminals, it can’t do much when guns are to be found in every other household. Either criminals and non-criminals will have them or neither will. Gun advocates prefer for both rather than neither to have them. But, as with nuclear weapons, we would all be safer if no one had guns — or, rather, no one other than trained and legally constrained police officers. Domestic defense would then be conducted the way we conduct national defense. We no longer accept, as the authors of the now obsolete Second Amendment did, that “a well-regulated militia” is “necessary to the security of a free state.” Rather than leaving national defense to citizens’ militias, we now, for a variety of compelling reasons, cede the right of national defense to certain state-authorized professional institutions: the Army, Navy, and so on. We rightly trust these forces to protect us from external threats and not to become instruments of domestic repression. We could have the same trust in a police force designed to protect us from domestic threats. A prohibition of private ownership would not mean that no one could shoot guns. Guns for target shooting could be rented under security arrangements at the range. And there’s perhaps scope for debate about private possession of single chamber shotguns for hunting. Gun advocates will object that a prohibition of private gun ownership is an impossibility in the United States. But this is not an objection they can press in good faith, for the only reason that a legal prohibition could be impossible in a democratic state is that a majority oppose it. If gun advocates ceased to oppose it, a prohibition would be possible. They will next argue that even if there were a legal prohibition, it could not be enforced with anything approaching complete effectiveness. This is true. As long as some people somewhere have guns, some people here can get them. Similarly, the legal prohibition of murder cannot eliminate murder. But the prohibition of murder is more effective than a policy of “murder control” would be. Guns are not like alcohol and drugs, both of which we have tried unsuccessfully to prohibit. Many people have an intense desire for alcohol or drugs that is independent of what other people may do. But the need for a gun for self-defense depends on whether other people have them and how effective the protection and deterrence provided by the state are. Thus, in other Western countries in which there are fewer guns, there are correspondingly fewer instances in which people need guns for effective self-defense.

#### Our opposition to gun violence alters the value system of American culture and endorses a nonviolent approach to politics that counters the dominant narrative of militarism

May 13 [Todd May (political philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University), "Is American Nonviolence Possible?," New York Times, 4/21/2013] AZ

(9) What would the alternative, nonviolence, look like? And what does it require of us? We must understand first that nonviolence is not passivity. It is instead creative activity. That activity takes place within particular limits. To put the point a bit simply, those limits are the recognition of others as fellow human beings, even when they are our adversaries. That recognition does not require that we acquiesce to the demands of others when we disagree. Rather, it requires that our action, even when it coerces the other (as boycotts, strikes, sit-ins and human blockades often do), does not aim to destroy that other in his or her humanity. It requires that we recognize others as fellow human beings, even when they are on the other side of the barricades. (10) This recognition limits what we can do, but at the same time it forces us to be inventive. No longer is it a matter of bringing superior firepower to bear. Now we must think more rigorously about how to respond, how to make our voices heard and our aims prevail. In a way it is like writing a Shakespearean sonnet, where the 14-line structure and iambic pentameter require thoughtful and creative work rather than immediate and overwhelming response. (11) To recognize someone’s humanity is, in perhaps the most important way, to recognize him or her as an equal. Each of us, nonviolence teaches, carries our humanity within us. That humanity cannot always be appealed to. In some cases, as with the tragedy at Sandy Hook, it can even become nearly irrelevant. However, in all but the most extreme cases nonviolence summons us to recognize that humanity even when it cannot serve as the basis for negotiation or resolution. It demands that we who act do so with a firm gaze upon the face of the other. It demands the acknowledgment that we are all fragile beings, nexuses of hope and fear, children of some mother and perhaps parents to others: that is, no more and no less than fellow human beings in a world fraught with imponderables. (12) Can we do this? Are we capable at this moment of taking on the mantle of nonviolence? (13) The lessons are already there in our history. The civil rights movement is perhaps the most shining example of nonviolence in our human legacy. After 9/11, after Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, and now, in the immediate on-the-ground responses to the Boston bombing, Americans pulled together with those they did not know in order to restore the web of our common existence. We are indeed violent, but we have shown flashes of nonviolence, that is to say moments where our competitive individualism, our insecurity, our desire for the highest return on our investment of time and money, has been trumped by the vividness of the likeness of others. Granted, these are only moments. They have not lasted. But they teach us that when it comes to nonviolent relations with others, we are not entirely bereft. (14) What would it require for these lessons to be become sedimented in our collective soul? There is much work to be done. We must begin to see our fellow human beings as precisely that: fellows. They need not be friends, but they must be counted as worthy of our respect, bearers of dignity in their own right. Those who struggle must no longer be seen as failures, but more often as unlucky, and perhaps worthy of our extending a hand. Those who come to our shores, whatever our policy toward them, must be seen as human beings seeking to stitch together a decent life rather than as mere parasites upon our riches. Those who are unhealthy must be seen as more than drains upon our taxes but instead as peers that, but for good fortune, might have been us. (15) None of this requires that we allow others to abdicate responsibility for their lives. Nor does it require that we refuse, when no other means are available, to defend ourselves with force. Instead it calls upon us to recognize that we, too, have a responsibility to more than our own security and contentment. It commands us to look to ourselves and at others before we start casting stones. (16) Would this end all senseless killing? No, it would not. Would it substitute for the limits on guns that are so urgently needed? Of course not. While the recently rejected limits on guns, however timid, might have provided a first public step toward the recognition of the requirements of our situation, our task would remain: to create a culture where violence is seen not as the first option but as the last, one that would allow us to gaze upon the breadth of space that lies between an unjust act and a violent response.

#### Gun control rejects the martial values of American militarism and the foundation of international hegemonic violence

Cowen, 12-10-2015, Tyler Cowen is an American economist, academic, and writer. He occupies the Holbert C. Harris Chair of economics, as a professor at George Mason University, and is co-author, with Alex Tabarrok, of the popular economics blog Marginal Revolution "How martial a country should the United States be? #guncontrol," Marginal Revolution <http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/12/how-martial-a-country-should-the-united-states-be.html#sthash.8uKKSYQT.W9Z17NF7.dpuf>

Chris Blattman cites a recent estimate that Americans own 42% of the civilian guns in the world. You’ll also see estimates that America accounts for about half of the world’s defense spending. I believe those numbers are a misuse of purchasing power parity comparisons, but with proper adjustments it is not implausible to believe that America accounts for…about 42% of the defense spending. Or thereabouts. I see those two numbers, and their rough similarity, as the most neglected fact in current debates about gun control. I see many people who want to lower or perhaps raise those numbers, but I don’t see enough people analyzing the two as an integrated whole. I don’t myself so often ask “should Americans have fewer guns?”, as that begs the question of how one might ever get there, which indeed has proven daunting by all accounts. But I do often ask myself “should America be a less martial country in in its ideological orientation?” Note that the parts of the country with the most guns, namely the South, are especially prominent in the military and support for the military. More importantly, if America is going to be the world’s policeman, on some scale or another, that has to be backed by a supportive culture among the citizenry. And that culture is not going to be “Hans Morgenthau’s foreign policy realism,” or “George Kennan’s Letter X,” or even Clausewitz’s treatise On War. Believe it or not, those are too intellectual for the American public. And so it must be backed by…a fairly martial culture amongst the American citizenry. And that probably will mean a fairly high level of gun ownership and a fairly high degree of skepticism about gun control. If you think America can sustain its foreign policy interventionism, or threat of such, without a fairly martial culture at home, by all means make your case. But I am skeptical. I think it is far more likely that if you brought about gun control, and the cultural preconditions for successful gun control, America’s world role would fundamentally change and America’s would no longer play a global policeman role, for better or worse. So who’s in this debate? 1. There are the anti-gun modern Democrats, who want Americans to own many fewer firearms, and who maybe favor slight cuts in defense spending, in order to spend more on redistribution. They don’t come to terms with the reality that their vision for America’s international state requires a fairly martial supporting culture at home, including strong attachments to gun ownership. By the way, citations of the Australian gun control experience are a good indicator of this position and its partial naivete; Australian pacifism can to some extent free ride upon American martial interest. Another “warning sign” is if someone is incredulous that the San Bernardino attack is strengthening America’s attachment to a relatively martial internal culture, rather than leading to gun control. That person is out of touch, even if he or she is right about the substance of the issue. 2. There is the radical, anti-war, anti-military-industrial complex, semi-pacifist, anti-gun Left. Their positions on these issues are quite consistent, though this branch of the Left has disappeared almost entirely. 3. There are the libertarians, who hate martial culture on the international scene, but who wish to allow it or maybe even encourage it (personally, not through the government) at home, through the medium of guns. They are inconsistent, and they should consider being more pro-gun control than is currently the case. But I don’t expect them to budge: they will see this issue only through the lens of liberty, rather than through the lens of culture as well. They end up getting a lot of the gun liberties they wish to keep, but losing the broader cultural battle and somehow are perpetually surprised by this mix of outcomes. I except non-American libertarians from these charges, and indeed many of them, albeit under the table, in fact support gun control as a libertarian and indeed pro-peace position. 4. There are the “right-wing conservatives.” They support a martial ethic, they support America’s active foreign policy abroad, and they are anti-gun control for the most part. And they find their greatest strength in the relatively martial American South. Like the old anti-war Left, their positions are consistent, and their positions are rooted in a cultural understanding of the issue. They see the gun control movement as a war on America’s greatness, America’s martial culture and the material embodiments of said culture. They don’t understand why “the world’s greatest nation” should give up its superpower role, and its supporting internal martial culture, all for the sake of limiting the number of suicides and maybe stopping a few shootings too. To them it’s not close to being worth it. OK, now look at who is winning this debate in terms of actual policy changes. It is the conservatives, for the most part. No matter how much you may disagree with them, they have the most coherent cultural and intellectual position, apart from the old anti-war Left. And in a fight between the right-wing conservatives, and the old anti-war Left, for the hearts and minds of the American people, we already know that, for better or worse, the conservatives usually will win. I find that pro-gun control Democrats, and libertarians, are incapable of understanding the issue in these cultural terms. But if you read something by a “really stupid conservative” on gun control, the more emotive and manipulative the text the better, it is often pretty close to the mark on the actual substance of what is at stake here.

#### Resistance to gun culture refuses the values of militarism and prevents mass violence – militarism detaches policymakers from reality and causes suffering and cyclic inequalities

Giroux 13 [Henry Giroux (social critic and educator, and the author of many books, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, "Violence, USA: The Warfare State and the Hardening of Everyday Life," excerpt from *America’s Education Deficit and the War on Youth*, 2013] AZ

Gun culture now rules U.S. values and has a powerful influence in shaping domestic policies. The National Rifle Association is the emerging symbol of what the United States has come to represent, perfectly captured in T-shirts worn by its followers that brazenly display the messages “I hate welfare” and the biblical-sounding message “If any would not work neither should he eat.”[39](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en39) The celebration of guns and violence merges in this case with a culture of cruelty, hatred, and exclusion. The National Rifle Association begins to resemble a regime of terror as politics and violence become an inseparable part of its message and the most important mediating force in shaping its identity. The relationship Americans have to guns may be complicated, but the social costs are less nuanced and certainly more deadly. In a country with “90 guns for every 100 people,” it comes as no surprise, as Gary Younge points out, that “more than 85 people a day are killed with guns and more than twice that number are injured with them.”[40](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en40) The merchants of death trade in a formative and material culture of violence that causes massive suffering and despair while detaching themselves from any sense of moral responsibility. Social costs are rarely considered, in spite of the endless trail of murders committed by the use of such weapons and largely inflicted on poor minorities and young people. With respect to young people, “Each year, more than 20,000 children and youth under age 20 are killed or injured by firearms in the United States. The lethality of guns, as well as their easy accessibility to young people, are key reasons why firearms are the second leading cause of death among young people ages 10 to 19. Only motor vehicle accidents claim more young lives.”[41](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en41) Violence has become not only more deadly but flexible, seeping into a range of institutions, cannibalizing democratic values, and merging crime and terror. As Jean and John Comaroff point out, under such circumstances a social order emerges that “appears ever more impossible to apprehend, violence appears ever more endemic, excessive, and transgressive, and police come, in the public imagination, to embody a nervous state under pressure.”[42](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en42) The lethality of gun culture and the spectacle of violence are reinforced in U.S. life as public disorder becomes both a performance and an obsession. The obsession with violence is clearly reflected in advertising and other everyday venues—advertising can even “transform nightmare into desire….[Yet] violence is never just a matter of the circulation of images. Its exercise, legitimate or otherwise, tends to have decidedly tangible objectives. And effects.”[43](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en43) An undeniable effect of the warmongering state is the drain on public coffers. The United States has the largest military budget in the world and “in 2010–2011 accounted for 40% of national [federal government] spending.”[44](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en44) The Eisenhower Study Group at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies estimates that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost the U.S. taxpayers between $3.7 and $4.4 trillion. What is more, funding such wars comes with an incalculable price in human lives and suffering. For example, the Eisenhower Study Group estimated that in these two wars there have been over 224,475 lives lost, 363,383 people wounded, and 7 million refugees and internally displaced people.[45](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en45) But war has another purpose, especially for neoconservatives who want to destroy the social state. By siphoning funds and public support away from much needed social programs, war, to use David Rothkopf’s phrase, “diminishes government so that it becomes too small to succeed.”[46](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en46) The warfare state hastens the dismantling of the social state and its limited safety net, creating the conditions for the ultra-rich, mega-corporations, and finance capital to appropriate massive amounts of wealth, income, and power. This has resulted between 2010 and 2012 in the largest-ever increase in inequality of income and wealth in the United States.[47](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en47) One acute register of the growing inequality in wealth and income is provided by Michael D. Yates: In the United States in 2007, it is estimated that the five best-paid hedge-fund managers “earned” more than all of the CEOs of the Fortune 500 corporations combined. The income of just the top three hedge-fund managers (James Simon, John Paulson, and George Soros) taken together was $9 billion dollars in 2007…. Pittsburgh hedge-fund manager David Tepper made four billion dollars…. If we were to suppose that Mr. Tepper worked 2,000 hours in 2009 (fifty weeks at forty hours per week), he took in $2,000,000 per hour and $30,000 a minute…. Others are not so fortunate. In 2010, more than 7 million people had incomes less than 50 percent of the official poverty level of income, an amount equal to $11,245, which in hourly terms (2,000 hours of work per year) is $5.62. At this rate, it would take someone nearly three years to earn what Tepper got each minute. About one-quarter of all jobs in the United States pay an hourly wage rate that would not support a family of four at the official poverty level of income.[48](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en48) Structural inequalities do more than distribute wealth and power upward to the privileged few and impose massive hardships on the poorest members of society. They also generate forms of collective violence accentuated by high levels of uncertainty and anxiety, all of which, as Michelle Brown points out, “makes recourse to punishment and exclusion highly seductive possibilities.”[49](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en49) The merging of the punishing and financial state is partly legitimated through the normalization of risk, insecurity, and fear in which individuals not only have no way of knowing their fate, but also have to bear the consequences of being left adrift by neoliberal capitalism.

#### The NRA's rhetoric of self-defense and argument that gun ownership protects individuals through violence is reflective of a broader problem – glorification of individual violence through a culture of war.

#### The belief that violence is "necessary" is constructed and condones systematic dehumanization, endless violence, and American imperialism abroad – perpetual war is made up to absolve policymakers of ethical responsibility for deaths

Giroux 13 [Henry Giroux (social critic and educator, and the author of many books, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, "Violence, USA: The Warfare State and the Hardening of Everyday Life," excerpt from *America’s Education Deficit and the War on Youth*, 2013] AZ

Since 9/11, the war on terror and the campaign for homeland security have increasingly mimicked the tactics of the enemies they sought to crush. Violence and punishment as both a media spectacle and a bone-crushing reality have become prominent and influential forces shaping U.S. society. As the boundaries between “the realms of war and civil life have collapsed,” social relations and the public services needed to make them viable have been increasingly privatized and militarized.[1](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en1) The logic of profitability works its magic in channeling the public funding of warfare and organized violence into universities, market-based service providers, Hollywood cinema, cable television, and deregulated contractors. The metaphysics of war and associated forms of violence now creep into every aspect of U.S. society. As the preferred “instrument of statecraft,” war and its intensifying production of violence crosses borders, time, space, and places.[2](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en2) The result is that the United States “has become a ‘culture of war’…engulfed in fear and violence [and trapped by a military metaphysics in which] homeland security matters far more than social security.”[3](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en3) Seemingly without any measure of self-restraint, state-sponsored violence now flows and regroups effortlessly, contaminating both foreign and domestic policies. The criticism of the military-industrial complex, along with its lobbyists and merchants of death, that was raised by President Eisenhower seems to have been relegated to the trash can of history. Instead of being disparaged as a death machine engaged in the organized production of violence, the military-industrial complex is defended as a valuable jobs program and a measure of national pride and provides a powerful fulcrum for the permanent warfare state. It gets worse. One consequence of the permanent warfare state is evident in the recent public revelations concerning war crimes committed by U.S. government forces. These include the indiscriminate killings of Afghan civilians by U.S. drone aircraft; the barbaric murder of Afghan children and peasant farmers by U.S. infantrymen infamously labeled as “the Kill Team”;[4](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en4) disclosures concerning four U.S. marines urinating on dead Taliban fighters; and the uncovering of photographs showing “more than a dozen soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division’s Fourth Brigade Combat Team, along with some Afghan security forces, posing with the severed hands and legs of Taliban attackers in Zabul Province in 2010.”[5](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en5) And, shocking even for those acquainted with standard military combat, there is the case of Army Staff Sergeant Robert Bales, who “walked off a small combat outpost in Kandahar province and slaughtered 17 villagers, most of them women and children, and later walked back to his base and turned himself in.”[6](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en6) Mind-numbing violence, war crimes, and indiscriminate military attacks on civilians on the part of the U.S. government are far from new and date back to infamous acts such as the air attacks on civilians in Dresden along with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War.[7](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en7) Military spokespersons are typically quick to remind the U.S. public that such practices are part of the price one pays for combat and are endemic to war itself. State violence wages its ghastly influence through a concept of permanent war, targeted assassinations, an assault on civil liberties, and the use of drone technologies that justifies the killing of innocent civilians as collateral damage. Collateral damage has also come home with a vengeance as soldiers returning from combat are killing themselves at record rates and committing mayhem—particularly sexual violence and spousal and child abuse.[8](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en8) After more than a decade at war, soldiers in the U.S. military are also returning home and joining the police, thus contributing to the blurring of the line between the military and law enforcement. The history of atrocities committed by the United States in the name of war need not be repeated here, but some of these incidents have doubled in on themselves and fueled public outrage against the violence of war.[9](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en9) One of the most famous events was the My Lai massacre, which played a crucial role in mobilizing protests against the Vietnam War.[10](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en10) Even dubious appeals to national defense and honor can provide no excuse for mass killings of civilians, rapes, and other acts of destruction that completely lack any justifiable military objective. Not only does the alleged normative violence of war disguise the moral cowardice of the warmongers, it also demonizes the enemy and dehumanizes soldiers. It is this brutalizing psychology of desensitization, emotional hardness, and the freezing of moral responsibility that is particularly crucial to understand, because it grows out of a formative culture in which war, violence, and the dehumanization of others becomes routine, commonplace, and removed from any sense of ethical accountability. It is necessary to recognize that acts of extreme violence and cruelty do not represent merely an odd or marginal and private retreat into barbarism. On the contrary, warlike values and the social mindset they legitimate have become the primary currency of a market-driven culture that takes as its model a Darwinian shark tank in which only the strongest survive. In a neoliberal order in which vengeance and revenge seem to be the most cherished values in a “social order organized around the brute necessity of survival,” violence becomes both a legitimate mediating force and one of the few remaining sources of pleasure.[11](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en11) At work in the new hyper-social Darwinism is a view of the Other as the enemy, an all-too-quick willingness in the name of war to embrace the dehumanization of the Other, and an all-too-easy acceptance of violence, however extreme, as routine and normalized. As many theorists have observed, the production of extreme violence in its various incarnations is now a source of profit for Hollywood moguls, mainstream news, popular culture, the corporate-controlled entertainment industry, and a major market for the defense industries.[12](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en12)

#### Militarism and gun culture exacerbate domestic conflicts while ensuring imperial violence continues abroad

Boggs 5 [Carl Boggs (Professor of Social Science at National University), "Imperial Delusions: American Militarism and Endless War," 2005] AZ

Owing in great measure to its long history of imperialism and militarism, to its endless fascination with guns and combat, the United States had by the 198os easily become the major hub of global violence: repeated armed interventions abroad found their domestic parallel in the world's largest prison system, an epidemic of civic violence, an out-of-control gun culture, homebred terrorism, gang warfare, militias spread around the country, do- mestic violence, spontaneous outbursts of youth violence like the one at Columbine High School in Colorado, a mass media saturated with images of violence and bloodshed. While such a culture of violence was not new, its expanding scope and its increasingly transparent connection with the military-industrial complex were. The close linkage between military and civilian forms of violence is the outgrowth of the role the Pentagon has come to play in so many areas of politics, the economy, culture, media, and everyday life. If governmental and military elites appear as regular purvey- ors of death and destruction worldwide, then an ethos of violence can be expected to develop locally, within civil society, as ordinary people follow the lessons taught by the power structure. As a government-supported mode of violence, militarism brings with it a definite form of legitimation, one of the consequences of which is that added impetus is given to individual and small-group violence. Such violence results not only from a deeply milita- rized foreign policy but from a social order steeped in gross social inequality, anomie, fragmentation, and powerlessness, and in which politics has lost its capacity to inspire or mobilize people, to get them involved as civic participants. At the turn of the new century the United States was clearly the most violent of nations, even as its political leaders customarily stressed high- sounding themes: peace, human rights, civic culture, law and order. This shameful condition grew out of a strong convergence of trends-global and domestic, military and civilian, national and local. And a culture nurtured on violence, on the resort to weapons and guns in solving conflicts, seems to require increasingly heavier doses of the medicine, as the 2003 war on Iraq once again confirmed. It could be that this culture has in some fashion become addicted to war, as the title of one book on US. militarism suggests.7 As Richard Rhodes argues, civic violence is typically rooted in human experiences that desensitize people to suffering, pain, and death-harsh economic realities, media images, personal encounters, prolonged exposure to war and/or civil insurrection.

#### Maintaining hegemony accelerates paranoid imperial violence – their obsession manufactures threats and conceals the US’ role in enemy construction – the aff makes visible power relationships that enable endless warfare

McClintock Simone de Beauvoir Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison 9

[Anne, "Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib," Muse]

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5 Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6 Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8 Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty? A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11 The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution. —C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians” The barbarians have declared war. —President George W. Bush C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism, Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. Where were the enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus? “And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?” By rights, the thawing of the cold war should have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military; any plausible external threat had simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army, bemoaned the enemy deficit: “It’s no use having an army that did nothing but train,” he said. “There’s got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for.” Dick Cheney likewise complained: “The threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain.” Colin Powell agreed: “Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that—the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain.” Before becoming president, George W. Bush likewise fretted over the post–cold war dearth of a visible enemy: “We do not know who the enemy is, but we know they are out there.” It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require “a catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.” 12

### 1AC – Framing

#### Current militaristic culture primes society to fight wars at all times and at all costs. This system starts with propaganda that infiltrates scholarship – the impact is the ongoing ignorance of the war on the home front and a flawed approach to problem solving that trends to relentless conflict.

Boggs 11 – Carl, Ph.D. Political Science, University of California, Berkeley (“The Global IndusTrIal Complex”, Published by Lexington Books, 2011, ISBN 978-0-7391-3697-3) RMT

As the American people are asked to endure burdensome costs and sacrifices of war and preparation for war, mechanisms of legitimation take on new meaning. Empire, a bloated war economy, recurrent armed interventions, hardships on the home front—all these must be made to appear “natural,” routine, even welcome if not noble. The historical myth of national exceptionalism, combined with hubris associated with economic, technological, and military supremacy, contributes to this ideological function. To translate such an ideological syndrome into popular language and daily life, to fully incorporate it into the political culture, is the task not so much of a classical state-run propaganda system as a developed hegemonic ideology reliant more on education and the media. In the United States, media culture has evolved into an outgrowth of megacorporate power that sustains the most far-reaching ideological and cultural network in history. Hollywood films alone have for many decades served as a crucial vehicle for legitimation of Empire. The repetitive fantasies, illusions, myths, images, and storylines of Hollywood movies (not to mention TV and other outlets) can be expected to influence mass audiences in rather predictable ways, much along lines of advertising and public relations. One popular response to the flood of violent combat, action-adventure, sci-fi, and horror films (with their companion video games) is stronger readiness to support U.S. military operations that, in an intensely patriotic, violent milieu will require little overt justification except where American casualties are deemed excessive. Such ideological legitimation is needed in a context where even the ensemble of corporate, military, and government power cannot suffice.

Despite its command of institutional power, tools of violence, and material resources, therefore, the system requires something along lines of a culture of militarism. In the United States, militarism has indeed evolved into an ideology forged by media culture, political messages, academic discourses, and patriotic indoctrination. If the linkage between militarism and daily life goes back in history, it has taken on new dimensions with the dramatic growth of the media and popular culture over the past few decades. If the culture of militarism endows warfare with a popular sense of meaning and purpose, it also constitutes the hegemonic façade behind which the power structure can more or less freely operate, domestically and worldwide. The decay of American economic, political, and social life cannot be understood apart from this destructive cycle—likely to worsen as the elites strive to maintain the advantages of Empire against new challenges. By the early twenty-first century it was obvious that war, and orientation to war, had become a way of life in the United States, a society in which both leaders and general population could be said to have grown addicted to war. If the United States fails to qualify as a full-fledged “warrior society” at the level of ancient Sparta, Nazi Germany, interwar Japan, or even Israel today, the military influence is perhaps even more pervasive—though not always recognizable as such—owing to the global presence of American power.

Who could expect otherwise, as the Pentagon dominates the globe with its military, technological, and communications presence, with its hundreds of bases and sites, and its status as the world’s biggest landlord (overseeing 300,000 housing units globally)? The U.S. military runs its own vast propaganda network with scores of newspapers and magazines, invests in hundreds of movies and TV programs, develops state-of-the-art video games, and is by far the largest sponsor of research and development, allowing it to influence such fields as nuclear physics, chemistry, astronomy, and electrical engineering. What might be called the militarization of the academy is reflected in the capacity of the Pentagon to shape research goals at such respectable universities as UC Berkeley, MIT, Stanford, Johns Hopkins, Penn State, and Carnegie Mellon—a few of the more than 350 institutions that routinely get military contracts. Under the familiar guise of national security, American society has seen a convergence of military, corporate, and academic centers of power.

Tens of billions are targeted annually for higher-tech warfare agendas: urbanassault counterinsurgency methods, satellite technology, nuclear modernization, robotics and other forms of remote combat, laser-guided weapons, war-gaming, and database collections among others. 19 In a militarized society the armed forces experience is bound to touch the lives of tens of millions of people, often in the most intimate ways—and often outside the ranks of the military itself. In her study of the “homefront,” Catherine Lutz comments: “In an important sense . . . we all inhabit an army camp, mobilized to lend support to the permanent state of war readiness that has been with us since World War II. No matter where we live, we have raised war taxes at work, and future soldiers at home lived with the cultural atmosphere of racism and belligerence that war mobilization often uses or creates, and nourished the public opinion that helps send soldiers off to war. . . . All experience the problems bred by war’s glorification of violent masculinity and the inequalities created by its redistribution of wealth to the already privileged.” Lutz adds that “we all have lived with the consequences of the reinvigorated idea that we prove and regenerate ourselves through violence.” This reality turns out to be even more all-consuming for military personnel and residents of Fayetteville, North Carolina—home of the sprawling Fort Bragg army base—that Lutz chose as the focus of her research. Here all the contradictions of U.S. militarism came home to roost—a “dumping ground for the problems of the American century of war and empire.” Here we have exaggerated problems of poverty, crime, child abuse, alcoholism, prostitution, homelessness, and a wide array of physical and mental injuries. These are the fruits of a permanent war system that transfigures daily life for those within and close to the “homefront” of Empire.

This is a world geared to warfare, preparation for warfare, killing, and refinement of the instruments for killing. In her classic work Military Brats, Mary Edwards Wertsch brilliantly weaves together narratives of life in the military, focusing on two lingering motifs—the warrior ethos, and the authoritarian character of social relations. She writes: “Growing up inside the fortress [as she did] is like being drafted into a gigantic theater company. The role of the warrior society, even in peacetime, is to exist in a state of perpetual ‘readiness’: one continuous dress rehearsal for war. The principal actors are immaculately costumed, carefully scripted, and supplied with a vast array of props. They practice elaborate large-scale stage movements—land, air, sea exercises simulating attacks and defenses.” All this is part of a deep socialization process that Wertsch expertly unravels. Well before 9/11 and the subsequent wars, she could remark that “this is a society prepared to wage war with the same relentless attention to detail it brings to every moment of every day.” 23 22 In such a culture authoritarian values inevitably prevail: “The Fortress, in short, is an authoritarian society. The masks worn there are authoritarian masks, each exactly like the others of its rank, each subservient to those of high rungs. The notions of conformity, order, and obedience reign supreme.” She adds: “The great paradox of the military is that its members, the selfappointed front-line guardians of our cherished American democratic values, do not live in a democracy themselves. Not only is individuality not valued in the military, it is discouraged. There is no freedom of speech, save on the most innocuous level. There is no freedom of assembly for anything that is not authorized. There is not even a concept of privacy . . .” God, community, family, nation—everything is glorified through the mediations of warfare, violence, hierarchy, and aggression.

The permanent war system undermines democracy at every turn: imperial projects lead to authoritarian controls domestically and globally. Militarization gives rise not only to a warrior ethos but to hierarchy, discipline, secrecy, surveillance, lopsided allocations, and narrowed debate in government operations. Richard Falk writes of a shift toward fascism in the global order that, he argues, permeates American domestic politics as power and wealth come to dominate the field of decision-making. An imperial arrogance that champions U.S. exceptionalism and subverts universal norms of legality on the world scene, that strives toward full-spectrum dominance, sooner or later generates a regime of lawlessness and violence at home. A Hobbesian universe, after all, is predictably rife with fear and hate. Falk observes that an authoritarian scenario will be momentarily disguised as necessary security adjustment to the threats of global terrorism.” 27 26 While this “scenario” has surely gained new credence since 9/11, the pattern was set during World War II with solidification of the war economy and security state. Further, as discussed in the first two chapters, the United States has throughout its history worked tirelessly to defeat democratic possibilities outside its own borders. The neocons, as we have seen, embrace an uncompromising global authoritarianism (while preaching “democracy promotion”) driven by U.S. entitlement to world supremacy. Falk argues: “ . . . I consider it reasonable to think of something one might call global fascism as the mentality of those seeking to regulate the world, from either above or below, according to their I went on to demonstrate how the libertarian principle of self-ownership supports PIA and why people cannot be responsible for all effects of their actions:

#### The core of the debate isn't about statistics but the fundamental cultural conflict of gun control –militarism permits gun ownership since it affirms their understanding of violence and world view

Braman 6 [Donald Braman (Irving S. Ribicoff Fellow, Yale Law School) & Dan M. Kahan, "Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate," Emory Law Journal, 2006] AZ

But so long as statistics continue to fund the parties’ arguments, the gun debate, we believe, will remain bankrupt. Purely instrumental arguments lack the power to persuade because they ignore what really motivates individuals to favor or oppose gun control⎯namely, their cultural worldviews. 3 Their prominent (and in many respects fabled) role in American history imbues guns with a surfeit of social meanings. For one segment of American society, guns symbolize honor, human mastery over nature, and individual self-sufficiency. By opposing gun control, individuals affirm the value of these meanings and the vision of the good society that they construct. For another segment of American society, however, guns connote something else: the perpetuation of illicit social hierarchies, the elevation of force over reason, and the expression of collective indifference to the well-being of strangers. These individuals instinctively support gun control as a means of repudiating these significations and of promoting an alternative vision of the good society that features equality, social solidarity, and civilized nonaggression. These competing cultural visions, we will argue, are what drive the gun control debate. They are what dispose individuals to accept certain empirically grounded public-safety arguments and to reject others. Indeed, the meanings that guns and gun control express are sufficient to justify most individuals’ positions on gun control independently of their beliefs about guns and safety. It follows that the only meaningful gun control debate is one that explicitly addresses whether and how the underlying cultural visions at stake should be embodied in American law. So why isn’t that what the protagonists in the mainstream academic and political debate are talking about? The answer is that they adhere to a common understanding⎯we intend to argue misunderstanding⎯about the inappropriateness of injecting partisan cultural values into democratic deliberations. Liberal norms are often thought to enjoin the state from imposing a cultural or moral orthodoxy. From this premise, it is said to follow that citizens and their representatives should avoid morally partisan stancetaking when debating public issues and instead frame their arguments in terms accessible to individuals of diverse cultural persuasions. The prevention of physical harm seems culturally ecumenical in this way. That’s why most citizens are moved to speak in the empirical, consequentialist idiom of public safety, even though instrumental arguments conceal the cultural foundations of their views toward guns. The problem with this strategy for minimizing cultural conflict, however, is that it doesn’t work. Because what individuals believe about the facts of gun control is inextricably bound up with their cultural identities, factual disagreement turns out to be no less divisive than explicit appeals to contested cultural values. Indeed, far from quieting cultural conflict, consequentialism as a liberal discourse strategy tends only to accentuate it. Because it is attractive only to citizens who are averse to cultural conflict, consequentialism as a liberal discourse strategy assures that whatever transparent cultural discourse persists is dominated by cultural zealots, thereby exaggerating each side’s perception that the other is bent on cultural domination.

#### Resistance to militarism begins in the classroom – as a judge, prioritize analysis of militarism to challenge dominant regimes of power, promote critical thinking against war culture, and disobey the traditions of state-defined civic duty

Giroux 13 [Henry Giroux (social critic and educator, and the author of many books, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University), "Violence, USA: The Warfare State and the Hardening of Everyday Life," excerpt from *America’s Education Deficit and the War on Youth*, 2013] AZ

Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational component. C. Wright Mills was right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the violence of an authoritarian social order from the cultural apparatuses that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only “guide experience, they also expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called ‘our own.’”[55](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en55) This narrowing of experience shorn of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live. Experience itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified, and increasingly militarized. Social responsibility gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility. Crucial here is the need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies that can foster an engaged mode of citizenship capable of naming the corporate and academic interests that support the warfare state and its apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the warfare state is, therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public spheres that would enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators of war and everyday violence to being informed and engaged citizens. Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education, which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than market-driven and militarized knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role, educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively participate in the process of governing. Without the public spheres for creating a formative culture equipped to challenge the educational, military, market, and religious fundamentalisms that dominate U.S. society, it will be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of domestic and foreign policy. Any viable notion of resistance to the current authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it means pedagogically to imagine a more democratically oriented notion of knowledge, subjectivity, and agency and what it might mean to bring such notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls “a new grammar of political disobedience.”[56](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en56) It is a reconfiguring of the nature and substance of the political so that matters of pedagogy become central to the very definition of what constitutes the political and the practices that make it meaningful. Critical understanding motivates transformative action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common sense that give war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to be a permanent social relation, nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and foreign policy. The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to one’s own self-interest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public good. This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the structuring forces of violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear, insecurity, and a weakened culture of civic engagement—one in which there is little room for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange. Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society “in which the production and circulation of death functions as political and economic recovery.”[57](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en57) The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the ideological and structural foundations of violence that are pushing U.S. society over the abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least, the U.S. public owes it to its children and future generations, if not the future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle this machinery of violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than death—the future of the current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture. It is time for educators, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social relations of democracy while establishing the institutions and formative cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing that: the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination, the absence of a viable political opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year of the protester…it would be premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment to what may be termed “a long march” through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist metropoles.[58](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en58) The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are making clear that this is not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform, but must constitute a political and social movement of sustained growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces, the progressive use of digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes of education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of young people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic. Any viable challenge to the new authoritarianism and its theater of cruelty and violence must include developing a variety of cultural discourses and sites where new modes of agency can be imagined and enacted, particularly as they work to reconfigure a new collective subject, modes of sociality, and “alternative conceptualizations of the self and its relationship to others.”[59](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en59) Clearly, if the United States is to make a claim to democracy, it must develop a politics that views violence as a moral monstrosity and war as virulent pathology. How such a claim to politics unfolds remains to be seen. In the meantime, resistance proceeds, especially among the young people who now carry the banner of struggle against an encroaching authoritarianism that is working hard to snuff out all vestiges of democratic life.

## **1AR**

### Giroux

#### Tens of thousands of people are casualties of the "right" to own guns – each killing spree is followed by another gun control debate and a wave of outrage and promises to act – but nothing happens – after seeing so many political charades, we should ask ourselves why this is allowed to continue – politics is an insufficient explanation – gun violence is the product of a militaristic American culture the gun industry has produced that fetishizes violence and spreads fear

### Nguyen Ext

#### First is a conceded uniqueness question—US education is structured to promote security—ciriculums are utilized by the security state to promote its legitimacy—students are educated for war and perpetuating fear, developing securitized subjectivities

#### Second is a colonialism disad—intervention and warfare is fueled by dichotomies of “here and there”, “us versus them”, and “west versus non-west, perpetuating **hegemony and humanizing US militarism, while refuelling a sense of imminent danger and fear across the US homeland**

#### Finally, critical intellectualism solves best—ruptures the security imaginary by exposing the ideological and discursive routes security takes to infuse itself into education—the alt is the only way to privilege other ways of knowing

### 1AR O/V

#### The root cause of gun violence, armed intervention abroad, and structures of oppression within the US is a culture of militarism, propped up by the NRA and perpetuated by private ownership of guns – that's Giroux 15 – the aff is key to solve

#### Banning handguns reduces crimes since it reduces availability of guns – that's McMahan. Self-defense doesn't apply – if no one has guns, there's no need for protection

#### Banning ownership of guns is a type of value reorientation – rather than glorifying violence as a mediating factor between people, the plan endorses pacifism and thus spills over to prevent American violence internationally – that's Cowen

#### The plan holds policymakers accountable for violence – militarism detaches the government from shootings since violence is seen as an isolated event rather than fundamental to the system of power that gun culture has produced

#### Aff outweighs

#### Scope – hegemonic violence abroad and oppressive militarism within the US kills hundreds of thousands every year – that's giroux

#### Try or die – the drive for violent control accelerates violence and ensures endless construction of threats – that's McClintock

### Ext – Rana

#### Technical security debates only insulate us from the real violence of the modern security apparatus. Their approach to IR fails – the aff ignores the *root causes* of conflict and externalizes threats onto other actors instead – this sanitizes mass violence as a response – moreover, it prevents effective responses which makes energy, environmental, and economic crises inevitable, culminating in extinction – that outweighs – the scope and degree of these crises accesses the aff’s impact at a much more fundamental level than they do

#### Regard their scenarios with skepticism – Orthodox assumptions in IR only perpetuate crisis – none of their claims are objectively true and are constructed to justify exorbitant military spending

### Ext – Solvency [LaFollette]

#### The plan reshapes cultural values to lessen violence

LaFollette 2k Hugh (USF St. Petersburg Philosophy Professor) “Gun Control” Ethics 110 (January 2000): 263–281

Gun advocates disagree: they claim that cultural factors explain the correlation. Although I think they are partly correct, they draw the wrong inference. For one crucial difference between European and American cultures is the widespread presence of guns. Each culture is the way it is, at least in part, because of the role guns (or their absence) played in its creation and maintenance. Therefore, curtailing the private possession of guns might well change the American culture so that it would be less violent. Consequently, it is not only that fewer guns would directly cause some decline in violent crimes - which it should. It is also likely to reshape the cultural values which, along with ready availability of deadly weapons, lead to such an extraordinarily high murder rate in America. On the other hand, the statistical evidence that guns prevent or thwart crimes is suggestive and cannot be ignored, despite its identified weaknesses. In summary, the overall statistical evidence tilts in favor of gun control advocates, although the evidence is disputable. But we should not expect nor do we need indisputable evidence. We can act on the best evidence we have, while being open to new evidence. If widespread availability of guns were responsible for even one-fourth of the increase in the number of murders, that would be a significant harm the state should prevent if it could do so in a relatively unintrusive and morally acceptable way. There is little doubt that we can do that, at least to some degree. If nothing else we could control some types of guns and ammunition. To take one obvious example, teflon-coated bullets are designed to pierce protective vests. People do not use these bullets to pierce the vests on a deer or a squirrel, on a target or a skeet. They use them to pierce the vests on people, usually law enforcement officers. This ammunition has no purpose except to cause harm. Hence, we are justified in abolishing teflon bullets and in establishing severe criminal penalties for those possessing them. This would not save large numbers of lives. But, assuming this ban's enforcement is not impractical, then, if it saved even a few lives, that would be a compelling reason to outlaw such bullets. On the other hand, some guns have a much wider use, even if they are occasionally used for ill. People have seemingly legitimate uses for shotguns and single-shot rifles. Consequently, barring strong evidence to the contrary, we should not abolish them. We should, however, study their contributory role in causing harm, and explore ways we might lessen this harm in a relative unintrusive way. The central debate concerns handguns. The evidence we have shows that handguns are disproportionately used in homicides and in robberies. Although "there are approximately three times as many long guns as handguns in the US, more than 80% of gun homicides and 90% of gun robberies involve handguns (Hemenway, D. 1995: 60). The experience in Canada suggests that criminals will not switch to long guns if handguns are unavailable. Given the special role handguns play in causing harm, we have compelling reasons to extensively control, or perhaps even abolish, handguns.

#### In the long-term, only the plan can create the cultural shift necessary to change the undercurrent of gun violence in America – Australia proves.

Donohue 15 [JOHN DONOHUE, columnist at Newsweek, "Gun Control: What We Can Learn From Other Advanced Countries", Newsweek, 10/3/15]

The story of Australia, which had [13 mass shootings](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2704353/) in the 18-year period from 1979 to 1996 but none in the succeeding 19 years, is worth examining. The turning point was the 1996 Port Arthur massacre in Tasmania, in which a gunman killed 35 individuals using semiautomatic weapons. In the wake of the massacre, the conservative federal government succeeded in implementing tough new [gun control laws](http://www.loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/australia.php) throughout the country. A large array of weapons were banned—including the Glock semiautomatic handgun used in the Charleston shootings. The government also imposed a mandatory gun buy back that substantially reduced gun possession in Australia. The effect was that both gun suicides and homicides (as well as total suicides and homicides) [fell](http://andrewleigh.org/pdf/gunbuyback_panel.pdf). In addition, the 1996 legislation made it a crime to use firearms in self-defense. When I mention this to disbelieving NRA supporters they insist that crime must now be rampant in Australia. In fact, the Australian murder rate has fallen to close to [one per 100,000](http://www.aic.gov.au/dataTools/facts/vicViolentRate.html) while the U.S. rate, thankfully lower than in the early 1990s, is still roughly at [4.5 per 100,000](https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_crime_in_the_united_states_by_volume_and_rate_per_100000_inhabitants_1994-2013.xls)—over four times as high. Moreover, robberies in Australia occur at [only about half](http://www.aic.gov.au/dataTools/facts/vicViolentRate.html) the [rate of the U.S.](https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/violent-crime/robbery-topic-page) (58 in Australia versus 113.1 per 100,000 in the U.S. in 2012). How did Australia do it? Politically, it took a brave prime minister to face the rage of Australian gun interests. John Howard [wore a bullet-proof vest](http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/anger-lingers-among-those-who-lost-their-firearms/2006/04/27/1145861489398.html) when he announced the proposed gun restrictions in June 1996. The deputy prime minister was [hung in effigy](http://www.latitudenews.com/story/i-was-hung-in-effigy-changing-a-countrys-gun-culture/). But Australia did not have a domestic gun industry to oppose the new measures, so the will of the people was allowed to emerge. And today, support for the safer, gun-restricted Australia is so strong that going back [would not be tolerated](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/14/america-mass-murder-australia-gun-control-saves-lives) by the public.

### Ext – PQ [Ernesto]

#### Prioritize analysis of militarism – anything else masks the culture that is the prerequisite to rampant state violence – we're a root cause

Ernesto 14 [Chris Ernesto (founding member of St. Pete for Peace, a non-partisan antiwar organization providing peace oriented education), "School Shootings and US Militarism," Counterpunch, 6/13/2014, http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/06/13/school-shootings-and-us-militarism/] AZ

You could see it coming. Both parties are looking for a way to excite their voter base by turning this into a “Democrats want to take away your guns” and “gun control is a way to prevent domestic massacres” false debate. The oversimplification by both parties is a made for TV, politically based distraction from talking about the root causes of American domestic killings, and as a way to keep the American people fighting each other instead of fighting the government. Sure, debating the proliferation of guns in America is important, but what’s even more important is to have a discussion about the brutally violent culture that has been ingrained into the people of the United States by its government, television, video games, movies and machismo. And most importantly, isn’t it time our society discusses the glorification of the military and how that translates into an everyday means of conflict resolution? People are taught to behave like those who are most respected by society. And the military is at the top of the pecking order of American society. The days of spitting on soldiers as they return from war have been replaced by a pro-military fervor that is so strong that if one dares say they don’t “support the troops” they run the risk of being ostracized or labeled a traitor. Politicians put the military on a pedestal. The music industry sings their praises. The sports world worships them. Video games portray them as Superman-like heroes. The media downplays their atrocities. They have national holidays in their honor. [Hollywood](http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2004/09/operation-hollywood) allows them to shape movies. And you’ll even hear “I support the warrior but not the war” at antiwar protests. Given this deification of the military, American citizens, especially children are going to think that the way to resolve a conflict is by force and not by the use of dialog or compromise. After all, even third grade students know that those in the military use guns and bombs, not words and reason to ‘stop the bad guy’ or to get payback for some wrong done to them. Our nation’s response to Sept. 11 provided the blueprint.

### Ext – ROB [Giroux]

#### The classroom should be a focal point of resistance – militarism manifests itself in education by silencing deviant viewpoints and rigorously conditioning students to accept the culture of war

Giroux 13 [Henry Giroux (social critic and educator, and the author of many books, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, "Violence, USA: The Warfare State and the Hardening of Everyday Life," excerpt from *America’s Education Deficit and the War on Youth*, 2013] AZ

Even public-school reform is now justified in the dehumanizing language of national security, which increasingly legitimates the transformation of schools into adjuncts of the surveillance and police state.[13](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en13) The privatization and militarization of schools mutually inform each other as students are increasingly subjected to disciplinary apparatuses that limit their capacity for critical thinking while molding them into consumers, testing them into submission, stripping them of any sense of social responsibility, and convincing large numbers of poor minority students that they are better off under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system instead of being treated as valued members of the public schools. Schools are increasingly absorbing the culture of prisons and are aggressively being transformed into an extension of the criminal justice system. Many public schools are being militarized to resemble prisons instead of being safe places that would enable students to learn how to be critical and engaged citizens. Rather than being treated with dignity and respect, students are increasingly treated as if they were criminals, given that they are repeatedly “photographed, fingerprinted, scanned, x-rayed, sniffed and snooped on.”[14](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en14) The space of the school resembles a high-security prison with its metal detectors at the school entrances, drug-sniffing dogs in school corridors, and surveillance cameras in the hallways and classrooms. Student behaviors that were once considered child play are now elevated to the status of a crime. Young people who violate dress codes, engage in food fights, hug each other, doodle, and shoot spit wads are no longer reprimanded by the classroom teacher or principal; instead their behavior is criminalized. Consequently, the police are called in to remove them from the classroom, handcuff them, and put them in the back of a police car to be carted off to a police station where they languish in a holding cell. There is a kind of doubling that takes place here between the culture of punishment, on the one hand, and the feeding of profits for the security-surveillance industries, on the other. What has emerged in the United States is a civil and political order structured around the problem of violent crime. This governing-through-crime model produces a highly authoritarian and mechanistic approach to addressing social problems that often focuses on low-income and poor minorities, promotes highly repressive policies, and places undue emphasis on personal security rather than considering the larger complex of social and structural forces that fuels violence in the first place. Far from promoting democratic values, a respect for others, and social responsibility, a governing-through-crime approach criminalizes a wide range of behaviors and in doing so often functions largely to humiliate, punish, and demonize. The abuse and damage that is being imposed on young people as a result of the ongoing militarization and criminalization of public schools defy the imagination. And the trivial nature of the behaviors that produce such egregious practices is hard to believe.

## Impacts/1AR Links

### Imperialism [Engelhardt]

#### Militarism ingrains endless, imperialist war in American policy

Engelhardt 13 (Tom, Fellow at the Nation Institute, “Overwrought empire: The discrediting of US military power,” <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/20121010104331399712.html>)

And here's the odd thing: in a sense, little has changed since then and yet everything seems different. Think of it as **the American imperial paradox**: **everywhere there are** now **"threats" against our well-being which** seem to **demand action** and yet nowhere are there commensurate enemies to go with them. Everywhere the US military still reigns supreme by almost any measure you might care to apply; and yet - in case the paradox has escaped you - **nowhere can it achieve its goals, however modest**. At one level, the American situation should simply take your breath away. **Never before** in modern history **had there been a**n arms race of only one or a **great power confrontation of only one**. And at least in military terms, just as the [neoconservatives imagined](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175336/tomgram%3A_engelhardt,_war_is_a_drug/) in those early years of the 21st century, the US remains the "sole superpower" or even "hyperpower" of planet Earth. The planet's top gun And yet **the more dominant the US military becomes in its ability to destroy and the more its forces are spread across the globe, the more** the **defeats** and semi-defeats **pile up**, **the more the missteps and mistakes grow**, the more the strains show, the more [the suicides rise](http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-09-26/news/bs-md-army-suicides-2-20120926_1_suicide-rate-suicide-prevention-army), the more the nation's treasure [disappears](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175545/hellman_kramer_war_pay) down a black hole - and in response to all of this, the more moves the Pentagon makes. A great power without a significant enemy? You might have to go back to the Roman Empire at its height or some Chinese dynasty in full flower to find anything like it. And yet Osama bin Laden is dead. Al-Qaeda is reportedly a shadow of its former self. The great **regional threats** of the moment, North Korea and Iran, **are** regimes **held together by baling wire** and the suffering of their populaces. The only incipient great power rival on the planet, **China**, has [just launched](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/world/asia/china-shows-off-an-aircraft-carrier-but-experts-are-skeptical.html) **its first aircraft carrier**, **a refurbished** Ukrainian **throwaway** from the 1990s on whose deck the country has no planes capable of landing. The US has [1,000](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175338/nick_turse_pentagon%27s_planet%29_of_bases) or more bases around the world; other countries, a [handful](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175592/engelhardt_monopolizing_war). The US spends as much on its military as the next [14 powers](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15/the-15-countries-with-the-highest-military-expenditure-in-2011-table/view) (mostly allies) combined. In fact, it's investing an estimated [$1.45 trillion](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/29/us-lockheed-fighter-idUSBRE82S03L20120329) to produce and operate a single future aircraft, the F-35 - more than any country, the US included, now spends on its national defence annually. The US military is singular in other ways, too. It alone has divided the globe - the complete world - into [six "commands"](http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175308/tomgram%3A_engelhardt,_american_warscapes). With (lest anything be left out) an added command, [Stratcom](http://www.stratcom.mil/), for the heavens and another, recently established, for the only space not previously occupied, [cyberspace](http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/cyber_command/), where we're already unofficially "[at war](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html)". No other country on the planet thinks of itself in faintly comparable military terms. When its high command plans for its future "needs," thanks to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, they repair (don't say "retreat") to a military base south of the capital where they argue out their future and war-game various possible crises while [striding across](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/us/top-general-dempsey-maps-out-us-military-future.html) a map of the world larger than a basketball court. What other military would come up with such a method? The president now has at his command not one, but two private armies. The first is the CIA, which in [recent years](http://www.salon.com/2011/04/28/petraeus_13/) has been [heavily militarised](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-blurring-of-cia-and-military/2011/05/31/AGsLhkGH_story.html), is overseen by a former four-star general (who calls the job "[living the dream](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/us/politics/petraeus-is-eyeing-princetons-top-job-paper-says.html)"), and is running its own private assassination campaigns and drone air wars throughout the Greater Middle East. The second is an [expanding elite](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175547/andrew_bacevich_golden_age_of_special_operations), the Joint Special Operations Command, [cocooned](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175426/nick_turse_a_secret_war_in_120_countries) inside the US military, members of whom are now deployed to hot spots around the globe. The US Navy, with its [11 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier](http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1460) task forces, is dominant on the global waves in a way that only the British Navy might once have been; and the US Air Force controls the global skies in much of the world in a totally uncontested fashion. (Despite numerous wars and conflicts, the [last](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34182338/ns/us_news-military/#.UGzXexgVmHk) American plane possibly downed in aerial combat was in the first Gulf War in 1991.) Across much of the global south, there is no sovereign space Washington's drones can't penetrate to kill those [judged](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175551/tom_engelhardt_assassin_in_chief) by the White House to be threats. In sum, the US is now the sole planetary [Top Gun](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175368/When) in a way that empire-builders once undoubtedly fantasised about, but that none from Genghis Khan on have ever achieved: alone and essentially uncontested on the planet. In fact, by every measure (except success), the likes of it has never been seen. Blindsided by predictably unintended consequences By all the usual measuring sticks, the US should be supreme in a historically unprecedented way. And yet it couldn't be more obvious that it's not, that **despite all the bases**, elite forces, private armies, drones, **aircraft carriers**, wars, conflicts, **strikes**, **interventions,** and clandestine **operations, despite a** [labyrinthine intelligence bureaucracy](http://www.intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence-community/)that never seems to stop growing and into which we pour a minimum of [$80bn a year](http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/02/13/80-billion-puzzle-the-part-of-the-pentagons-budget-you-wont-see/), **nothing seems to work out** in an imperially satisfying way. It couldn't be more obvious that **this is** not **a** glorious dream, but some kind of ever-expanding **imperial nightmare**. This should, of course, have been self-evident since at least early 2004, less than a year after the Bush administration invaded and occupied Iraq, when the roadside bombs started to explode and the suicide bombings to mount, while the comparisons of the US to Rome and of a prospective Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East to the Pax Romana vanished like a morning mist on a blazing day. Still, the wars against relatively small, ill-armed sets of insurgents dragged toward their dismally predictable ends. (It says the world that, after almost 11 years of war, the 2,000th US military death in Afghanistan [occurred](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/09/30/afghan-us-insider-attacks/1603753/) at the hands of an Afghan "ally" in an "insider attack".) In those years, Washington continued to be regularly blindsided by the unintended consequences of its military moves. Surprises - none pleasant - became the order of the day and victories proved vanishingly rare. One thing seems obvious: **a superpower military** with unparalleled capabilities for one-way destruction **no longer has the** more basic **ability to impose its will** anywhere **on the planet**. Quite the opposite, **US military power has been** remarkably **discredited globally** by the most pitiful of forces. From Pakistan to Honduras, just about anywhere it goes in the old colonial or neocolonial world, in those regions known in the contested Cold War era as the Third World, resistance of one unexpected sort or another arises and failure ensues in some often long-drawn-out and spectacular fashion. Given the lack of enemies - a few thousand jihadis, a small set of minority insurgencies, a couple of feeble regional powers - why this is so, what exactly the force is that prevents Washington's success, remains mysterious. Certainly, it's in some way related to the more than half-century of decolonisation movements, rebellions and insurgencies that were a feature of the previous century. It also has something to do with the way economic heft has spread beyond the US, Europe and Japan - with the rise of the "tigers" in Asia, the explosion of the Chinese and Indian economies, the advances of Brazil and Turkey, and the movement of the planet toward some kind of genuine economic multi-polarity. It may also have something to do with the end of the Cold War, which put an end as well to several centuries of imperial or great power competition and left the sole "victor", it now seems clear, heading toward the exits wreathed in self-congratulation. Explain it as you will, it's as if the planet itself, or humanity, had somehow been [inoculated](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175510/andy_kroll_how_empires_fall) against the imposition of imperial power, as if it now rejected it whenever and wherever applied. In the previous century, it took a half-nation, North Korea, backed by Russian supplies and Chinese troops to fight the US to a draw, or a popular insurgent movement backed by a local power, North Vietnam, backed in turn by the Soviet Union and China to defeat American power. Now, small-scale minority insurgencies, largely using roadside bombs and suicide bombers, are fighting American power to a draw (or worse) with no great power behind them at all. Think of the growing force that resists such military might as the equivalent of the "dark matter" in the universe. The evidence is in. We now know (or should know) that it's there, even if we can't see it. Washington's wars on autopilot After the last decade of military failures, stand-offs and frustrations, you might think that this would be apparent in Washington. After all, the US is now visibly an overextended empire, its sway waning from the Greater Middle East to Latin America, the [limits of its power](http://www.amazon.com/dp/0805090169/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20) increasingly evident. And yet, here's the curious thing: two administrations in Washington have drawn none of the obvious conclusions and no matter how the presidential election turns out, it's already clear that, in this regard, nothing will change. Even as military power has proven itself a bust again and again, **our policymakers have come to rely** ever more completely **on a military-first response to global problems**. In other words, **we are** not just a classically overextended empire, but also an overwrought one **operating on** some kind of **militarised autopilot**. Lacking is a learning curve. By all evidence, it's not just that there isn't one, but that there can't be one. Washington, it seems, now has only one mode of thought and action, **no matter who is at the helm or what the problem may be,** and **it** always **involves**, directly or indirectly, openly or clandestinely, **the application of militarised force**. Nor does it matter that each further application only destabilises some region yet more or undermines further what once were known as "American interests". Take Libya, as an example. It briefly seemed to count as a rare American military success story: a decisive intervention in support of a rebellion against a brutal dictator - so brutal, in fact, that the CIA previously [shipped](http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/06/us/us-libya-torture-report/index.html) "terrorist suspects", Islamic rebels fighting against the Gaddafi regime, there for torture. No US casualties resulted, while American and NATO air strikes were decisive in bringing a set of ill-armed, ill-organised rebels to power. In the world of unintended consequences, however, the fall of Gaddafi sent Tuareg mercenaries from his militias, armed with high-end weaponry, [across the border](http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/blue_man_coup_how_gadhafis_mercenaries_broke_mali_20120516/) into Mali. There, when the dust settled, the whole northern part of the country had come unhinged and fallen under the sway of Islamic extremists and al-Qaeda wannabes as other parts of North Africa threatened to destabilise. At the same time, of course, the first American casualties of the intervention occurred when Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans died in an attack on the Benghazi consulate and a local "safe house". With matters worsening regionally, the response couldn't have been more predictable. As Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock of the Washington Post recently [reported](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-secret-meetings-examine-al-qaeda-threat-in-north-africa/2012/10/01/f485b9d2-0bdc-11e2-bd1a-b868e65d57eb_story.html?socialreader_check=0&amp;denied=1), in ongoing secret meetings, the White House is planning for military operations against al-Qaeda-in-the-Magreb (North Africa), now armed with weaponry pillaged from Gaddafi's stockpiles. These plans evidently include the approach used in Yemen (US special forces on the ground and CIA drone strikes), or a Somalia "formula" (drone strikes, special forces operations, CIA operations and the support of African proxy armies), or even at some point "the possibility of direct US intervention". In addition, Eric Schmitt and David Kilpatrick of the New York Times [report](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/world/africa/us-said-to-be-preparing-potential-targets-tied-to-libya-attack.html)that the Obama administration is "preparing retaliation" against those it believes killed the US ambassador, possibly including "drone strikes, special operations raids like the one that killed Osama bin Laden and joint missions with Libyan authorities". The near certainty that, like the previous intervention, this next set of military actions will only further destabilise the region with yet more unpleasant surprises and unintended consequences hardly seems to matter. Nor does the fact that, in crude form, the results of such acts are known to us ahead of time have an effect on the unstoppable urge to plan and order them. Such situations are increasingly [legion](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/africa/private-army-leaves-troubled-legacy-in-somalia.html) across the Greater Middle East and elsewhere. Take one other tiny example: Iraq, from which, after almost a decade-long military disaster, the "last" US units essentially fled in the [middle of the night](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/world/middleeast/last-convoy-of-american-troops-leaves-iraq.html) as 2011 ended. Even in those last moments, the Obama administration and the Pentagon were [still trying](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-13/army-chief-dempsey-willing-to-keep-u-s-troops-in-iraq-past-2011.html) to keep significant numbers of US troops there (and, in fact, did manage to [leave behind](http://news.antiwar.com/2012/10/01/us-may-keep-units-american-troops-in-iraq-despite-lack-of-authority/) possibly several hundred as trainers of elite Iraqi units). Meanwhile, Iraq has been supportive of the embattled Syrian regime and drawn ever closer to Iran, even as its own sectarian strife has ratcheted upward. Having watched this unsettling fallout from its last round in the country, [according to](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/world/middleeast/iraq-faces-new-perils-from-syrias-civil-war.html?pagewanted=2) the New York Times, the US is now negotiating an agreement "that could result in the return of small units of American soldiers to Iraq on training missions. At the request of the Iraqi government, according to General Caslen, a unit of Army Special Operations soldiers was recently deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and help with intelligence". Don't you just want to speak to those negotiators the way you might to a child: No, don't do that! The urge to return to the scene of their previous disaster, however, seems unstaunchable. You could offer various explanations for why our policymakers, military and civilian, continue in such a repetitive - and even from an imperial point of view **- self-destructive vein in situations where unpleasant surprises are** essentially **guaranteed and lack of success a given**. Yes, there is the military-industrial complex to be fed. Yes, we are interested in the control of crucial resources, especially energy, and so on. But **it's** probably more **reasonable to say that a deeply militarised mindset and the global maneuvers that go with it are** by now **just part of the way of life of a Washington eternally "at war".** They are the tics of a great power with the equivalent of Tourette's Syndrome. **They happen because they** can't help but happen, because they **are engraved in the policy DNA of our national security complex**, and can evidently no longer be altered. In other words, they can't help themselves.

### Root Cause

#### Militarism is the root cause of mass violence by the state

Jenkins 14 [Colin Jenkins (founder, editor and Social Economics Department chair at the Hampton Institute, and has been published on Truthout, Common Dreams, Dissident Voice, Black Agenda Report, Popular Resistance, and in Z Magazine), "Coming Home to Roost: American Militarism, War Culture, and Police Brutality," Hampton Institution – Society & Culture, 2/27/2014, http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#.Vmuxv\_krLIU] AZ

America's culture of war and violence was bound to catch up to all of us. Over the past decade, yearly US military expenditures [more than doubled](http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending) from a little over $300 billion in 2001 to over [$682 billion](http://portal.sipri.org/publications/pages/expenditures/country-search) in 2013. [[61]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn61" \o ") [[62]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn62" \o ") US military spending represents 39% of global spending - more than the combined spending of China, Russia, United Kingdom, Japan, France, Saudi Arabia, Germany, India, Italy, Canada, and Australia. Since 1945, the US military has invaded, intervened in, or occupied at least 50 countries.[[63]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn63" \o ") Currently, the US operates and/or controls between 700 and 800 military bases worldwide, a list that includes locations in 63 countries. In addition to these bases, there are 255, 065 US military personnel deployed in 156 countries worldwide.[[64]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn64" \o ") This global military presence has real and often disastrous consequences for human life. In the 2011 book, The Deaths of Others: The Fate of Civilians in America's Wars, author John Tirman estimates that "between six and seven million people died in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq alone, the majority of them civilians."[[65]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn65" \o ") However, wartime casualties pale in comparison to the lingering effects, chaos, and disorder stemming from prolonged military occupations. "In the period 1950-2005, there have been 82 million avoidable deaths from deprivation (avoidable mortality, excess deaths, excess mortality , deaths that did not have to happen) associated with countries occupied by the US in the post-1945 era."[[66]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn66" \o ") While it's difficult to gauge how much of a role the military occupations played in this devastation, it's safe to assume the instability created by such occupations factor significantly. The violence that is perpetrated abroad mimics the violent culture at home. As of June 2013, it's estimated that there are [up to 310 million guns](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/04/a-minority-of-americans-own-guns-but-just-how-many-is-unclear/) in the US, which amounts to just about one gun per person (the US population is 314 million).[[67]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn67" \o ") The next highest number of guns per capita by country is Serbia at 58% and Yemen at 55%, compared to the US at 90%.[[68]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn68" \o ") Since 1968, there have been 1,384,171 gunfire deaths in the US - which amounts to more American deaths than from all of the US wars in the nation's history combined (1,171,177).[[69]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn69" \o ") The US averages 10.2 "firearm-related deaths" per every 100,000 people. Americans are 10 times more likely to suffer gun-related deaths than people in Australia and Ireland; 15 times more likely than people in Turkey; 40 times more likely than those in England; and 170 times more likely than those in Japan. [[70]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn70" \o ") America's police forces also reflect this culture. And while law enforcement agencies across the US have delivered pain and devastation to poorer, inner-city communities for nearly a half-century, their militarization has only recently begun to attract national attention. Much of this attention can be pinpointed to the Occupy Wall Street movement and the response it received from police, which included unadulterated brutality against peaceful protesters, unnecessary use of force, and the negligent use of tasers and Oleoresin Capsicum (pepper) spray - a substance that has been [proven](http://blogs.plos.org/speakeasyscience/2011/11/20/about-pepper-spray/) to cause "adverse cardiac, respiratory, and neurologic effects, including arrhythmias and even sudden death" in some cases.[[71]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn71" \o ") However, it was not merely these careless and sadistic actions which have attracted such attention, but rather the changing profile of the victims of this brutality - young, white, "middle-class" women and men. "For 25 years, the primary 'beneficiaries' of police militarization have been poor people in high-crime areas - people who generally haven't had the power or platform to speak up," [explains](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QfXEDcymNOgJ:motherboard.vice.com/blog/police-militarization-an-interview-with-radley-balko+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us) Balko. "The Occupy protesters were largely affluent, white, and deft at using cell phones and social media to document and publicize incidents of excessive force." Their public victimization, despite falling far short of the police brutality that has existed within communities of color for decades, inevitably struck a chord with a nation still inundated with white supremacist ideals that assign varying degrees of value to American lives - mainly based on the color of one's skin and their socioeconomic background. Ultimately, white members of the media, seeing reflections of their own sons and daughters being abused, suddenly chose to report en masse. White viewers, seeing reflections of their neighbors and relatives, suddenly expressed widespread disgust. This was no longer an episode of COPS, "glamorizing controversial police tactics" and perpetuating "implicit biases regarding race and class."[[72]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn72" \o ") These were now white, middle-class lives being affected and brutalized. Essentially, the hate that Malcolm X spoke of, historically reserved for "defenseless black people," is now developing into indiscriminate rage - targeting poor and working-class people of all colors throughout the US. Through this ongoing process, it is becoming apparent that even white privilege, in itself, is beginning to lose its immunity from this unaccountable wrath. The 2011 beating of a homeless schizophrenic man, [Kelly Thomas](http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/13/us/california-homeless-beating-verdict/), in a transit parking lot in Fullerton, California confirmed this wrath. The incident was, unbeknown to officers, recorded by security cameras on the night of July 5, 2011, and later viewed by millions of Americans as the officers' trial was closely followed. Thomas was unarmed and posed no threat at the time of the beating. "The surveillance camera footage shows Thomas being beaten, clubbed and stunned with a Taser by police." [[73]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn73" \o ")Thomas suffered a coma and died five days later in a hospital bed.

### VTL/PTSD

#### The deification of violence is intertwined with American militarism abroad –war culture that makes possible endless warfare, devalues human life, and causes psychological trauma

Jenkins 14 [Colin Jenkins (founder, editor and Social Economics Department chair at the Hampton Institute, and has been published on Truthout, Common Dreams, Dissident Voice, Black Agenda Report, Popular Resistance, and in Z Magazine), "Coming Home to Roost: American Militarism, War Culture, and Police Brutality," Hampton Institution – Society & Culture, 2/27/2014, http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#.Vmuxv\_krLIU] AZ

America's "war culture" goes far beyond psychological preparation and conditioning. Ultimately, and most significantly, it includes the physical projection of this collective mentality. It includes, as social commentator Joe Rogan simply [put it](http://lybio.net/joe-rogan-the-american-war-machine/people/), "sending these big metal machines that kill people" halfway across the world.[[23]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn23) The young, working-class women and men (like myself) who become the willing participants of this projection are the very products of this conditioned mentality. As children, our inherent submission to objectification and subsequent immersion into "war culture" makes this possible. Unfortunately, the effects of war are real. They are shocking. And they are horrifying. The mental health effects on the participants of these wars are vast, especially with regards to the modern battlefield. Soldiers are returning to the US with a variety of such conditions - most notably Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), Depression, and Anxiety. Dr. Deborah Warden, of the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, noted in a [report](http://galvin-group.com/media/22741/tbi204.pdf) for the Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation that elements specifically related to modern warfare have resulted in a significant increase in head trauma-related injuries.[[24]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn24)Two major factors in this development are technological advances in protective equipment and a relative increase in "blast attacks." "In the current conflict, mortality has declined, and it is believed that this is because of the advances in body armor worn by the military personnel," explains Dr. Warden. "With the high-quality body armor, individuals who may have died in previous wars may survive with possible injuries to extremities and head and neck." In addition to this, "more TBI may be occurring in the current war because of the frequency of explosive, or blast attacks. Military sources report that approximately two thirds of army war zone evacuations are due to blast," and "88% of injuries seen at second echelon treatment sites were due to blast." In a study conducted nearly six years after the beginning of the US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, it was determined that, out of 1.64 million military service members who were deployed into these arenas, "approximately 300,000 individuals currently suffer from PTSD or major depression, and that [320,000 individuals](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG720.pdf) experienced a probable TBI during deployment." [[25]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn25) Additionally, "about one-third of those previously deployed have at least one of these three conditions, and about 5 percent report symptoms of all three." A separate study found that "21 percent of active duty soldiers and 43 percent of reserve soldiers [developed symptoms](http://www.medicaldaily.com/insomnia-can-worsen-ptsd-depression-and-anxiety-returning-war-veterans-247233) significantly related to mental health disorders."[[26]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn26) According to another study: "15,204 soldiers who had completed their first deployment participated in two questionnaires about their mental health and sleep patterns from 2001 to 2008. During baseline questionnaires before deployment, most soldiers did not have any psychiatric disorders or a history of one. However, during follow-up questionnaires, 522 soldiers had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 151 have anxiety, and 303 were depressed. Fifty percent of the soldiers studied reported combat-related trauma and 17 percent reported having insomnia prior to their deployment." [[27]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn27) The increase in mental illness among soldiers has been identified as the main cause of increasing suicide rates. In 2012, the Army reported that [325 suicides](http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/02/us/army-suicides) occurred within its ranks - "Our highest on record," according to Lt. Gen. Howard Bromberg, deputy chief of staff, manpower and personnel for the Army.[[28]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn28) Naturally, within any arena of combat where young, impressionable adults are moved around like pawns on a chessboard, human emotion runs wild. Despite the robotic conditioning that occurs during basic training, this chaotic environment has a tendency to penetrate the human psyche, bringing about an extreme range of feelings, vexations, actions, and reactions. Human beings are simply not equipped to handle the terrors that accompany war - the sight of human corpses, charred and mangled bodies, some of them children - in their totality. And coping skills, whether inherent or forced, vary in effectiveness from person to person. Unfortunately, some cope by internalizing the terror. In these cases, we see the worst in humanity. The infamous Wikileaks [video](http://www.collateralmurder.com/) that leaked in 2010, showing "thirty-eight grisly minutes of US airmen casually slaughtering a dozen Iraqis in 2007" - including two Reuters newsmen - puts this savagery into focus "not because it shows us something we didn't know, but because we can watch it unfold in real time. Real people, flesh and blood, gunned down from above in a [hellish rain of fire](http://www.thenation.com/blog/war-crimes-iraq-and-afghanistan)."[[29]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn29) The video footage, which immediately went viral, came on the heels of the haunting images taken at Abu Ghraib, where Iraqi prisoners were physically and sexually abused, tortured, raped, sodomized, and killed by American and Iraqi soldiers.[[30]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn30) Other such incidents were inevitable. 2010 was an especially gruesome year in Afghanistan. A February 12th nighttime raid by U.S. Special Operations forces near Gardez [killed five people](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/12/AR2010041200761.html?hpid=moreheadlines), including two pregnant women.[[31]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn31) Another [airstrike](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/AR2010022200842.html?nav=emailpage)by U.S. Special Operations forces helicopters on February 23 killed more than 20 civilians and injured numerous others. Among the injured was a 4-year-old boy who lost both of his legs. A few months later, during a visit with the child at a hospital in Kabul, Afghan President Hamid Karzai "scooped him up from his mattress and walked out to the hospital courtyard," and asked, "Who injured you?" as helicopters passed overhead. "The boy, crying alongside his relatives, pointed at the sky."[[32]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn32) A few months later, in April, American troops "raked a large passenger bus with gunfire" near Kandahar, Afghanistan, [killing 5 civilians](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/world/asia/13afghan.html?ref=world&_r=1&) and wounding 18.[[33]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn33) In January of 2014, numerous photos showing US Marines [burning and looting](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/military-investigating-photos-of-marines-burning-bodies-in-fallujah-in-2004/2014/01/15/9a37fc36-7e10-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html) the dead bodies of Iraqi soldiers were obtained by the media. "Two of the photos show a Marine apparently pouring a flammable liquid on two bodies. Other shots show the remains on fire and, after the flames went out, charred. A Marine in another photo is shown apparently rifling through clothing amid one corpse's skeletal remains. Another Marine is shown posing in a crouch with his rifle pointing toward a human skull." [[34]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn34) Overall, more than a dozen bodies were shown in the photos, some of which were covered with flies and one being eaten by a dog. Considering the savagery that accompanies such an environment, it is not difficult to see how undervalued human life becomes. The soldiers who carry out, witness, or even hear of this brutality are almost certain to suffer long-standing mental health effects. According to the Department of Veterans Affairs website, [symptoms](http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/PTSD-overview/basics/what-is-ptsd.asp) of PTSD include "bad memories or nightmares" and "flashbacks"; triggered and impulsive emotions; intense feelings of fear, guilt, or shame; and "hyperarousal" - feeling jittery, paranoid, and "always on the lookout for danger."[[35]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn35) The [effects of TBI](http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/traumatic-brain-injury/basics/definition/con-20029302) include numerous sensory problems, depression and anxiety, and severe mood swings and/or aggressive behaviors, among many other things. [[36]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#_edn36) When all is said and done, and the politicians decide to bring them home, the soldiers who are lucky enough to return in one physical piece are often shattered into bits and fragments of mental and emotional distress. Often times, these soldiers face limited options - one of the most common of which is transitioning to a career in law enforcement.

### Turns Terrorism

#### Militarism inspires domestic terrorism

Boggs 5 [Carl Boggs (Professor of Social Science at National University), "Imperial Delusions: American Militarism and Endless War," 2005] AZ

The culture of violence extends to acts of domestic terrorism, which in the 199os found fertile soil on the terrain of reactionary populism. Proto- fascist episodes of violence directed at public targets were frequent, the work of seemingly ordinary people taking some very ordinary American ideas (freedom, rugged individualism, patriotism, the right to bear arms) to fanat- ical extremes. Such actions have been, at least indirectly, encouraged by the gun lobby, media images, gang subcultures, generally high rates of violent crimes, the revitalized war economy, and plentiful examples of US. military intervention abroad. Local incidents of terrorism proliferated throughout the 19905: according to the ATE in the peak year 1993 there were almost 2,400 bombings across the nation, leading to 70 deaths and 1,375 injuries. Reportedly hundreds of other actions were intercepted by the FBI and po- lice agencies. The heightened interest in bombs and guns, including sophis- ticated assault weapons, was fueled by mail-order companies that cater to paramilitary enthusiasts, not to mention what is available through the Inter- net, shortwave radio, fax systems, and talk-radio programs hosted by militia sympathizers. Aided by the Internet and alarmed by domestic and global threats, hate groups have multiplied since just the late 199os. In 1998 ob- servers from Klanwatch and the Militia Task Force documented an all-time high of 474 hate groups in the United States, an increase of 20 percent from 1996. The targeting of many groups of Arabs, Muslims, and immigrants was sharpened in the aftermath of 9/11, and the number of crimes directed against those minorities also multiplied. This orbit includes biblical doom- sayers often inspired by violent rock lyrics; collectors of high-powered weapons; builders of chemical devices and bombs; architects of Internet websites that coordinate literally hundreds of reactionary groups. Right-wing terrorism was of course responsible for the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building in April 1994, but this bold attack was simply the tip of the iceberg; politically motivated violence became a durable element of the culture, though it virtually disappeared on the Left after the 197os. Recurrent assaults on women’s health clinics took place, along with increasing numbers of attacks directed against minorities, gays, Arabs, and Muslims. The violent mood has been nourished by a mounting sense of powerlessness in American society resulting from several factors: economic globalization, the growth of bureaucratic and corporate power, influence of media culture, and popular cynicism over the rather boring, meaningless character of normal politics. The violent mood is exacerbated by the spread of paranoid, conspiratorial beliefs that often come with fears of nebulous intruders or some kind of imminent apocalypse.15 Paranoid obsession with black helicopters, alien creatures, drug cartels, and secret military missions-all seen as possible elements of a tyrannical new order-can be understood in this milieu. Such beliefs can produce a violent de- monology, which, when combined with genuine fears of terrorist attacks, furnish a convenient substitute for familiar cold war images of the Communist devil. Domestic terrorism is hardly synonymous with reactionary populism, but the ideological milieu established by the latter helped nourish the former. As noted above, thousands of politically motivated acts of violence were carried out in the United States during the 199os, with no doubt thousands more intercepted before they could be launched. These figures dwarf anything attributed to al Qaeda, but this homegrown variety of terrorism received little media attention. At the time of the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh and his accomplices, militia groups were at their peak, with membership estimated to be as high as four million (in- cluding over four hundred thousand paramilitary activists).]ust before the bombing former CIA director William Colby said:

### Turns Racism

#### Militarism condones violence against non-white peoples by defining them as disposable and provides the principal motivation for anti-black violence

Jenkins 14 [Colin Jenkins (founder, editor and Social Economics Department chair at the Hampton Institute, and has been published on Truthout, Common Dreams, Dissident Voice, Black Agenda Report, Popular Resistance, and in Z Magazine), "Coming Home to Roost: American Militarism, War Culture, and Police Brutality," Hampton Institution – Society & Culture, 2/27/2014, http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#.Vmuxv\_krLIU] AZ

Any discussion involving American militarism must include the underpinnings of white supremacy, an all-encompassing ideology which has ravaged the lives and communities of non-white peoples for centuries. White supremacy is fueled by objectification and, more specifically, the collective dehumanization of peoples of color. Its power lies in the fact that it not only transcends the fundamental societal arrangement of class, but that it is embraced largely by working class whites who have shown a willingness to internalize and project their own oppression onto others - in this case, the non-white working classes. Not surprisingly, this foundation extends far beyond the geographic confines of the US, representing the basis for which the "[White Man's Burden](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_White_Man's_Burden)" and age-old foreign policies like the [Roosevelt Corollary](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roosevelt_Corollary)of the [Monroe Doctrine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monroe_Doctrine) operate. The ties that bind what Martin Luther King, Jr. once referred to as "the giant triplets of racism, materialism, and militarism" cannot be underestimated, as they provide the self-righteous, societal "justification" necessary to carry out indiscriminate acts of aggression both here and abroad. Social theorist bell hooks' assessment of George Zimmerman, the self-appointed neighborhood watchman turned murderer of Trayvon Martin, captures this mindset: "White supremacy has taught him that all people of color are threats irrespective of their behavior. Capitalism has taught him that, at all costs, his property can and must be protected. Patriarchy has taught him that his masculinity has to be proved by the willingness to conquer fear through aggression; that it would be unmanly to ask questions before taking action."[[7]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn7" \o ") When Muhammad Ali refused to fight in Vietnam, famously stating, "I ain't got no quarrel with them Viet Cong; No Viet Cong ever called me nigger," he was referring to the dominant power structure of white supremacy that had not only subjugated him in his own country, but also had global implications regarding imperialism, colonialism, and ever-increasing militarism. Ali, along with other conscious Black Americans, recognized life in the U.S. as a microcosm of the war in Vietnam. Whether in Birmingham, Alabama or the Ben Tre Province in South Vietnam, black and brown people were being murdered indiscriminately. African Americans had their share of enemies at home - Bull Connor, George Wallace, the Ku Klux Klan, the FBI, Jim Crow - and, for good reason, had no vested interest in wars abroad. Their priorities were defense and self-preservation in their homeland; not offense and destruction in Vietnam. Racism is a cousin to militarism, and its influence on shaping American culture over the years is undeniable. Despite misconceptions, reconstruction in the post-slavery US was no more kind to Black Americans than during colonial years, especially in the southern states. "In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the lynching of Black people in the Southern and border states became an institutionalized method used by whites to terrorize Blacks and maintain white supremacy," [explains](http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1979/2/79.02.04.x.html)Robert A. Gibson. "In the South, during the period 1880 to 1940, there was deep-seated and all-pervading hatred and fear of the Negro which led white mobs to turn to 'lynch law' as a means of social control."[[8]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn8" \o ") These lynchings were almost always spontaneous, rooted in white supremacist and racist emotion, and void any semblance of due process. They were also mostly supported - whether through direct supervision or "turning a blind eye" - by local politicians, judges, and police forces. According to Tuskegee Institute figures, between the years 1882 and 1951, 3,437 African Americans were lynched in the United States - a tally that amounts to roughly 50 per year, or a little over 4 per month through the lifespan of an entire generation.[[9]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn9" \o ") Essentially, for nearly a century, "freed" slaves were still very much at the mercy of, as WEB DuBois once noted, "men who hated and despised Negroes and regarded it as loyalty to blood, patriotism to country, and filial tribute to the fathers to lie, steal or kill in order to discredit these black folk." [[10]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn10" \o ") This general hatred was not only projected by white citizens throughout the country, but remained institutionalized by laws of racial segregation - also known as "Jim Crow" - in much of the US until the 1960s. While the courageous and awe-inspiring Civil Rights movement of the '60s was successful in curbing some government-backed segregation, the ugly stain of white supremacy has endured well into the 21stcentury through a convoluted lens of extreme poverty, poor education, lack of opportunity, and disproportionate imprisonment. It has become blatantly evident within the world of 'criminal justice,' and more specifically through the ways in which law enforcement engages and interacts with Black communities across America. Modern forms of lynching have gained a foothold with laws such as New York City's ["Stop and Frisk"](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rWtDMPaRD8)and Florida's infamous "Stand Your Ground" - with both providing legal outlets to harass and kill Black Americans at an alarming rate. However, even before such laws, police officers terrorized inner-cities for decades. The most glaring example occurred in 1991 with the beating of Rodney King - an incident that uncovered a deliberate and widespread brand of racist policing as well as "an organizational culture that alienates itself from the public it is designed to serve" while teaching "to command and confront, not to communicate."[[11]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn11" \o ") The 2012 murder of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman served as a sobering reminder of the tragically subhuman value that has been placed on Black life in America. Martin's death rightfully brought on cries of an "open season on young black men," while another 2012 murder, this time of 17-year-old Jordan Davis, who was shot and killed by Michael Dunn in broad daylight while sitting in a car with three friends, reiterated this fact. Like Martin, Davis was unarmed and posed no threat - and certainly not enough of a threat to justify lethal force. In Davis' case, the murderer, Dunn, indiscriminately fired 8 bullets into the vehicle where Davis and his friends were sitting. The public reaction to the two murders (adults killing unarmed children, mind you), especially from those who somehow felt compelled to defend the killers, as well as the subsequent trials, the posthumous (and false) 'criminalizing' of the victims with decontextualized images and information, and the total absence of justice on both accounts - all products of a long-standing culture of white supremacy - exposed the lie that is "post-racial" America. However, these reactions were and are nothing new. It has been "open season" on young black males for many years in the US, and very few outside African American or activist communities couldn't care less. One [study](http://mxgm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Operation-Ghetto-Storm.pdf) estimates that "one Black person is killed every 24 hours by police, security guards, or vigilantes."[[12]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn12" \o ") Furthermore, "43% of the(se) shootings occurred after an incident of racial profiling," Adam Hudson [tells us](http://www.alternet.org/news-amp-politics/1-black-man-killed-every-28-hours-police-or-vigilantes-america-perpetually-war-its). "This means police saw a person who looked or behaved "suspiciously" largely because of their skin color and attempted to detain the suspect before killing them. [[13]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn13" \o ") Many of the victims of these "extrajudicial" killings posed no threat at the time of their murders, as was the case with Amadou Diallo, Sean Bell, Oscar Grant, Aaron Campbell, Orlando Barlow, Steven Eugene Washington, Ervin Jefferson, Kendrec Mcdade, Kimani Gray, Wendell Allen, Ronald Madison, James Brisette, Tavares McGill, and Victor Steen, to [name a few](http://www.theroot.com/photos/2013/06/unarmed_black_men_shot_by_police_20_sad_stories.html). [[14]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn14" \o ") Some, like Brisette (17), Gray (16), McGill (16), and Steen (17), were children. Others, like Madison and Steven Eugene Washington, were mentally ill or autistic. All were unarmed. If the Rodney King trial taught us (and police) anything, it was that officers in the US can inexplicably beat an unarmed and non-threatening Black man to near-death and face no consequences for doing so. Twenty years later, this unaccountability on the part of law enforcement has evolved into an overly-aggressive and often fatal approach to interacting with innocent, young black men. This has never been more evident than during a rash of indiscriminate and blatant acts of police brutality in recent years. All peoples of color have become viable targets, and some of the most alarming examples have been directed at children and people with special needs and disabilities.

### Turns Biopower

#### The biopolitical state manages the population through militarism, thus implicitly conditioning citizens to become "productive" and proper soldiers – in the culture of war, those deemed deviant are disposable

Giroux 13 [Henry Giroux (social critic and educator, and the author of many books, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, "Violence, USA: The Warfare State and the Hardening of Everyday Life," excerpt from *America’s Education Deficit and the War on Youth*, 2013] AZ

The politics and pedagogy of death begins in the celebration of war and ends in the unleashing of violence on all those considered disposable on the domestic front. A survival-of-the-fittest ethic and the utter annihilation of the Other have now become normalized, saturating everything from state policy to institutional practices to the mainstream media. How else to explain the growing taste for violence in, for example, the world of professional sports, extending from professional hockey to extreme martial arts events? The debased nature of violence and punishment seeping into the U.S. cultural landscape becomes clear in the recent revelation that the New Orleans Saints professional football team was “running a ‘bounty program’ which rewarded players for inflicting injuries on opposing players.”[37](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en37) In what amounts to a regime of terror pandering to the thrill of the crowd and a take-no-prisoners approach to winning, a coach offered players a cash bonus for “laying hits that resulted in other athletes being carted off the field or landing on the injured player list.”[38](http://monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa#en38) The bodies of those considered competitors, let alone enemies, are now targeted as the war-as-politics paradigm turns the United States into a warfare state. And even as violence flows out beyond the boundaries of state-sponsored militarism and the containment of the sporting arena, citizens are increasingly enlisted to maximize their own participation and pleasure in violent acts as part of their everyday existence—even when fellow citizens become the casualties. Maximizing the pleasure of violence with its echo of fascist ideology far exceeds the boundaries of state-sponsored militarism and violence. Violence can no longer be defined as an exclusively state function, since the market in its various economic and cultural manifestations now enacts its own violence on numerous populations no longer considered of value. Perhaps nothing signals the growing market-based savagery of the contemporary moment more than the privatized and corporate-fueled gun culture of the United States.

### Turns Patriarchy

#### Militarism entrenches patriarchy and sexist gender roles

White 7 [Aaronette M. White (professor of social psychology at UC Santa Cruz), "All the Men Are Fighting for Freedom, All the Women Are Mourning Their Men, but Some of Us Carried Guns: A Raced‐Gendered Analysis of Fanon’s Psychological Perspectives on War," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 2007] AZ

As social institutions, military forces are not gender neutral. The ideology of militarism interacts with discrete forms of military organizations to produce gender identities consonant with patriarchal ideology and practices (Cock 1991; de Waal 2002; Enloe 2004b). Militarist and patriarchal ideologies and practices often work against democratic values associated with revolutionary transformation. Thus nationalist parties engaged in armed struggle often end up “shooting democracy in the foot” (Mama 2000). The patriarchal nature of war, militarism, and military training combined to perpetuate violent injustices and entrench colonized mentalities that Fanon predicted revolutionary violence would eradicate (Mama 2000; de Waal 2002; Campbell 2003). The patriarchal mentality of many African men nurtured under colonial rule was reinforced during independence struggles as nationalist consciousness became militarized through values imparted by involvement with the armed forces (Cock 1991; de Waal 2002; Enloe 2004b). Authoritarianism and the notion of combat as men’s work promoted narrow, hypermasculine views of manhood (e.g., manhood as aggressive, competitive, stoic, and the opposite of anything feminine). Revolutionary war also produced sexual divisions of labor that worked against the equal recognition of women by men in military forces. As an ideology, militarism construes violence in terms of various masculine ideals—courage, virility, chivalry, and superiority (Mama 2000; de Waal 2002; Enloe 2004b). Authoritarianism, deemed essential to military organization, construes power in terms of absolute authority, hierarchy, and obedience (de Waal 2002). By privileging hierarchy and rule by command, authoritarianism works against democratic values such as free expression, consensus, egalitarianism, and transparency in decision making (de Waal 2002). Authoritarian values are important to military organizations because war is strategic, aimed at gaining and exercising power. Combat is the manifestation of power in its most brutal and uncompromising form (de Waal 2002). Authoritarianism molds a soldier who will obey orders without thinking and will internalize unquestioning loyalty to his superiors in ways that minimize the chance that he will flinch in combat (Grossman 1995; de Waal 2002). However, by fostering blind compliance military values work against the autonomy of soldiers, regardless of gender, complicating any sense of agency that Fanon claimed combat would restore. This ~~blind~~ compliance works against women’s sense of agency, in particular, because prewar gender inequalities are exacerbated by a predominantly male military leadership more prone to abuse its power during the war given the subordinate status of most female soldiers combined with the stress of life in the camps. In addition to the authoritarianism that pervades the military as a social institution, the stereotype of the supermacho combat soldier perpetuates hypermasculine attitudes and values that also work against a male soldier’s recognition of a woman soldier (or any woman) as his equal. South African feminist sociologist Jacklyn Cock elaborates: “War does not challenge women to prove that they are women, whereas wars have been historically symbolized as the touchstone of ‘manliness.’ The concept of war as a proving ground of manliness has centered on the notion of combat, which is understood to be the ultimate test of masculinity, and thus crucial to the ideological structure of patriarchy” (1991, 235–36). The guerrilla warfare tactics used in most of Africa’s revolutionary wars did not rely on hand‐to‐hand combat. They often relied on ambushing patrols, sabotaging communication and transportation lines, and making hit‐and‐run attacks against enemy posts—tasks women are fully capable of carrying out (Goldman 1982; Cock 1991; Goldstein 2001). Yet the myth of combat as men’s work dies hard; even with today’s technologically sophisticated war weaponry, the “presumption that a man is unproven in his manhood until he has engaged in collective, violent, and physical struggle against someone categorized as the enemy” is widespread (Enloe 1983, 13). Indeed, Fanon’s arguments concerning the transformative potential of war resonate with such masculinist overtones. Masculinist notions also serve as powerful tools for making men into soldiers because military forces encourage aggressiveness and competitiveness while censuring emotional expression and denouncing physically weak soldiers as effeminate (Enloe 1983; Cock 1991; Goldstein 2001). Combat readiness, male bonding, and social cohesion are achieved through military training by emphasizing the otherness of both women and the enemy: women represent the weaker sex, home and hearth, and the need to be protected, while the enemy represents the weaker force to be dominated and conquered (Enloe 1983; Cock 1991; Goldstein 2001). Given the interactive relationship among militarism, military forces as social institutions, and combat as the test of a man’s masculinity, it is not surprising that women have been excluded from most combat, whether in conventional or guerrilla armies (Goldman 1982; Cock 1991; Goldstein 2001).11

#### Gender violence impact

Alexander, PhD. In International relations, 2010

[Ronni, “"Confronting Militarization: Intersections of Gender(ed) Violence, Militarization and Resistance in the Pacific", edited by Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via, page 71, Jacob]

In the Pacific, as elsewhere, militarization and militarized mentalities often constitute a form of structural violence that is gendered and is not only violent in and of itself but also, under certain circumstances, results in direct violence. Quite frequently, this takes the form of gender violence, most often directed against women by men. Gender violence is “a systematic, institutionalized and/or programmatic violence (sexual, physical, psychological) that operates through the constructs of gender” (Nayak and Suchland 2006, 469).

In the Pacific, conflict and gender violence are at least in part a legacy of colonial rule that institutionalized male privilege through systems for control over social and economic resources such as land and social position, as well as by recreating and reinforcing gendered roles. Colonization and cultural governance also created ethnic tensions as different ethnic and/or tribal groups were brought together, often in ways that suited the needs of the colonizers, and later those of local elites, rather than the colonized. The pyramid of colonization privileged white over nonwhite, male over female, and some ethnicities over others, generally ensuring white men a secure spot on top and relegating indigenous women to the bottom. Similarly, modern cultural governance metes out legitimacy to some more than others, privileging men over women and giving transgendered people virtually no place all.

#### Militarism results in a patriarchal and ethnic structural violence whose sole focus is to further the war machine

**Alexander,** professor of transnational relations**, 10**

[Ronni, Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives, edited by: Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via, page 71-72, BS]

Militarization is a powerful tool of cultural governance, and it uses gen­der to further its goals. The archetype of women as mothers, wives, and caregivers commits women to bearing and raising sons to send off to war to fight for their nation. When caregiving institutions are militarized, the people who work in them (largely women) are serving military aims, even if they do not consciously support them.

Cultural governance and militarization also work to define gender violence, as they marginalize women in general and certain women in particular, thereby legitimizing some forms of gender violence but not necessarily others. Laura Kaplan (1994) explains the relationship between privileged masculinity and militarization with what she calls "patriarchal militarism." One aspect of patriarchal militarism is that it encourages men to create images of women as "devalued others" and then use those images as a "model for training and inspiring masculine warriors to devalue and distance themselves from enemies" (L. Kaplan 1994, 124). The devalued images of women used by the military encourage gender violence, often so much so that it is disguised or made invisible. Patriarchal militarism uses dual images of male and female, masculine and feminine to enhance male violence at the expense of women. In that both men and women play the roles based on this gender opposition, they are part of this process.

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Pacific women identify the following as the major causes of conflict in the region:

Increasingly unequal access to land, paid employment and economic resources, particularly when inequality is based on ethnicity; centralisation of resources and services; lack of involvement in decision-making and authority; a weakening of traditional methods of dispute resolution; and the growth of a "Rambo" culture of violence and guns among young unemployed men. (Thomas 2005,157)

Local violence is manifested not only in an increase in armed conflict but also in direct violence by armed youth gangs or increasing domestic vio­lence. It is also visible as structural/cultural violence in such forms as gen­der and ethnic discrimination, lack of access to social resources for women and particular ethnic groups, and discriminatory legislation. The outbreak of armed conflict in the region, the use of peacekeepers to contain that conflict, and participation by Pacific Island forces in international peace­keeping have helped to spread the culture of violence within the islands, reaching more and more people and causing more and more pain.

#### Militarism reifies patriarchal gender roles and diverts attention away from needed policies

Lutz 2 [Catherine Lutz (American anthropologist and Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Family Professor of Anthropology and International Studies at Brown University), "Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization and the Current Crisis," American Anthropologist, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 723-735, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3567250] AZ

It is true, however, that the capillaries of militarization have fed and molded social Institutions seemingly little connected to battle. In other words, the process of militarization has been not simply a matter of weaponry wielded and bodies buried. It has also created what is taken as knowledge, particularly in the fields of physics and psychology, both significantly shaped by military funding and goals (Leslie 1993; Lot: 1997]. It has redefined proper masculinity and sexuality (D'Amico I997; Enloe 2000), further marginalizing anyone but the male heterosexual-the only category of person seen (it for the full citizenship conferred by combat. Militarization emerges from the images of soldiers in recruitment ads that blast across the popular culture landscape through both the $2 billion annual recruitment budget and Hollywood fare from The Sands of lwa lime to Black Hawk Down. It has rear-ranged U.S. social geography through internal migrations to the South and West for military work (Markusen et al. 1991) and has accelerated the suburbanization process and the creation of black bantusians in the core of older cities, it created the bulk of both the federal deficit and the resistance to social welfare benefits in a workforce divided into those soldiers and veterans with universal health care, a living wage, and other benefits, and those without them (Hardin 1991). It has contributed to the making of race and gender in the United States through the biases of military spending toward the whiter and more male seg- ments of the workforce. Much of the history and the physical and symbolic costs of war on the home front and of war itself have been invisible to people both inside and outside the military. This is the outcome of secrecy laws, of an increasingly muzzled or actively complicit corporate media, and of the difficulty of assessing a highly complex and far-flung institution and the not-so-obviously related consequences or its actions. The costs have also been shrouded behind simplified histodes, public relations work, or propaganda. Most recently, Tom Brokaw's The Greatest Generation, Stephen Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan, and the many best-selling paeans to soldiering by Stephen Ambrose are responsible for selling a powerful nostalgia and desire for war in a new generation. These popular culture works assert that war builds character, makes men, and grants freedom to the nation and a kind of supercitizenship to those who wage it. This militarization in the United States is not, of course, what the current crisis is supposedly about. The book- shelves of stores that have a section devoted to our current predicament burst with books on Islam and fundamentalist Islam, the Taliban, and Nostradamus. They are on “the Arab World” and the vectors of danger to the US population in the form of germs and weapons of mass destruction, Weapons that are construed as dangerous only in the hands of the immature nations, something Hugh Gusterson has termed "nuclear orientalism" (1999].

### A2 Fanon [Revolutionary War]

#### Fanon is wrong – combat is not revolutionary and only re-entrenches colonialist and patriarchal attitudes

White 7 [Aaronette M. White (professor of social psychology at UC Santa Cruz), "All the Men Are Fighting for Freedom, All the Women Are Mourning Their Men, but Some of Us Carried Guns: A Raced‐Gendered Analysis of Fanon’s Psychological Perspectives on War," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 2007] AZ

As social institutions, military forces are not gender neutral. The ideology of militarism interacts with discrete forms of military organizations to produce gender identities consonant with patriarchal ideology and practices (Cock 1991; de Waal 2002; Enloe 2004b). Militarist and patriarchal ideologies and practices often work against democratic values associated with revolutionary transformation. Thus nationalist parties engaged in armed struggle often end up “shooting democracy in the foot” (Mama 2000). The patriarchal nature of war, militarism, and military training combined to perpetuate violent injustices and entrench colonized mentalities that Fanon predicted revolutionary violence would eradicate (Mama 2000; de Waal 2002; Campbell 2003). 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By privileging hierarchy and rule by command, authoritarianism works against democratic values such as free expression, consensus, egalitarianism, and transparency in decision making (de Waal 2002). Authoritarian values are important to military organizations because war is strategic, aimed at gaining and exercising power. Combat is the manifestation of power in its most brutal and uncompromising form (de Waal 2002). Authoritarianism molds a soldier who will obey orders without thinking and will internalize unquestioning loyalty to his superiors in ways that minimize the chance that he will flinch in combat (Grossman 1995; de Waal 2002). However, by fostering blind compliance military values work against the autonomy of soldiers, regardless of gender, complicating any sense of agency that Fanon claimed combat would restore. This ~~blind~~ compliance works against women’s sense of agency, in particular, because prewar gender inequalities are exacerbated by a predominantly male military leadership more prone to abuse its power during the war given the subordinate status of most female soldiers combined with the stress of life in the camps. In addition to the authoritarianism that pervades the military as a social institution, the stereotype of the supermacho combat soldier perpetuates hypermasculine attitudes and values that also work against a male soldier’s recognition of a woman soldier (or any woman) as his equal. South African feminist sociologist Jacklyn Cock elaborates: “War does not challenge women to prove that they are women, whereas wars have been historically symbolized as the touchstone of ‘manliness.’ The concept of war as a proving ground of manliness has centered on the notion of combat, which is understood to be the ultimate test of masculinity, and thus crucial to the ideological structure of patriarchy” (1991, 235–36). The guerrilla warfare tactics used in most of Africa’s revolutionary wars did not rely on hand‐to‐hand combat. They often relied on ambushing patrols, sabotaging communication and transportation lines, and making hit‐and‐run attacks against enemy posts—tasks women are fully capable of carrying out (Goldman 1982; Cock 1991; Goldstein 2001). 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### 2AC – Links - Asymmetric War

#### The negative's “asymmetric war discourse” moralizes and depoliticizes conflicts—the impact is selective rationalization of brutal tactics, justification of collective punishments of entire populations, and sanctioning of high civilian casualties.

Winter 11 — Yves Winter, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, holds a Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of California-Berkeley, 2011 (“The asymmetric war discourse and its moral economies: a critique,” *International Theory*, Volume 3, Issue 3, November, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Cambridge Journals Online, p. 489-490)

By referring to the Gaza war as a ‘new kind of conflict’, the US officials draw on a by now familiar discourse on new and asymmetric warfare that has become the prevalent paradigm for talking about war over the past 20 years. According to many researchers and commentators, we are in an era of ‘new’ wars, or what have also been called ‘low-intensity conflicts’ (Kitson 1971), ‘fourth-generation warfare (4GW)’ (Lind et al. 1989; Lind 2004), ‘small wars’ (U.S. Marine Corps 1940; Merom 2003), ‘network-centric warfare’ (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998; see also Arquilla 2007), ‘nonconventional’, ‘hybrid’ (Mattis and Hoffman 2005), and ‘asymmetric’ wars (Mack 1975; Paul 1994; Arreguı ́n-Toft 2001).3 While these terms have different (and to some extent contradictory) valences, together they form a discursive constellation, a vocabulary for theorizing contemporary war, which I call the ‘asymmetric war discourse’. Even though this term cannot capture the internal differentiation and heterogeneity of this discursive field, I use it to highlight two categories— novelty and [end page 489] asymmetry (and asymmetry as novelty)— that I take to be critical for the political effects it generates. Among the wars that have been called ‘asymmetric’ are the civil wars and insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Palestine, Angola, Somalia, Congo, and Sierra Leone; usually included are also the low-intensity wars in Colombia, Indonesia, and in Kashmir, and the terminology is sometimes also meant to incorporate the campaigns of internationally networked terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, as well as the United States’ Global War on Terror (GWOT).

In this essay, I would like to offer some critical observations and hypotheses concerning the asymmetric war discourse. My questions and approach are interpretive: they are concerned less with the denotative meaning than with the political and cultural significance of this discourse in the contemporary conjuncture. I will argue that the currency of the debates about asymmetric wars lies in its normative dimension: the idiom of asymmetry is not just a neutral descriptive military jargon; rather, it tends to moralize and depoliticize contemporary conflict constellations. In part 1 of the paper, I will map the asymmetric war discourse before turning, in part 2, to this discourse’s normative valence, what I call the asymmetric moral economy. I use this term to designate a peculiar feature of the asymmetric war discourse, the tendency to portray powerful states as weak and vulnerable victims of dangerous non-state actors. By emphasizing states’ vulnerabilities to certain kinds of tactics and enemies, this discourse allows states to selectively rationalize brutal tactics against non-state actors; to justify collective punishments of entire populations; and to defend maneuvers that cause high casualties among civilians. The idea of asymmetry functions as a source of legitimacy because it frames the confrontation between states and their ‘asymmetric’ enemies in moral terms and transposes that confrontation onto a neo-colonial template of civilized vs. uncivilized forms of warfare. The claim that asymmetric wars represent new and unprecedented dangers have generated demands to revise the international laws of armed conflict, especially the Geneva Conventions. In part 3, I discuss these demands, as well as the broader consequences of the asymmetric war discourse for the international normative and legal order. While it is unlikely that the calls for official modifications of the Geneva Conventions will be successful, I conclude that the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians is being undermined in less formal and more complicated ways: through imaginative redefinitions of legal terms and creative legal interpretation. These strategies allow officials to publicly defend the integrity of domestic and international legal conventions while pursuing policies that directly contravene their very principles.

### 2AC – Links – Climate

#### The negative's apocalyptic framing of climate change results in denial and despair, undermining the political will to act.

Foust et al 08 [Christina R. Foust, Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, et al., with William O. Murphy, Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, and Chelsea Stow, Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, 2008, “Global Warming and Apocalyptic Rhetoric: A Critical Frame Analysis of US Popular and Elite Press Coverage from 1997-2007,” Paper Submitted to the Environmental Communication Division of the National Communication Association Convention in San Diego, November 20th, Available Online at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p260125\_index.html, Accessed 03-18-2009, p. 22-23]

Elements of an apocalyptic frame could be said to exist in most of the articles we read, though all elements were not present in each article. Nonetheless, apocalyptic framing should give us pause, for it threatens to hinder progress in forming a political will to change the carbon-based energy economy (and thus mitigate the consequences of global warming). To announce the coming of the apocalypse creates despair as people feel they cannot stop such an event, but can only hope that they are among the chosen few to be saved (if they believe in the immanence of the end). Apocalyptic framing also creates denial, as when people fail to exit the movie theater because they have heard fire yelled once too often. There may also be a sense of denial in terms of the effectiveness of solutions: Why make changes to our lifestyle, if the world is going to end [end page 22] quickly and our actions don’t make a difference anyway? If the end is, indeed, the total destruction of earth, won’t our efforts to make change now be in vain? As Brummett suggests of pre-millennial apocalyptic rhetoric (which assumes that the world will be destroyed after a judgment day), the cosmically mandated telos of catastrophe overshadows any efforts to change the trajectory of the narrative. The only place for human agency within such rhetoric is the capacity to agree with prophesies, against the polarized opposition of non-believers. By agreeing with the prophesies, “believers” feel a sense of control over the situation because they are “right,” not necessarily because they are taking collective and personal steps to resolve the issue.

### 2AC – Links - Narcoterror

#### Narcoterror Representations justify violent American dominance – it is used to deny political legitimacy to other states

Knopf 7 - prof of Cultural Studies at University of Greifswald [Kerstin Institute of British and Visiting Professor of North American Literature and Cultural Studies at the Institute of English, 2007, <http://www2.brandonu.ca/library/CJNS/27.2/03knopf.pdf>, Accessed 8/1/13]

Terrorism in historical and contemporary discourses has many faces: from state terrorism of totalitarian regimes, to terrorism in guerrilla warfare and liberation movements, left- and right-wing terrorism of individuals and groups to achieve their political objectives, religious fundamentalist terrorism, racially-motivated terror, and terrorism incited by national and global political and economical inequalities. With regard to such various forms of ‘terrorism,’ the questions arise: Who defines ‘terrorism’? And who sees an act of threat or violence as terrorist and who sees the same as an act for the advancement of a political cause? Beau Grosscup argues that the Western image of ‘terrorism’ is built upon cultural stereotypes, serves political and ideological agendas, and has monopolized Western public discourses. During the cold war era, terrorism was largely identified as philosophically and ideologically inspired by leftist and revolutionary thinkers and financed, facilitated, and controlled by Eastern countries, specifically the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the socialist ideological stronghold, the West redesigned the imagery of global threat and strove to organize the New World order as aligned with its own interests. 19 In line with the 298 Kerstin Knopf introduction of the concepts ‘rogue regime’ and ‘global intifada,’ Islamic-inspired terrorism emerging from ‘undemocratic,’ ‘fundamentalist,’ and ‘inherently barbaric’ nations was established as the major threat to Western democracies, much like the leftist-inspired and sponsored terrorism of the previous era, both supposedly intending to subvert Western democracies. While the Cold War discourse on narco-terrorism linked Soviet-sponsored leftist guerrillas with drug operations in Latin America, the post-Cold War discourse drops the premise of Soviet sponsorship and adds Islamic ‘fundamentalist’ regimes to the list of narcoterrorist states. 21 Grosscup holds: **“**The ‘insidious’ imagery surrounding narco-terrorism allows the big power architects of the new world order to justify their intervention into the affairs of the designated ‘rogue regimes’ even if it means the elimination of the right to national sovereignty and territorial borders.” 22 These discourses on terrorism, constructed and carried by politicians, academics, experts, the media and film industry, so Grosscup contends, are coloured in black and white, are monolithic and biased representations, and serve Western democracies to rationalize their political agendas and to “orchestrate a new world order poised to protect western capitalist, specifically American interests above all others.” 23

### Cuomo Module

#### The perception of war as an isolatable event that makes it impossible to deal with the pervasive effects of everyday militarism

Cuomo, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, 96

[Chris, PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Fall, “War is not just an event: Reflections on the significance of everyday Violence” Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30]

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

## A2 DA/CP

### A2 Self Defense

#### The whole 1AC was an answer to this – the idea that being human requires violent protection from others is bad

#### This logic is wrong – if no one had guns, then self-defense wouldn't be necessary

McMahan 12 [Jeff McMahan (professor of philosophy at Rutgers University), "Why Gun ‘Control’ Is Not Enough," New York Times, 12/19/2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/why-gun-control-is-not-enough/?\_r=0] AZ

Gun advocates sometimes argue that a prohibition would violate individuals’ rights of self-defense. Imposing a ban on guns, they argue, would be tantamount to taking a person’s gun from her just as someone is about to kill her. But this is a defective analogy. Although a prohibition would deprive people of one effective means of self-defense, it would also ensure that there would be far fewer occasions on which a gun would be necessary or even useful for self-defense. For guns would be forbidden not just to those who would use them for defense but also to those who would use them for aggression. Guns are only one means of self-defense and self-defense is only one means of achieving security against attack. It is the right to security against attack that is fundamental. A policy that unavoidably deprives a person of one means of self-defense but on balance substantially reduces her vulnerability to attack is therefore respectful of the more fundamental right from which the right of self-defense is derived. In other Western countries, per capita homicide rates, as well as rates of violent crime involving guns, are a fraction of what they are in the United States. The possible explanations of this are limited. Gun advocates claim it has nothing to do with our permissive gun laws or our customs and practices involving guns. If they are right, should we conclude that Americans are simply inherently more violent, more disposed to mental derangement, and less moral than people in other Western countries? If you resist that conclusion, you have little choice but to accept that our easy access to all manner of firearms is a large part of the explanation of why we kill each at a much higher rate than our counterparts elsewhere. Gun advocates must search their consciences to determine whether they really want to share responsibility for the perpetuation of policies that make our country the homicide capitol of the developed world.

### A2 Mental Health

#### Mental health isn't the cause of gun violence – this is a myth

Giroux 15 [Henry A. Giroux (social critic and educator, and the author of many books, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University), "Murder, Incorporated: Guns and the Growing Culture of Violence in the US," Truth-Out, 10/7/2015] AZ

In the face of mass shootings, the public relations disimagination machine goes into overdrive claiming that guns are not the problem, and that the causes of such violence can be largely attributed to people living with mentally illness. When in actuality, as two Vanderbilt University researchers, Dr. Jonathan Metzl and Kenneth T. MacLeish, publishing in the American Journal of Public Health, observed that: Fewer than 6 percent of the 120,000 gun-related killings in the United States between 2001 and 2010 were perpetrated by people diagnosed with mental illness. Our research finds that across the board, the mentally ill are 60 to 120 percent more likely than the average person to be the victims of violent crime rather than the perpetrators.... There are 32,000 gun deaths in the United States on average every year, and people are far more likely to be shot by relatives, friends or acquaintances than they are by lone violent psychopaths. [(2)](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us#a2) It may not be an exaggeration to claim that the US government has blood on its hands because of the refusal of Congress to rein in a gun lobby that produces a growing militarism that sanctions a love affair with the unbridled corporate institutions, financial interests and mass-produced cultures of violence. The Oregon community college shooting is the 41st school shooting this year while there have been 142 incidents of violence on school properties since 2012. Yet, the violence continues unchecked, all the while legitimated by the cowardly acts of politicians who refuse to enact legislation to curb the proliferation of guns or support measures as elementary as background checks - which 88 percent of the American people support - or for that matter, ban large-capacity ammunition magazines and assault rifles.

#### This is a militaristic fantasy – attempts to deflect responsibility onto individuals rather than the structural conditions of power that caused gun violence are complicit violence – that's Giroux 13

### A2 Culture Precedes Policy

#### Technology isn't value-neutral – the existence of guns produces militarism and reduces others to potential targets

Selinger 12 [Evan Selinger (an associate professor of philosophy at Rochester Institute of Technology), "I Grip the Gun and the Gun Grips Me," Wired Magazine, 12/21/2012] AZ

Taking on the instrumentalist conception of technology, [Don Ihde](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Don_Ihde), a leading philosopher of technology, claims that “the human-gun relation transforms the situation from any similar situation of a human without a gun.” By focusing on what it is like for a flesh-and-blood human to actually be in possession of a gun, Ihde describes “lived experience” in a manner that reveals the NRA position to be but a partial grasp of a more complex situation. By equating firearm responsibility exclusively with human choice, the NRA claim abstracts away relevant considerations about how gun possession can affect one’s sense of self and agency. In order to appreciate this point, it helps to consider the fundamental materiality of guns. In principle, guns, like every technology, can be used in different ways to accomplish different goals. Guns can be tossed around like Frisbees. They can be used to dig through dirt like shovels, or mounted on top of a fireplace mantel, as aesthetic objects. They can even be integrated into cooking practices; gangster pancakes might make a tasty Sunday morning treat. But while all of these options remain physical possibilities, they are not likely to occur, at least not in a widespread manner with regularity. Such options are not practically viable because gun design itself embodies behavior-shaping values; its material composition indicates the preferred ends to which it “should” be used. Put in Ihde’s parlance, while a gun’s structure is “[multistable](http://figureground.ca/interviews/don-ihde/)” with respect to its possible uses across a myriad of contexts, a partially determined trajectory nevertheless constrains which possibilities are easy to pursue and which of the intermediate and difficult options are worth investing time and labor into. A gun’s excellence simply lies in its capacity to quickly fire bullets that can reliably pierce targets. With respect to the trajectory at issue, guns were designed for the sole purpose of accomplishing radical and life-altering action at a distance with minimal physical exertion on the part of the shooter. Since a gun’s mechanisms were built for the purpose of releasing deadly projectiles outwards, it is difficult to imagine how one could realistically find utility in using a gun to pursue ends that do not require shooting bullets. For the most part, a gun’s excellence simply lies in its capacity to quickly fire bullets that can reliably pierce targets. Using the butt of a gun to hammer the nail into a “Wanted” post–a common act in the old cowboy movies–is an exceptional use. What the NRA position fails to convey, therefore, are the perceptual affordances offered by gun possession and the transformative consequences of yielding to these affordances. To someone with a gun, the world readily takes on a distinct shape. It not only offers people, animals, and things to interact with, but also potential targets. Furthermore, gun possession makes it easy to be bold, even hotheaded. Physically weak, emotionally passive, and psychologically introverted people will all be inclined to experience shifts in demeanor. Like many other technologies, Ihde argues, guns mediate the human relation to the world through a dialectic in which aspects of experience are both “amplified” and “reduced”. In this case, there is a reduction in the amount and intensity of environmental features that are perceived as dangerous, and a concomitant amplification in the amount and intensity of environmental features that are perceived as calling for the subject to respond with violence. French philosopher [Bruno Latour](http://www.bruno-latour.fr/) goes far as to depict the experience of possessing a gun as one that produces a different subject: “You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun is different with you holding it. You are another subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has entered into a relationship with you.” While the idea that a gun-human combination can produce a new subject may seem extreme, it is actually an experience that people (with appropriate background assumptions) typically attest to, when responding to strong architectural configurations. When walking around such prestigious colleges as Harvard and the University of Chicago, it is easy to feel that one has suddenly become smarter. Likewise, museums and sites of religious worship can induce more than a momentary inclination towards reflection; they can allow one to view artistic and spiritual matters as a contemplative being.

### A2 Regulations CP

#### Solvency deficit – only a complete ban can solve – otherwise people will always be incentivized to buy guns in a national arms race since there's a section of the population with more firepower than they do – that's McMahan

#### Perm do both – place regulations and [insert CP text] while instituting a ban on handguns

#### Perm do the counterplan – the CP also advocates a ban on a part of the population

#### Solvency deficit – gun control can't solve the aff since it still allows a gun culture – as long as the NRA holds influence in politics, militarism will continue, which is the root cause of violence inside and outside the US – only blanket prohibition can solve – that's Asher

### A2 Violence PIC

#### The 1AC is a turn – using violence as a political strategy always fails since it's fundamentally an instance of militarism – that's May 13

#### Their argument is that minorities have been historically under-protected by the police and excluded from the law – the aff changes that by altering the logic of disposability and holding policymakers accountable for violence

## A2 T/Theory

## A2 kritiks

### State Key

**Criticism alone fails—imperialist warmongering will continue as a result of militaristic politicians unless alternative strategies are promoted through policy making**

**Bandow, Cato Institute senior fellow, 2010**

[Doug, 3/15/10, Cato Institute, “Battling the Bipartisan Consensus for War,” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/battling-bipartisan-consensus-war?print, 7/13/14, IC]

It is this world which brought representatives from Right to Left together. **Participants** discussed rhetoric: **criticizing “imperialism**,” for instance, **resonates** far better **with the Left** than the Right. **But there was broad agreement on policy. Washington** today **has a strategy of “empire.”** The U.S. isn’t the same as the Roman or British empires, to be sure. But **American** foreign and **military policy could hardly be further from those one would expect from a** constitutional **republic** with a government of limited powers **intended to concentrate on protecting the safety and liberty of its citizens**. Thus, **Americans need real change**, not the faux variety offered by the Obama administration. The military should be configured to defend America, not client states around the globe. U.S. taxpayers should not be fleeced to subsidize wealthy allies. **Washington should not use patriotic 18-year-olds to occupy Third World states, treating them like American satrapies**, governed by U.S. ambassadors. **Uncle Sam should stop trying to micro-manage the globe**, treating every conflict or controversy as America’s own, **exaggerating foreign threats and inflating Washington’s abilities**. The price of today’s policy of empire is high. Far from being the costless adventure imagined by members of Washington’s ubiquitous sofa samurai, **war is the ultimate big government program, a threat to Americans’ life, prosperity, and liberty**. So far the Iraqi “cakewalk” has resulted in the death of roughly 4400 Americans and 300 other coalition soldiers. Then there are tens of thousands of maimed and injured Americans, others suffering from PSD, and numerous broken families and communities. At least 100,000 and probably many more Iraqis have died. Some estimates run up to a million, a truly astonishing number. **America’s ivory tower warriors seem particularly unconcerned about dead foreigners. However many Iraqis died, it is treated as a small price to pay for the privilege of being liberated by Washington.** Another cost is financial. Direct military outlays this year will run over $700 billion. Iraq is ultimately likely cost $2 or $3 trillion. Washington spends more on “defense,” adjusted for inflation, today than at any point during the Cold War, Korean War, and Vietnam War. The U.S. accounts for nearly half of the globe’s military expenditures. American taxpayers pay to defend prosperous and populous European states. Japan devotes about a fourth as much of its economic strength to the military as does the U.S. The NATO member which makes the most military effort is crisis-prone Greece — in response to nominal ally Turkey. For years American taxpayers spent as much as South Koreans to defend the Republic of Korea. Such generosity might have made sense in the aftermath of World War II, when so many Asian and European states had been ruined by war and faced Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China. No longer, however. Especially with the U.S. budget deficit expected to run nearly $1.6 trillion this year alone. Over the next decade Uncle Sam likely will rack up another $10 trillion in red ink. In effect, Washington is borrowing every penny which it is spending to defend other nations. **Liberty also suffers from a policy of empire**. “War is the health of the state,” intoned Randolph Bourne, and it certainly is the health of the national security state. The constitutional deformations of the Bush years were legendary, yet President Barack Obama has done little to rein in his predecessor’s lawless conduct. Executive aggrandizement, government secrecy, privacy violations, military arrests and trials, and constitutional violations. The U.S. is in danger of losing its republican soul. Of course, one could imagine a truly necessary war which would have to be fought almost irrespective of cost—World War II, perhaps. However, while jihadist terrorists are ugly and murderous, they are a poor substitute for Adolf Hitler with armored divisions and Joseph Stalin with nuclear weapons. We aren’t fighting World War III. We aren’t fighting anything close to World War III. And if we were in such a conflict, a policy of empire, of meddling around the globe, of engaging in international social engineering, would be about the most foolish strategy possible. **Most of what the U.S. military does has nothing to do with American security**: protecting European states threatened by no one, aiding a South Korea which vastly out ranges its northern antagonist, attempting to turn decrepit Third World states into liberal democracies and Western allies. The problem of **terrorism is** real, but is **best met by** sophisticated, **targeted countermeasures rather than promiscuous blunt-force intervention**. The war in Iraq has enhanced Iran’s strategic position, weakened America’s reputation, stretched U.S. military forces, spurred terrorist recruitment, and confirmed the radical terrorist narrative. A lengthy occupation of Afghanistan and overflow combat into Pakistan risk doing much the same—potentially for years. Expanded American intervention in Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere would have a similar effect. **Militaristic sloganeering, patriotic preening, and demagogic ranting are no substitute** **for making a realistic assessment both of threats and capabilities**. Meeting participants agreed that **pro-peace activists must seize back the patriotic mantle**. **Patriotism should no longer be** the last refuge of the scoundrel, **used to shield from scrutiny policies drafted by those personally unwilling to serve which have wreaked death and destruction abroad** and increased debt and insecurity at home. And any antiwar movement should welcome those who have worn the nation’s uniforms, whose courage has been misused by self-serving politicians. This is not the first time that people from across the political spectrum have joined in an attempt to stop imperialist adventures. Various groups opposed the Spanish-American War and especially the brutal occupation of the Philippines. Woodrow **Wilson’s bloody crusade for democracy was resisted by conservatives and progressives**; socialist Eugene Debs went to prison for criticizing that conflict. **Left and Right even opposed** Franklin Delano **Roosevelt’s** surreptitious **push for war**, though the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and German declaration of war ultimately made involvement inevitable. Indeed, mainstream American concern about international adventurism goes back to George Washington’s famed farewell address warning against “foreign entanglements” and consequent “overgrown military establishments.” Secretary of State John Quincy Adams warned against going abroad “in search of monsters to destroy.” Future Civil War generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee expressed disquiet at America’s rapacious war with Mexico even while serving their nation in that very conflict. “The commercial interests” angered war-hawk Teddy Roosevelt for opposing his campaign for war against Spain. Middle America resisted demands that the U.S. join both great European wars of the 20th century. President Dwight D. Eisenhower left office warning about the military-industrial complex. Unfortunately, **politicians have proved extraordinarily adept at rousing**, at least temporarily, **public support for foreign military adventures. Resisting the ivory tower warmongers will be no easier today. But those who believe in peace have no choice but to try**, and try again. **Peace should be America’s natural condition**. Unfortunately, **it will not be so as long as today’s unnatural alliance of liberal and neoconservative hawks runs U.S. foreign policy.** And **only the American people can take back control**. The future of the American people and republic is at stake.

**State based politics are key—it co-opts egalitarian, anti-militaristic movements**

**Conversi, University of the Basque Country and Ikerbasque Contemporary History Research Professor, 2008**

[Daniele, 9/10/08, “’We are all equals!’ Militarism, homogenization and ‘egalitarianism’ in nationalist state-building (1789-1945),” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31:7, p. 1308, 7/12/14, IC]

My focus on militarism is not intended to entirely replace industrialization as a broader explanation for the rise of nationalism. It rather intends to accompany and complement it. **By highlighting the importance of the military, the attention is** concurrently **shifted to the role of the state** and the centrality of political power. **State-centred approaches have been covered widely** in the nationalism literature (see Breuilly 1993). Thus, **my contribution is** more expressly **concerned with the state’s cultural homogenizing drive and its recurrent attraction to militarism and war-making via nationalism, particularly as underpinned by egalitarian rhetoric**. Military developments have been at the heart of most major contemporary events. Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Union was mostly a consequence of unsustainable military spending, while the central role of the army in the breakup of Yugoslavia is also widely acknowledged.24 **Political decisions can affect everyday life, but can also** shape, change and **manipulate national identities**.

### A2 Fight the State!

#### LOL handguns can't fight tanks – also this misses the point

McMahan 12 [Jeff McMahan (professor of philosophy at Rutgers University), "Why Gun ‘Control’ Is Not Enough," New York Times, 12/19/2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/why-gun-control-is-not-enough/?\_r=0] AZ

To many devotees of the Second Amendment, this is precisely the point. As former Congressman Jay Dickey, Republican of Arkansas, said in January 2011, “We have a right to bear arms because of the threat of government taking over the freedoms we have.” The more people there are with guns, the less able the government is to control them. But if arming the citizenry limits the power of the government, it does so by limiting the power of its agents, such as the police. Domestic defense becomes more a matter of private self-help and vigilantism and less a matter of democratically-controlled, public law enforcement. Domestic security becomes increasingly “privatized.” There is, of course, a large element of fantasy in Dickey’s claim. Individuals with handguns are no match for a modern army. It’s also a delusion to suppose that the government in a liberal democracy such as the United States could become so tyrannical that armed insurrection, rather than democratic procedures, would be the best means of constraining it. This is not Syria; nor will it ever be. Shortly after Dickey made his comment, people in Egypt rose against a government that had suppressed their freedom in ways far more serious than requiring them to pay for health care. Although a tiny minority of Egyptians do own guns, the protesters would not have succeeded if those guns had been brought to Tahrir Square. If the assembled citizens had been brandishing Glocks in accordance with the script favored by Second Amendment fantasists, the old regime would almost certainly still be in power and many Egyptians who’re now alive would be dead.

### A2 Fem

#### Link turn – prevents gender violence

**The perm is best—simultaneous interrogation of hegemonic power systems and gendered violence is key**

**Nayak, Pace University Political Science Associate Professor, and Suchland, Ohio State University Slavic and East European Languages and Cultures Assistant Professor, 2006**

[Meghana & Jennifer, 12/06, “Gendered Violence and Hegemonic Projects,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 8:4, p. 479-480, 7/13/14, IC]

Importantly, Russo’s work pulls together recent scholarship (including Agathangelou and Ling 2004; Butler 2004; Shepherd 2006; Nayak 2006) that examines how **hegemonic actors deﬂect and distort criticism by explicitly invoking concern about gender violence**. Thus**, those who address gender violence in the same way as the hegemonic actor, are actually supporting and endorsing the hegemonic project** even if they are resisting gender violence itself. **Resistance movements and organizations, without careful and thorough interrogation of power, often leave undisturbed those power relations** even as they attempt to address gender violence. In effect, resistance becomes about saving one’s own antagonistic relation to the Other.

### A2 Anti-Blackness

#### Refusal of violence as an everyday norm helps transition to a politics of love – only our approach is able to heal the *victims and survivors* of oppression, rather than struggling for the sake of struggle.

Hooks 03 [Bell Hooks (has held positions as Professor of African-American Studies and English at Yale University, Associate Professor of Women's Studies and American Literature at Oberlin College in Oberlin, Ohio, and as Distinguished Lecturer of English Literature at the City College of New York). “We Real Cool: Black Men and Masculinity.” Chapter 4—Don’t Make Me Hurt You: Black Male Violence. 2003]

They will act on impulse, led by reactive rage. In the early nineties musician and critic Greg Tate, in the essay “Love and the Enemy,” critiqued the limitations of any movement for black liberation based solely on rhetoric and a pretend display of force: When reaction rage is the dominant form of our politics, when it takes police or mob violence to galvanize us into reaction, it means that there is an unacceptable level of suffering and misery. When quality of life issues are not given the same attention as our antilynching activities, it means we have a low level of life expectations…. The warriors we need to step forward now aren’t the confrontational kind, but healers. Folk who know how to reach into where we really hurt, to the wounds we can’t see and that nobody likes to talk about. If black male leadership doesn’t move in the direction of recognizing the pain and trauma beneath the rage… if we don’t exercise our power to love and heal each other by digging deep into our mutual woundedness, then what we’re struggling for is merely the end of white supremacy —and not the salvaging of its victims. Death by suicide, homicide, or soul murder is still just death, not the winning of a cause but a way to bow out. When black males are unable to move past reactive rage they get caught in the violence, colluding with their own psychic slaughter as well as with the very real deaths that occur when individuals see no alternatives. Creative alternative ways to live, be, and act will come into being only when there is mass education for critical consciousness—an awakening to the awareness that collectively black male survival requires that they learn to challenge patriarchal notions of manhood, that they claim nonviolence as the only progressive stance to take in a world where all life is threatened by patriarchal imperialist war. If black males were to truly reclaim the legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr. and add to this political platform an awareness of the need to end male domination, they would be able to end the violence that is destroying black male life, minute by minute, day by day. It is no accident that just at the moment in our country’s history when the nonviolent civil rights struggle rooted in a love ethic was successfully working to end discrimination, galvanizing the nation and the world— movements that included a critique of militarism, capitalism, and imperalism—the white-supremacist patriarchal state gave unprecedented positive attention to the black males who were advocating violence. It is no accident that just as Malcolm X was moving away from an anti-white black separatist discourse to global awareness of neo-colonialism, linking anti-racist struggle here at home with freedom struggles everywhere, his voice was silenced by state-supported black-on-black homicide. The real agency and power of black liberation struggle was felt when black male leaders dared to turn away from primitive models of patriarchal violence and warfare toward a politics of cultural transformation rooted in love. These radical perspectives and the resistance struggle they put in place led to greater freedom. As powerful alternative visions, spearheaded by charismatic black male leaders who were not ashamed to admit mistakes, who were humble, who were willing to make sacrifices, they represented an absolute threat to the existing status quo. This is the masculinity black males must emulate if they are to survive whole. To end black male violence black males must dare to embrace that revolution of values King writes about in Where Do We Go from Here: “The stability of the world house which is ours will involve a revolution of values to accompany the scientific and freedom revolution energizing the earth. We must rapidly begin the shift from a thing-oriented society to a person-oriented society. When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, materialism, and militarism are incapable of being conquered.” Clearly, King’s vision has proven to be far more radical than the political visions of black power advocates who embraced a militaristic vision of struggle. While King did not live long enough to undergo a conversion to feminist politics that would have enable him to critique his own negative actions toward women and change them, by insisting on the power of a love ethic he was offering a vision that, if realized, would challenge and change patriarchy. Male violence is a central problem in our society. Black male violence simply mirrors the styles and habits of white male violence. It is not unique. What is unique to black male experience is the way in which acting violently often gets both attention and praise from the dominant culture. Even as it is being condemned black male violence is often deified. As Orlando Patterson suggests, as long as white males can deflect attention from their own brutal violence onto black males, black boys and men will receive contradictory messages about what is manly, about what is acceptable. Contrary to the vision of black men who advocated black power, there is no freedom to be found in any dominator model of human relationships. As long as the will to dominate is there, the context for violence is there also. To end our cultural fascination with violence, and our imposition onto men in general and black men in particular who carry the weight of that violence, we must choose a partnership model that posits interbeing as the principle around which to organize family and community. And as Dr. King wisely understood, a love ethic should be the foundation. In love there is no will to violence.

#### Perm

Mills, John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy at Northwestern University, 97

[Charles W. Mills, Ph.D. from the University of Toronto, “Revisionist Ontologies: Theorizing White Supremacy” , Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race, Page 100-101, <http://www.faculty.umb.edu/lawrence_blum/courses/318_11/readings/mills_revisionist_ontologies_theorizing_white_supremacy.pdf>, accessed 7-18-14]

Second, one of the crucial ambiguities in its usage is precisely that between racism as a complex of ideas, values, and attitudes and racism as an institutionalized politico-economic structure for which the ideas are an ideological accompaniment. If the term white racism were consistently employed in the latter sense, we might not need another locution, but this is not at all the case. On the contrary, the ideational sense is usually intended. And this has the theoretical disadvantage of making it possible for everybody to be "racist:” in a Hobbesian scenario of equipowerful atomic individuals with bad attitudes, thereby deflecting attention from the massive power differentials actually obtaining in the real world between nonwhite individuals with bigoted ideas and institutionalized white power. White supremacy and global white supremacy, in contrast, have the semantic virtues of clearly signaling reference to a system, a particular kind of polity, so structured as to advantage whites. A more hostile objection might be that to speak of white supremacy as a political system necessarily implies its complete autonomy and explanatory independence from other variables. But I don't see why this follows. The origins of white racism as an elaborated complex of ideas (as against a spontaneous set of naive prejudices) continue to be debated by scholars, with various rival theories-ethnocentrism on a grand scale, religioculturalist predispositions, the ideology of expansionist colonial capitalism, the rationalizations of psychosexual aversions, cal~ulated rational-choice power politics-contending for eminence. We don't need to make a commitment to the truth of any of these theories; we can just be agnostic on the question, bracketing the issue and leaving open the question which explanation or complementary set of explanations turns out to be most adequate. All that is required is that, whatever the origins of racism and the politico-economic system of white supremacy, they are conceded to have attained at least a partial, relative autonomy, so that they are not immediately reducible to something else. Correspondingly, I am not claiming that white supremacy as a politic;! system exhausts the political universe. The idea is not that white supremacy must now replace previous political categorizations but that it should supplementthem. In other words, it is possible to have overlapping, interlocking, and intersecting systems of domination. The concept of white supremacy focuses attention on the dimension of racial oppression in these systems; it is not being claimed that this is the only dimension. In some contexts, the focus on race will be illuminating; in other contexts it will not. The idea is to correct the characteristic methodological omissions of past and present, not to prescribe an exclusivist theoretical attention to this one aspect of the polity.

### A2 Ableism

#### Prefer our empirical analysis – their kritik is reductionist and doesn't analyze the history of war

Trappen 13 [Sandra Trappen, (Ph.D. candidate in Sociology at the City University of New York Graduate Center and Adjunct Professor of Sociology at Queens College, CUNY), "War and Disability," The Feminist Wire, 11/25/2013, http://www.thefeministwire.com/2013/11/war-and-disability/] AZ

The challenge, I think, from the perspective of disability theory and critique, is how to go about theorizing disability in connection with war in such a way that one might avoid mind-body traps, competing dualisms, and other limitations bound up with representational discourses that focus on identity. This task is made more difficult by the fact that there is no single literature that deals with the issue of combat injuries and disability. Gerber (2012), among others, has argued that in opting for a direction driven by the focus of cultural studies on critical race theory, queer theory, literary theory, and gender theory, the genre has privileged issues of identity to the detriment of critiquing disability in connection with the social history of war. In some cases, as Gerber points out, disabled veterans have themselves been problematized. This pattern is similarly reproduced in the socio-medical literature, where empirical studies tend to be driven by a policy focus. Empirical studies are limited and when they do occur, the focus leans more toward informing government program initiatives (i.e., veterans’ social welfare benefits, housing, substance abuse, rehabilitation, and social reintegration).

#### Analysis of the body must avoid binaries that separate ability/disability – perm solves best

Trappen 13 [Sandra Trappen, (Ph.D. candidate in Sociology at the City University of New York Graduate Center and Adjunct Professor of Sociology at Queens College, CUNY), "War and Disability," The Feminist Wire, 11/25/2013, http://www.thefeministwire.com/2013/11/war-and-disability/] AZ

Findings Findings from my study indicate that disability is, at least on some levels, productive to the collective practices of knowledge making, wound-making, and body-making, as these are not isolated and dissimilar productions. Incorporating the stories of the soldiers themselves was, I found, also important to theorizing the nature of disabling injury. Personal narratives and histories were marked by a concerted effort to “bring the body back in,” as story telling emphasized the carnal aspects of having and being a body disabled by war. Bodies are cut open. Friends bleed. And many are wounded to the point of death. Yet even still, the body itself remains elusive. For the anatomical logic of war is such that, regardless of how many rifles, bullets, bayonets, and knives might render skin from bone, not even a mountain of casualties can imprint the psyche of the uninitiated in such a way that they might fully grasp the brute nature of slaughter—that alone remains an exclusive possession of those who are witness to war. Consequently, representational narratives and practices that focus simply on identity inevitably fall short of well-intentioned aims that purport to help us know how to see and to feel (Kaplan, 2013). They are precluded from accounting for the embodied nature of wounded and disabled subjectivity. Thus, we are only ever left with a lingering sense of what happens to a body that is wounded in war. Conclusion Presently, simplified analysis that merely takes into account binary understandings of “abled/disabled” and “male/female” bodies renders it nearly impossible to understand how war objectifies and produces bodies across a more diverse relational spectrum. One way to overcome these limitations is to combine identity critique with more dynamic non-representational thought paradigms. The turn to affect in critical theory, body theory, psychoanalytic theory, and the new materialism theories might all be called upon to explore how knowledge and power continue to imbricate the complex topographies of mind and body bound up in disability studies and the political economy of bodies produced by war. Training a feminist lens on the problem of prevailing dualisms here makes it possible to see how injury, illness, and disability potentially engender new and different forms of oppression, as recovery and rehabilitation are often achieved through enhanced means of bioscientific and biotechnological control. In this instance, embodied contradiction is both the marker and the result of contemporary power configurations investing in the making of gendered bodies to organize society for the production of ongoing war. Feminist scholars might thus continue to debate the entanglement of body politics and state politics by effectively linking issues of health, injury, and disability to larger issues of militarization and the social organization of violence.

## A2 NCs

### A2 Constitution NC

#### Militarism is the historical basis of gun rights.

Reynolds 94 [Reynolds, Glenn Harlan, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. J.D. Yale Law School, 1985; B.A. University of Tennessee, 1982.. "Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, A." Tenn. L. Rev. 62 (1994): 461.]

Nonetheless, there is that troubling language about the "well regulated militia." The Second Amendment does contain a preamble of sorts, and although there seems little enthusiasm for paying attention to the Preamble to the Constitution itself,46 criticism of arguments in favor of a personal right to bear arms always seems to turn on that point. The argument is that because the Second Amendment opens with the words, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State," it must therefore not protect a right that can be asserted by individuals. Standard Model scholars disagree. Once again, we will look first at the text, then at the historical circumstances surrounding it.

First, as William Van Alstyne points out, the "right of the people" described in the Second Amendment is "to keep and bear arms," not to belong to a militia.

Rather, the Second Amendment adheres to the guarantee of the right of the people to keep and bear arms as the predicate for the other provision to which it speaks, i.e., the provision respecting a militia, as distinct from a standing army separately subject to congressional ... control.... In relating these propositions within one amendment, moreover, it does not disparage, much less does it subordinate, "the right of the people to keep (pg.473) and bear arms." To the contrary, it expressly embraces that right and indeed it erects the very scaffolding of a free state upon that guarantee. It derives its definition of a well-regulated militia in just this way for a "free State": The militia to be well-regulated is a militia to be drawn from just such people (i.e., people with a right to keep and bear arms) rather than from some other source (i.e., from people without rights to keep and bear arms).47

In other words, the right to keep and bear arms is not subordinate to the purpose of having a militia—the notion of a "well regulated militia" is subordinate to the purpose of having an armed citizenry.48 Furthermore, Van Alstyne points out, the reference in the Second Amendment's opening clause is "an express reference to the security of a 'free state.' It is not a reference to the security of THE STATE."49 Thus, the purpose of the Second Amendment is to ensure an armed citizenry, from which can be drawn the kind of militia that is necessary to the survival of a free state.

#### Their appeal to the Constitution as a protection of basic right ignores the privilege involved – their interpretation of the Constitution is an act of white privilege

Jenkins 14 [Colin Jenkins (founder, editor and Social Economics Department chair at the Hampton Institute, and has been published on Truthout, Common Dreams, Dissident Voice, Black Agenda Report, Popular Resistance, and in Z Magazine), "Coming Home to Roost: American Militarism, War Culture, and Police Brutality," Hampton Institution – Society & Culture, 2/27/2014, http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html#.Vmuxv\_krLIU] AZ

Naturally, these interpretations are skewed by a myriad of privileges. Regardless of the officer's own ethnicity or socioeconomic background, it is the role that ultimately represents a virtual arm of white supremacy and class oppression. Regarding the racist dynamics of law enforcement in the US, "It's useful to understand this as an allegory about how white skin privilege works," explains Annalee Newitz. "The police uniform (and) the badge are like white skin, and the person who wears that skin is allowed to enforce laws which he doesn't himself intend to follow." [[81]](http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/coming-home-to-roost.html" \l "_edn81" \o ") Within their roles as "officers of the law," they become the embodiment of the government-backed suppression they often despise in their private lives. Only the suppression they carry out is against a specific target population (people of color, the poor and disenfranchised, and the working class). And, despite coming from that very working class, they undoubtedly lose any and all sense of class consciousness in their roles as ruling class watchdogs. Within this role, they take ownership of a wide array of hypocritical entitlements - a mindset that wholeheartedly believes the US Constitution protects my rights to own guns, and my rights to protect my privileged status in society, and my rights to protect my property, and so on. However, those rights don't apply to you. And they certainly don't apply to young men of color who happen to be walking home at night. Nor do they apply to striking workers demanding a living wage. Nor do they apply to Occupy protestors collectively sitting in protest of illegal wars, corporate greed, and corrupt banks. Nor do they apply to evicted homeowners who were exploited by deceitful mortgage schemes. Nor do they apply to homeless people who are simply trying to survive on the streets.

### A2 Libertarianism NC

#### Turn – the aff decreases spending on foreign wars and the military

#### Most taxes go toward the military

Claremont 14 [Robin Claremont (Director of Development and Communications at National Priorities Project), "The Surprising Truth Behind Tax Day: Where Your Taxes Go," Moyers and Company, 4/14/2014] AZ

Across the United States, the average taxpayer [paid $11,715](http://nationalpriorities.org/interactive-data/taxday/average/2013/us/receipt/) in 2013 federal income taxes. The military received the [largest share](http://nationalpriorities.org/blog/2014/04/07/tax-day-pictures/) of that sum, $3,174, followed by health care, which received $2,662 for programs like Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Meanwhile, only $238 went to education programs, and just $15.84 and $6.56 went to the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program and National Forest System, respectively.

#### Technology isn't value-neutral – the existence of guns produces militarism and reduces others to potential targets

Selinger 12 [Evan Selinger (an associate professor of philosophy at Rochester Institute of Technology), "I Grip the Gun and the Gun Grips Me," Wired Magazine, 12/21/2012] AZ

Taking on the instrumentalist conception of technology, [Don Ihde](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Don_Ihde), a leading philosopher of technology, claims that “the human-gun relation transforms the situation from any similar situation of a human without a gun.” By focusing on what it is like for a flesh-and-blood human to actually be in possession of a gun, Ihde describes “lived experience” in a manner that reveals the NRA position to be but a partial grasp of a more complex situation. By equating firearm responsibility exclusively with human choice, the NRA claim abstracts away relevant considerations about how gun possession can affect one’s sense of self and agency. In order to appreciate this point, it helps to consider the fundamental materiality of guns. In principle, guns, like every technology, can be used in different ways to accomplish different goals. Guns can be tossed around like Frisbees. They can be used to dig through dirt like shovels, or mounted on top of a fireplace mantel, as aesthetic objects. They can even be integrated into cooking practices; gangster pancakes might make a tasty Sunday morning treat. But while all of these options remain physical possibilities, they are not likely to occur, at least not in a widespread manner with regularity. Such options are not practically viable because gun design itself embodies behavior-shaping values; its material composition indicates the preferred ends to which it “should” be used. Put in Ihde’s parlance, while a gun’s structure is “[multistable](http://figureground.ca/interviews/don-ihde/)” with respect to its possible uses across a myriad of contexts, a partially determined trajectory nevertheless constrains which possibilities are easy to pursue and which of the intermediate and difficult options are worth investing time and labor into. A gun’s excellence simply lies in its capacity to quickly fire bullets that can reliably pierce targets. With respect to the trajectory at issue, guns were designed for the sole purpose of accomplishing radical and life-altering action at a distance with minimal physical exertion on the part of the shooter. Since a gun’s mechanisms were built for the purpose of releasing deadly projectiles outwards, it is difficult to imagine how one could realistically find utility in using a gun to pursue ends that do not require shooting bullets. For the most part, a gun’s excellence simply lies in its capacity to quickly fire bullets that can reliably pierce targets. Using the butt of a gun to hammer the nail into a “Wanted” post–a common act in the old cowboy movies–is an exceptional use. What the NRA position fails to convey, therefore, are the perceptual affordances offered by gun possession and the transformative consequences of yielding to these affordances. To someone with a gun, the world readily takes on a distinct shape. It not only offers people, animals, and things to interact with, but also potential targets. Furthermore, gun possession makes it easy to be bold, even hotheaded. Physically weak, emotionally passive, and psychologically introverted people will all be inclined to experience shifts in demeanor. Like many other technologies, Ihde argues, guns mediate the human relation to the world through a dialectic in which aspects of experience are both “amplified” and “reduced”. In this case, there is a reduction in the amount and intensity of environmental features that are perceived as dangerous, and a concomitant amplification in the amount and intensity of environmental features that are perceived as calling for the subject to respond with violence. French philosopher [Bruno Latour](http://www.bruno-latour.fr/) goes far as to depict the experience of possessing a gun as one that produces a different subject: “You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun is different with you holding it. You are another subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has entered into a relationship with you.” While the idea that a gun-human combination can produce a new subject may seem extreme, it is actually an experience that people (with appropriate background assumptions) typically attest to, when responding to strong architectural configurations. When walking around such prestigious colleges as Harvard and the University of Chicago, it is easy to feel that one has suddenly become smarter. Likewise, museums and sites of religious worship can induce more than a momentary inclination towards reflection; they can allow one to view artistic and spiritual matters as a contemplative being.

## A2 Heg Good

Your answers to heg shouldn’t just be impact turns – take a more nuanced approach that agrees heg is good but answers the internal link by saying militarism makes hegemony less effective – that’ll be a good way to neutralize their offense

* why deterrence/military intervention fails
* liberal order good – benevolent heg is good – economic reforms

### 1AR Top Level

#### this assumes international threats are real - interventionism abroad produces threats that are confirmed by the military industrial complex to be security concerns – proves hegemony is a self-fulfilling prophecy, that's Giroux

#### Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy – the most powerful military in the world swings between phases of paranoia and illusions of omnipotence – by constructing external threats and attempting to police the world, American hegemony overstretches and cause violence, that's McClintock

#### No impact to military hegemony – no correlation between US activism and stability

Fettweis 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### International restraints preserve American power – this preserves the liberal order while avoiding imperial violence and overreach

Sapolsky et al. ‘9 [Harvey M. Sapolsky is a professor of public policy and organization at MIT. Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at Cato Institute. Eugene Gholz is an associate professor of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Daryl G. Press is an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College. “Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty” Fall, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2009-Fall/full-Sapolsky-etal-Fall-2009.html]

**Restraint would offer the opportunity to reinvigorate the foundations of America’s strength. Foreign distractions**, among other causes, **have led the U**nited **S**tates **to neglect its transportation infrastructure**, its **educational system**, its **finances**, **and** its **tech**nology **base**. **If we were to restrain** the **global interventionism** that has become our second nature since the end of World War II, **we could ensure our safety while** preserving our power **to deal** more precisely **with threats that may materialize in an uncertain future.** The first virtue of **a restraint strategy** is that it **husbands American power**. **It acknowledges** both **America’s great strengths—a combination of human and physical resources unmatched in the world—and the limitations of our power,** which is easily dissipated in wasteful attempts to manage global security. **No nation or ideology now menaces American security in the same ways or to the same degree that the Soviet Union** and Communism **did** **during the Cold War**. Instead, **a variety of ethnic, religious, and nationalistic conflicts** oceans away from us **now obsess our policymakers, even though those conflicts have** little to no prospect **of spreading our way**. To be sure, **radical Islamists** have attacked Americans at home and abroad, and while these attackers should be hunted down, they do not pose an existential threat, only a difficult and distracting one. Killing or capturing the criminals who attack Americans makes sense; **trying to fix** the **failed states** they call home **is** hopeless and unnecessary**. The U**nited **S**tates **is safer than ever. The challenge now is staying safe**. The U.S. military is supposed to stand between America and hostile nations, but its **forward deployment** actually **puts our forces between others and their own enemies**. **Alliances** once meant to hold a coalition together against a common foe **now protect foreign nations from adversaries that in most cases have no direct dispute with the U**nited **S**tates. **Although our allies are capable of fending for themselves, the fact that they can take shelter under an American umbrella allows them to defer taking responsibility for their own security**. The United States should now use tough love to get our allies off our security dole. We need to do less so others will do more. Restraint should not be confused with pacifism. Calling for America to come home is different today than it was during the Cold War, when there was a world to lose. Today it is not a call for capitulation or disarmament, though it does provide an opportunity for force reductions. The restraint strategy requires a powerful, full-spectrum, and deployable military that invests heavily in technology and uses realistic training to improve capabilities and deter challenges. Restraint demands a military with a global reach that is sparingly used. Similarly, restraint is not isolationism. **Isolation avoids economic and diplomatic engagement and eschews potential profits from the global economy and the enrichment that sharing ideas and cultures can offer**. The United States would be foolish to decline these opportunities. **Restraint does not mean retreating from history, but merely ending U.S. efforts to try to manage it. Restraint would rebalance global responsibilities among America and its allies, match our foreign objectives to our abilities, and put domestic needs first**.

### Overstretch/Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### Pursuit of hegemony is a fantasy of control that relies upon construction of threatening Otherness --- this prompts resistance and create a permanent state of conflict

Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program – University of Colorado-Boulder, 6

[Ira, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, p. 53-54]

The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it won’t stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons’ efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has “unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended.” Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: “For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.”39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that don’t. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. It’s no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a “secret plan” for world conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer “a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution.” They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: “We should not try to convince people that things are getting better.” Michael Ledeen: “The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.”40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons’ fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a **permanent state of conflict**, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the “manly virtues” of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The neocons’ story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy. Just as neocons need monsters abroad, they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget). The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it, and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a “window of vulnerability.” The quest for strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

### Heg Unsustainable

#### Politics of naval domination have normalized the state of emergency – hegemony has become impossible—any exercise of US force in the future is only domination without hegemony that is doomed to fail

Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, 13

[Bruno, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, 7-12-14, Tang]

I think that we have now an understanding of what **the situation is: The sovereign everywhere**, be it the political or financial elite, **fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest**. In truth, **they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof**. This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, **the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony.** This is true in general, but **it is** perhaps **particularly true with respect to** the greatest power on earth, **the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished**. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. **Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence**. The usual, **traditional ideological justifications for dominance** (**such as bringing democracy** and freedom here and there) **have now become very weak because of the contempt that the dominant nations** (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly **show toward legality, morality, and humanity**. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations: **who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will,** or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, **though** still **dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness.** All **attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance.** Although **they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine** (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) **and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy**, **which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing** (now excellently incarnated by Africom), **they know that they have lost their hegemony.**

‘**Domination without hegemony’** **is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study** of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), **the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty**, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future” (1994/2010: 221). It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “**the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis**.” He continues:

Although **the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’** (1994/2010: 384). **What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance**. In the last few years, **we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden**. While that action was most likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), **it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony.** In fact, **this killing**, **just like G. W. Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing**. Barack **Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin** (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but **it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible.** **The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination**. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence. **What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift.**

#### New challengers to US hegemony mean at best it’s only sustainable in the short term

Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, 13

[Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, “Pull Back,” Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13, WD]

The United States emerged from the Cold War as the single most powerful state in modern times, a position that its diversified and immensely productive economy supports. Although its share of world economic output will inevitably shrink as other countries catch up, the United States will continue for many years to rank as one of the top two or three economies in the world. The United States' per capita GDP stands at $48,000, more than five times as large as China's, which means that the U.S. economy can produce cutting-edge products for a steady domestic market. North America is blessed with enviable quantities of raw materials, and about 29 percent of U.S. trade flows to and from its immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico. The fortuitous geostrategic position of the United States compounds these economic advantages. Its neighbors to the north and south possess only miniscule militaries. Vast oceans to the west and east separate it from potential rivals. And its thousands of nuclear weapons deter other countries from ever entertaining an invasion. Ironically, however, instead of relying on these inherent advantages for its security, the United States has acted with a profound sense of insecurity, adopting an unnecessarily militarized and forward-leaning foreign policy. That strategy has generated predictable pushback. Since the 1990s, rivals have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing" -- low-grade diplomatic opposition. China and Russia regularly use the rules of liberal international institutions to delegitimize the United States' actions. In the UN Security Council, they wielded their veto power to deny the West resolutions supporting the bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and more recently, they have slowed the effort to isolate Syria. They occasionally work together in other venues, too, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Although the Beijing-Moscow relationship is unimpressive compared with military alliances such as NATO, it's remarkable that it exists at all given the long history of border friction and hostility between the two countries. As has happened so often in history, the common threat posed by a greater power has driven unnatural partners to cooperate. American activism has also generated harder forms of balancing. China has worked assiduously to improve its military, and Russia has sold it modern weapons, such as fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and diesel-electric submarines. Iran and North Korea, meanwhile, have pursued nuclear programs in part to neutralize the United States' overwhelming advantages in conventional fighting power. Some of this pushback would have occurred no matter what; in an anarchic global system, states acquire the allies and military power that help them look after themselves. But a country as large and as active as the United States intensifies these responses. Such reactions will only grow stronger as emerging economies convert their wealth into military power. Even though the economic and technological capacities of China and India may never equal those of the United States, the gap is destined to narrow. China already has the potential to be a serious competitor. At the peak of the Cold War, in the mid-1970s, Soviet GDP, in terms of purchasing power parity, amounted to 57 percent of U.S. GDP. China reached 75 percent of the U.S. level in 2011, and according to the International Monetary Fund, it is projected to match it by 2017. Of course, Chinese output must support four times as many people, which limits what the country can extract for military purposes, but it still provides enough resources to hinder U.S. foreign policy Meanwhile, Russia, although a shadow of its former Soviet self, is no longer the hapless weakling it was in the 1990s. Its economy is roughly the size of the United Kingdom's or France's, it has plenty of energy resources to export, and it still produces some impressive weapons systems.

#### China is taking steps to become a global hegemon

Cropsey, Center for American Seapower Director, 11

(Seth, Jan Feb 11, Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and Bush administrations, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute [Areas of Expertise: Foreign Policy, Terrorism & Radical Ideologies, Defense Strategy, Security Alliances, National Security], World Affairs, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2011,“Anchors Away: American Sea Power in Dry Dock”, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/anchors-away-american-sea-power-dry-dock>, Accessed 7/8/14, AA)

Also virtually absent from strategic calculations is China. The Quadrennial Defense Review published by the current administration early in 2010 mentions China’s rise and its large population. Otherwise, the report, which is supposed to survey the nation’s defenses and set its future course, remains silent about the possibility of strategic competition with Asia’s largest state, whose oft-declared intent is to deny the US access to the western Pacific.

The rise of a dominant power in Asia threatens what should be the major goal of America’s security strategy—i.e., promoting a world order that encourages political liberty and expanding commerce based on free enterprise and such international norms as respect for sovereignty and untroubled transit through international waters—at least as much as the contest for European or Eurasian hegemony once did. China’s mercantilist economy based on exports and sustained by the manipulation of currency (which also bolsters unproductive state-owned industries); its recent bullying of smaller neighbors over sovereignty questions in the surrounding seas; its growing nationalism; its increasingly powerful navy—all of these factors demonstrate Beijing’s steely ambition to become the Asian hegemon.

If China should achieve these objectives, the consequences for America would be profound. The network of US alliances—with democratic Asian states like Japan, the Republic of Korea, and whatever remains of Taiwan after it is inevitably attacked—would splinter as these and other smaller Asian states seek economic, diplomatic, and military accommodation with China. Denied access to the region, the US would lose its century-old status as a major Pacific power, not to mention the bases from which it can now project military force (both aerial and amphibious) as well as support naval operations throughout the region. China’s authoritarian economic and political systems would become the model of governance and regional intercourse. Chinese influence underwritten by its unopposed naval power would reach far; a diminished US Navy would find itself impotent in shielding India. With Asia’s huge population—about half the world’s people—and growing wealth, America’s loss of status as the major Pacific power would spell its demise as a great international force.

### A2 Deterrence

#### US hegemonic deterrence fails—questionable credibility and ignored threats

**Monteiro, Yale political science professor, 10**

[Nuno, P., Spring/Summer 2010, “Why U.S. Power Does Not Deter Challenges”, <http://yalejournal.org/2010/07/20/why-u-s-power-does-not-deter-challenges/>, accessed 7-3-13 BLE]

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis‐à‐vis the world's sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world's other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while suffering little itself. And America's new enemies are not more "irrational" than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming "we will bury you" Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today's world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world's most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth.

#### American hegemony is impossible to support and administer

Freeman, American Diplomat, 12

[Chas Freeman, 2-23-12, The National Interest, “The China Bluff,” http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/the-china-bluff-6561, 7-6-13, JZ]

Actually, we have a much bigger problem than that presented by the challenge of dealing with a rising China. We cannot hope to sustain our global hegemony even in the short term without levels of expenditure we are unprepared to tax ourselves to support. Worse, the logic of the sort of universal sphere of influence we aspire to administer requires us to treat the growth of others' capabilities relative to our own as direct threats to our hegemony. This means we must match any and all improvements in foreign military power with additions to our own. It is why our military-related expenditures have grown to exceed those of the rest of the world combined. There is simply no way that such a militaristic approach to national security is affordable in the long term, no matter how much it may delight defense contractors.

### A2 Hegemony Solves Conflict

#### Hegemony is the most conflict-prone system

Monteiro 14 [Nuno, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, April, “Theory of Unipolar Politics,” *Cambridge University Press*, pg. 181-4/AKG]

At the same time, the first two-and-a-half decades of our unipolar system have been anything but peaceful in what concerns U.S, involvement in interstate conflict. U.S. forces have been employed in four interstate wars – Kuwait (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001-), and Iraq (2oo3-2011) – in addition to many smaller interventions including Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and Sudan.5 As a result, the United States has been at war for fifteen of the twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, In fact, the first two-and-a-half decades of unipolarity — representing around 1o percent of U.S. history account for more than 30 percent of the nation's total wartime.6 For critics of U.S. interventionism, "the central question [of contemporary international politics] is how to contain and moderate the use of military force by the United States."8

Table 5 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: from 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; from 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and unipolarity since 1990.9 Table 6 then presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is by far the most conflict prone of all systems according to two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great-power years were spent at war versus 16 percent in bipolarity. In unipolarity, in contrast, a remarkable 64 percent of great-power years have been until now spent at war – by far the highest percentage in all systems. Furthermore, during multipolarity and bipolarity the probability that war involving a great power would, break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 16.o percent – or around four times higher.

It might be argued that the higher number of years that great powers spent at war under unipolarity are merely the result of the long, grinding, and unforeseen occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq by U.S. forces.11 But even if these two wars had gone according to U.S. plans – if the Afghanistan War had ended in the spring of 2002 and the Iraq War in the summer of 2003 – unipolarity would still be particularly prone to great-power involvement in war. Even if the United States had not occupied either Afghanistan or Iraq, it would still have spent 16.0 percent of the post-Cold War years at war, which is about the same as the respective percentages for bipolar and multipolar systems. In other words, even if the United States had refrained from any military occupations, the frequency of its use of military force in major operations would still give us no reason to believe that unipolarity is any more peaceful than any other past configuration of the international system.

As things turned out in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the last two-and-a-half decades saw a sharp increase in both the incidence of conflict and the percentage of great-power years spent at war. This is a particularly puzzling finding given that the current unipole – the United States – is a democracy in a world populated by more democracies than at any time in the past. In light of arguments about how democracies are better able to solve disputes peacefully, choose to engage only in those wars they can win, and tend to fight shorter wars, the United States should have spent fewer years at war than previous nondemocratic great powers.12

As we can see, post-Cold War history can be used in support of both the widespread claim that the overall level of conflict has declined and of the claim that the United States has experienced an unprecedented level of involvement in interstate war. Reality seems to be chafing against the view that unipolarity produces no incentives for confilict; at least in what concerns the unipole's involvement in interstate wars, the past two-and-a-half decades seem to point in the opposite direction.

#### The risk only swings one way—if we’re disengaged, we can choose to enter the fight without being forced into it – solves all their offense – but extended deterrence kills our strategic flexibility which guarantees war

Layne 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 163 //wyo-tjc]

Although rare, great power wars do happen. Indeed, there are many reasons to believe another Eurasian great power war might break out in the next several decades. The United States does have a choice grand strategically. It can maintain its Eurasian military commitments in the hope of preventing such a war, or it can pull back its forward presence from Eurasia and rely on a multipolar regional power balance to block the emergence of a hegemon. If the United States sticks with its current grand strategy and fails to stop the outbreak of great power war in Eurasia, it will be automatically swept up in the fighting—regardless either of its degree of interest in the conflict or the costs and risks of involvement. As an offshore balancer, on the other hand, the United States would have the ability to intervene in a war if its security interests necessitated that it do so, but it might also be able to stay out of a war altogether if they didn’t.

### A2 Transition Wars

Hegemony is not key to stability and no transition wars – empirics prove the theory false

Fettweis, Naval War College, Professor of Security Studies, 10

(Christopher J., Tulane University’s Assistant Professor of Political Science, October 27, 2010, “Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace”, p.173-4, accessed 7/5/12, YGS)

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace in only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break our around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “redound to America’s detriment.”71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that U.S hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great power is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”73 If the pacific trend were due not the U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

#### Transition from unipolarity will be to multipolarity – that ensures stability through international institutions

Ikenberry, Princeton Politics and International Affairs professor, 11

(G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, lexis, accessed 6/28/12, THW)

There is no longer any question: wealth and power are moving from the North and the West to the East and the South, and the old order dominated by the United States and Europe is giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states. But if the great wheel of power is turning, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some anxious observers argue that the world will not just look less American -- it will also look less liberal. Not only is the United States' preeminence passing away, they say, but so, too, is the open and rule-based international order that the country has championed since the 1940s. In this view, newly powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and agendas for global order, and a weakened United States will find it harder to defend the old system. The hallmarks of liberal internationalism -- openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism -- could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries. The fact that today's rising states are mostly large non-Western developing countries gives force to this narrative. The old liberal international order was designed and built in the West. Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anticolonial pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist societies. The recent global economic slowdown has also bolstered this narrative of liberal international decline. Beginning in the United States, the crisis has tarnished the American model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts about the ability of the United States to act as the global economic leader. For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization **(**WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

#### No transition wars – rising powers will integrate into international institutions with no incentives for aggression

Ikenberry, Princeton Politics and International Affairs professor, 11

(G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis, accessed 6/28/12, THW)

REASON FOR REASSURANCE Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order. China has already experienced a taste of such a backlash. Last year, its military made a series of provocative moves -- including naval exercises -- in the South China Sea, actions taken to support the government's claims to sovereign rights over contested islands and waters. Many of the countries disputing China's claims joined with the United States at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July to reject Chinese bullying and reaffirm open access to Asia's waters and respect for international law. In September, a Chinese fishing trawler operating near islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea rammed into two Japanese coast guard ships. After Japanese authorities detained the trawler's crew, China responded with what one Japanese journalist described as a "diplomatic 'shock and awe' campaign," suspending ministerial-level contacts, demanding an apology, detaining several Japanese workers in China, and instituting a de facto ban on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan. These actions -- seen as manifestations of a more bellicose and aggressive foreign policy -- pushed ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea perceptibly closer to the United States. As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears. Of course, it might be that some elites in China are not interested in practicing restraint. But to the extent that China is interested in doing so, it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions -- redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II. The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions and constructed new ones -- thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions. More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up. As the global economic system becomes more interdependent, all states -- even large, powerful ones -- will find it harder to ensure prosperity on their own. Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateralcooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself. So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism.

### A2 Realism

#### The Claim that realism is inevitable dis-empowers the individual and destroys agency

Bleiker, Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Queensland, 2000

[Roland, former Professor at the Australian National University, the Pusan National University, and the University of Tampere, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, p. 48-49]

The very notion of prediction does, by its own logic, annihilate human agency. To assert that international relations is a domain of political dynamics whose future should be predictable through a convincing set of theoretical propositions is to assume that the course of global politics is to a certain extent predetermined. From such a vantage-point there is no more room for interference and human agency, no more possibility for politics to overtake theory. A predictive approach thus runs the risk of ending up in a form of inquiry that imposes a static image upon a far more complex set of transversal political practices. The point of a theoretical inquiry, however, is not to ignore the constantly changing domain of international relations. Rather, the main objective must consist of facilitating an understanding **[end page 48]** of transversal struggles that can grapple with those moments when people walk through walls precisely when nobody expects them to do so**.** Prediction is a problematic assessment tool even if a theory is able to anticipate future events. Important theories, such as realist interpretations of international politics, may well predict certain events only because their theoretical premises have become so objectivised that they have started to shape decision makers and political dynamics. Dissent, in this case, is the process that reshapes these entrenched perceptions and the ensuing political practices.

#### Their realism defenses are epistemologically bankrupt – they naturalize political assumptions to legitimize violence and oppressive political structures – Their method causes self-fulfilling prophesies – the alt is key to reclaim agency from inevitable violence

Busser, Masters Candidate at the Dept of Political Science at York University, 6

[Mark, August , “The Evolution of Security: Revisiting the Human Nature Debate in International Relations ”, <http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/documents/WP40-Busser.pdf>]

**Responding directly to Thayer,** Duncan Bell and Paul MacDonald have expressed concern at the intellectual functionalism inherent in sociobiological explanations, suggesting that **too often analysts choose a specific behaviour and read backwards into evolutionary epochs in an attempt to rationalize explanations for that behaviour. These arguments**, Bell and MacDonald write, **often fall into** what Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould have called ‘adaptionism,’ or “**the attempt to understand all** physiological and **behavioural traits** of an organism **as evolutionary adaptations**.”42 Arguments such as **these are hand-crafted by their makers**, **and tend to carry forward their assumptions and biases**. In an insightful article, Jason Edwards suggests that sociobiology and its successor, evolutionary psychology, are fundamentally political because they frame their major questions in terms of an assumed individualism**.** Edwards suggests that **the main question** in both subfields **is: “given human nature, how is politics possible**?”43 **The problem is** that **the ‘givens’ of human nature are drawn backward from common knowledges and truths about humans in society, and the game-theory experiments which seek to prove them are** often **created with such assumptions in mind.** **These** arguments **are** seen by their critics as **politicized from the** very **start**. **Sociobiology** in particular **has been widely interpreted as a conservative politico-scientific tool because of these basic assumptions, and because of the political writings of many sociobiologists**.44 Because **sociobiology naturalizes certain behaviours like conflict, inequality and prejudice**, Lewontin et al. suggest that **it “sets the stage for legitimation of things as they are**.”45 The danger inherent in arguments that incorporate sociobiological arguments into examinations of modern political life, the authors say, is that such arguments naturalize variable behaviours and support discriminatory political structures. **Even if certain behaviours are found to have a biological drives behind them, dismissing those behaviours as ‘natural’ precludes the possibility** that **human actors can make choices and can avoid** anti-social, **violent**, or undesirable **action**.46 While the attempt to discover a geneticallydetermined human nature has usually been justified under the argument that knowing humankind’s basic genetic programming will help to solve the resulting social problems, **discourse about human nature seems to generate** self-fulfilling prophesies by putting limits on what is considered politically possible. While sociobiologists tend to distance themselves from the naturalistic fallacy that ‘what is’ is ‘what should be,’ **there is** still **a problem with employing adaptionism to ‘explain’ how existing political structures because** conclusions tend to be drawn in terms of conclusions that assert what ‘must be’ because of biologically ingrained constraints.47 **Too firm a focus on sociobiological arguments about ‘natural laws’ draws attention away from humanity’s potential for social and political solutions that can counteract and mediate any inherent biological impulses**, whatever they may be. A revived classical **realism** based on biological arguments **casts biology as destiny** in a manner that parallels the neo-realist sentiment that the international sphere is doomed to everlasting anarchy. Jim George quotes the English School scholar Martin Wight as writing that “hope is not a political virtue: it is a theological virtue.”48 George questions the practical result of traditional realsist claims, arguing that the suggestion that fallen man’s sinful state can only be redeemed by a higher power puts limitations on what is considered politically possible. Thayer’s argument rejects the religious version of the fallen man for a scientific version, but similar problems remain with his ‘scientific’ conclusions.

## zWIP

### Legalism Cards

Legal restraints motivated by conflict narratives cause endless intervention and WMD warfare

John Morrissey, Lecturer in Political and Cultural Geography, National University of Ireland, Galway; has held visiting research fellowships at University College Cork, City University of New York, Virginia Tech and the University of Cambridge. 2011, "Liberal Lawfare and Biopolitics: US Juridical Warfare in the War on Terror," Geopolitics, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2011

In the ’biopolitical nomos’ of camps and prisons in the Middle East and elsewhere

AND

legally sanctioned military violence and to maximize its ’operational capacities of securitization’.

A bigger question, of course, is what the US military practices of lawfare

AND

who "participate~s~ in discussions of strategy and tactics".118

The US military’s liberal lawfare reveals how the rule of law is simply another securitization

AND

necessitated by the perennial political economic ’need’ to securitize volatility and threat.

Conclusion: enabling biopolitical power in the age of securitization

"Law and force flow into one another. We make war in the shadow of law, and law in the shadow of force" – David Kennedy, Of War and Law 124

Can a focus on lawfare and biopolitics help us to critique our contemporary moment’s proliferation

AND

even sometimes embracing it – as a tactic of statecraft and war".128

Since the inception of the war on terror, the US military has waged incessant

AND

’make live’ and the anticipating and management of life’s uncertain ’future’.

Some of the most key contributions across the social sciences and humanities in recent years

AND

toxic combination’ of US geopolitics and biopolitics defining the current age of securitization.

Legal restraints guarantee increasing public resistance and executive secrecy

Michael J. Glennon 14, I-law prof at Tufts, National Security and Double Government, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Glennon-Final.pdf

If Bagehot’s theory is correct, the United States now confronts a precarious situation.

AND

stories, Holmes said, if people do not believe in ghosts.511

It might be supposed at this point that the phenomenon of double government is nothing

AND

administrative state-cum-technocracy?515 Why is national security different?

There is validity to this intuition and no dearth of examples of the frustration confronted

AND

are in no position to assess. Why is national security any different?

It is different for a reason that I described in 1981: the organizations in

AND

its name can permit that power to escape the control of the people.

It might also be supposed that existing, non-Madisonian, external restraints pose

AND

when one flies off the telephone wire, they all fly off.524

More importantly, the premise—that a vigilant electorate fueled by a skeptical press

AND

Madisonian checks, and the internal Madisonian checks only minimally constrain the Trumanites.

Some suggest that the answer is to admit the failure of the Madisonian institutions,

AND

again provide the popular check" that they were intended to provide.532

That, however, is exactly what many thought they were doing in electing Barack

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bul its enduring ambilion is lo become, in reality, less Madisonian.

It is not clear what precisely might occur should Bagehot’s cone of government "fall

AND

forms and familiar symbols, takes on the substance of a silent directorate.

Another possibility, however, is that the fall to earth could entail consequences that

AND

to act against perceived authoritarian tendencies by leaving open the vault of secrecy.

A smaller, less reliable pool of potential recruits would hardly be the worst of

AND

governmental officials’ assertions on national security threats are inclined to extend their skepticism.

Governmental assurances concerning everything from vaccine and food safety to the fairness of stock-

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those assumed to be undertaken merely through bureaucratic inertia or lack of imagination.

The government itself, meanwhile, could not be counted upon to remain passive in

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that might be taken to prevent the entire structure from falling to earth.

Vote neg to debase the aff’s reliance securitized law in favor of democratic restraints on the President

Stephanie A. Levin 92, law prof at Hampshire College, Grassroots Voices: Local Action and National Military Policy, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 372

In this sense, what is important about federalism is not that it locates power

AND

Only in this dynamic tension does the best protection for the citizenry lie.

2NC

### Xtra militarism cards

#### pedagogy of violence makes gun violence possible

Giroux 13 [Henry Giroux (social critic and educator, and the author of many books, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University), "Violence is Deeply Rooted in American Culture: An Interview With Henry A. Giroux," Truth-Out, 1/17/2013, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/13982-violence-is-deeply-rooted-in-american-culture-interview-with-henry-a-giroux] AZ

There is little doubt that the role of the NRA is instrumental in the violence haunting American culture, or that gun control is important, but it is only one factor in the culture of symbolic and institutional violence that has such a powerful grip on the everyday cultural apparatuses and workings of American society. The issue of violence in America goes far beyond the issue of gun control. When gun control is the focus — instead of a broader consideration of violence — it can actually serve to deflect the most important questions that need to be raised. The grave reality is that violence saturates almost every aspect of North American culture. Domestically, violence weaves through the cultural and social landscape like a highly charged forest fire burning everything in its path. Popular culture, extending from Hollywood films and sports thuggery, to video games, embraces the spectacle of violence as the primary medium of entertainment. The real issue here is the existence of a pedagogy of violence that actually makes the power of deadly violence attractive. Representations of violence dominate the media and often parade before viewers less as an object of critique than as a for-profit spectacle, just as the language of violence and punishment now shapes the U.S. culture — with various registers of violence now informing school zero-tolerance policies, a bulging prison-industrial complex, and the growing militarization of everyday life. There is also the fact that as neoliberalism and its culture of cruelty weaves its way through the culture it makes the work place, schools, and other public spheres sites of rage, anger, humiliation, and misery, creating the foundation for blind rebellion against what might be termed intolerable conditions. Accepting the logic of radical individual responsibility, too many Americans blame themselves for being unemployed, homeless, and isolated and end up perceiving their misery as an individual failing and hence are vulnerable to forms of existential depression and collective rage. We have seen such violence among students reacting to bullying and among postal workers responding to intolerable work conditions. There is no one cause of violence, but a series of a number of causes that range from the war on drugs and the militarization of police departments to mass incarcerations in prisons to the return from brutal wars of many trained killers suffering with PTSD.[2] All of these factors combine in an explosive mix to create an dangerous culture of violence and cruelty and as Jeff Sparrow points out a “willingness of ordinary people to commit unthinkable atrocities.”[3]

#### Gun legislation fails because of a culture that views guns as an existential feature of American identity

Gutting 12/28 [Gary Gutting (American philosopher and holder of an endowed chair in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, editor of Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews), "Guns and Racism," NY Times, 12/28/2015] AZ

Those of us in favor of stronger laws to abate gun violence mostly support our cause by arguing against the claims of the gun lobby (roughly, the N.R.A. and gun manufacturers). It should by now be obvious that this is a waste of time. The case for action is overwhelming, but there’s no chance of convincing the entrenched minority who are so personally (or financially) invested in gun ownership. Legislative efforts have failed because the opposition is more deeply committed — more energized, more organized, more persistent. My purpose here is not to continue arguing with the gun lobby or even to discuss the precise form that new gun legislation should take. Instead, I’m interested in understanding the intensity gap and how we might overcome it. Only when there’s a sustained passion against gun violence will there be a meaningful chance of effective action. It might seem that fear of gun violence is the great motivator. Pro-gun advocates see guns as our best defense against armed criminals. Anti-gun advocates see the wide availability of guns as a greater threat than criminal violence. The issue seems to come down to what you fear more: criminals or guns. But the passion of the gun lobby goes much deeper than fear of criminals. As Firmin DeBrabander’s excellent [book](http://yalepress.yale.edu/book.asp?isbn=9780300208931), “Do Guns Make Us Free?” demonstrates, the basic motivation of the pro-gun movement is freedom from government interference. They talk about guns for self-defense, but their core concern is their constitutional right to bear arms, which they see as the foundation of American freedom. The right to own a gun is, as the N.R.A. website puts it, “the right that protects all other rights.” Their galvanizing passion is a hatred of tyranny. Like many other powerful political movements, the gun lobby is driven by hatred of a fundamental evil that it sees as a threat to our way of life — an existential threat — quite apart from any specific local or occasional dangers. The intensity gap exists because opponents of gun violence have no corresponding deep motivation. We cite suicide rates, urban violence, and, especially, mass shootings as horrors requiring more effective gun laws. But few of us actually see guns as existential threats to fundamental American values. In this, however, we are mistaken. Our permissive gun laws are a manifestation of racism, an evil that, in other contexts, most gun-control advocates see as a fundamental threat to American society.

#### Weak gun control laws are racist

Gutting 12/28 [Gary Gutting (American philosopher and holder of an endowed chair in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, editor of Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews), "Guns and Racism," NY Times, 12/28/2015] AZ

Our permissive gun laws are a manifestation of racism, an evil that, in other contexts, most gun-control advocates see as a fundamental threat to American society. We’ve heard a lot recently about how blacks still don’t feel safe in this country. You can argue about how seriously to take complaints from black students at elite universities or even whether outrageous cases of unjustified police shootings are just isolated occurrences. But there’s no argument that black people in the “bad parts” of our cities have to live with utterly unacceptable levels of gun violence. In 2010, blacks, who make up only 13 percent of the population, were [55 percent of gun homicide victims](http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/05/07/chapter-2-firearm-deaths/?beta=true&utm_expid=53098246-2.Lly4CFSVQG2lphsg-KopIg.1&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F). It’s no surprise that [blacks favor stricter gun controls](http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx) considerably more than whites do. How does racism enter into this picture? Let me put it in personal terms. I spend a fair amount of time in Chicago, where the newspapers regularly offer front-page reports of shootings from the previous night. Checking The Tribune on a recent morning, I learned that two people were killed and a dozen wounded. You might think that a steady stream of such reports (this year, Chicago will have over 2,700 shootings, with over 400 people killed) would induce high levels of fear, especially since many shootings occur on the streets. In fact, I’m not particularly afraid, since — like most Chicagoans — I’m hardly ever where the violence occurs. There’s something to worry about only if you live in certain overwhelmingly black communities on the West and South sides of town. (The papers publish helpful[maps](http://crime.chicagotribune.com/chicago/homicides) showing how the killings are distributed.) These are where almost all the shootings occur, and the large majority of victims (and perpetrators) are black. The patterns are similar in other large American cities, so that those who live with gun violence as an imminent, personal threat are mostly black. But imagine if there regularly were shootings in previously “safe” white areas. Now there are frequent killings on the Magnificent Mile, the Gold Coast and in Lincoln Park. Both the perpetrators and the victims are white, and, despite greatly increased police protection, the violence continues. Given the strong support for gun control among residents of these areas, the cause would quickly become very personal. Chicago has relatively strong gun laws, but the city borders on Indiana, where the laws are much laxer. My neighbors and I would join a vigorous and relentless campaign for stricter national gun laws. This isn’t our reaction to gun violence in black parts of town. Does this mean that we’re racists? Perhaps not. Perhaps we just haven’t realized the extent to which gun violence is destroying urban black communities. But once we realize this, our passion for justice and hatred of racism should galvanize us to action. Here the parallel to the Black Lives Matter movement is instructive. When black protesters convinced whites that striking examples of unjustified police violence were not just occasional aberrations, the whites supported protests against what they now saw as a racist practice. Similarly, white supporters of gun control should join with blacks —[including mayors of major cities](http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/mayors-survey-congress-pass-gun-control-reform-213296) — who have recognized the racist effects of gun proliferation. The case for the racist effect of our permissive gun laws is especially powerful. There’s no way of explaining away all these deaths as aberrations. If we fail to oppose with equal passion and vigor the relentless political pressure of (mostly white) gun advocates, we force a large number of black citizens to live with the constant threat of gun violence. We’re in effect letting the Second Amendment trump the Fourteenth Amendment, implicitly preferring the right of gun ownership to the right of black people to live free from fear. The gun lobby, of course, will say that gun control laws won’t help. Some will also dismiss gun violence as a “black problem” since it’s often a matter of blacks attacking other blacks. But here I’m not concerned with refuting gun-lobby arguments. I’m speaking to those who already agree that we need stronger gun laws and who realize that when our fellow citizens are dying and there’s something we can do about it, it’s morally vacant to say it’s their problem. Hatred of racism should be a major motivation for the gun control movement. This will give it the vigor and persistence needed to overcome the gun lobby’s passionate fantasy that citizens with guns protect us from tyranny.

### neg?

#### neg card??

Ernesto 14 [Chris Ernesto (founding member of St. Pete for Peace, a non-partisan antiwar organization providing peace oriented education), "School Shootings and US Militarism," Counterpunch, 6/13/2014, http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/06/13/school-shootings-and-us-militarism/] AZ

There’s no doubt that people in the US want senseless mass killings to stop. But are we strong enough as a society to get to the root causes of these killings, to really take a look at who we are and be willing to make some changes to our values, not just our laws? People like myself who want to live in a country free of guns have to face the fact that the 2nd Amendment says that the government shall not infringe on the right of the people to keep and bear arms. I don’t like it, but I invoke my 1st Amendment rights every time a cop harasses people at a protest I’m attending, so unless I want to be intellectually dishonest, I must accept both Amendments. This still leaves room for a discussion on background checks, assault rifles and concealed weapons. But what may be more effective in helping stem domestic killings would be a redirection of the debate from the overly-simplistic, partisan gun control conversation to one that asks what kind of society produces this many alienated and deeply troubled people Let’s debate the pressures that our consumer/glamour society puts on young people. And, let’s talk about our culture of glorifying violence and using aggression to resolve problems. Obama rightly stated that the US is the only developed country experiencing this level of mass killings. But we’re also the [world’s number one arms dealer](http://www.salon.com/2012/01/24/america_arms_dealer_to_the_world/), and the world leader in waging war. It’s difficult to preach about peace at home when you’re practicing violence all around the world.

### Jasinski

#### The 1ac was a critical rupture in current in current political frameworks – that’s key to challenge imperial violence

Jasinski 12

[Shawn Mark Jasinski, MA in philosophy @ the University of Vermont, 2012, “CRITICAL RUPTURES: VIOLENCE AND THE LEGACY OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISLM FROM THE COLD WAR TO 9/11”, Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of Binghamton University, Proquest, Jacob]

Conclusion “Why is there clearly something wrong about reality and what is it that’s wrong?” - Phillip K. Dick Reality is shaped by violence. This project began with inquiries into the way violence shapes human artifice, the manner in which American politics of exception embody that practice, the moments at which cracks in that artifice are revealed, and how literature and film can both reflect and guide our attempt to understand the implications of what I have referred to as moments of critical rupture. My main focus has been on the primary events used to both perpetuate and challenge the American state fantasy from the Cold War through the aftermath of 9/11, with an emphasis on the way the Bush Administration perpetuated the grand narrative of American exceptionalism after 9/11 by drawing from the legacy of the Cold War and the culture of containment. Orientalist fear has lost none of its ability to generate an almost endless supply of political capital, in fact, the “terrorist” represents an Other capable of replacing the Communist as America’s longest running political enemy. The photographs of torture taken at Abu Ghraib prison presented a definite challenge to the biopolitical basis of the “terrorist” Other, but I question their continued resonance. Pease rightfully remarks that “After they were transmitted globally, the photographs of the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison became the space in which the spectatorial public refused the complicities that the security state had solicited” (184), but eight years have passed and the public outcry dissipated as if the “isolated incident” at Abu Ghraib has not set a precedent for violence that will be reenacted when justified by a new emergency. One cannot deny that “Abu Ghraib’s significance resided in its restoration of the memory of a history of national shames that 286 met the disapproval or condemnation of the entire political spectrum” (Pease 190) and the release of the photographs was a source of rupture for some Americans, but, as seems to be the case throughout American history, fear or inability to acknowledge the full implications of America’s violent history encourages most Americans to disavow events that cannot be easily accommodated by the exceptionalist state fantasy as either freak occurrences or isolated incidents justified by a state of exception. The Bush Administration worked tirelessly to endow the state of exception with the ability to self-perpetuate indefinitely as the norm in American politics. Drawing from Donald Pease’s discussion of the equivalence between nation and security state enacted by the Bush Administration, the means by which citizens within the Homeland Security State are reduced to biopolitical mass in need of protection, we can see the installation of emergency politics as a source of political capital with no clear terminus. The emergency may evolve, but the political framework stays the same. President Obama’s campaign for “change” in 2008 seemed to suggest otherwise, but the state of exception born on 9/11 continues to evolve and Obama seems to have inaugurated a doomed fantasy. President Obama has consistently reaffirmed that the United States is still in a state of “national emergency” and that he will continue indefinitely to seek out and destroy terrorist threats, which risks the perpetuation of the treatment of enemy life as ungrievable, despite the improvement of conditions at detention centers like Guantanamo Bay. In January, 2012, when Bilal el-Berjawi was assassinated by a drone strike, the Obama Administration did not even need to provide evidence of his guilt because of State Secrets Privilege. El- Berjawi is just one example of the continued acceptance of biopolitical violence by both the Obama Administration and the American public as a whole. 287 After his election, one of the first signs that President Obama would not provide change on a scale that would overhaul American politics of Homeland Security was his reliance on State Secrets Privilege, which allows both physical and symbolic violence to continue free of restraint. Privileging state secrets is used as a way to limit the American exposure to legal proceedings and military actions involving supposed terrorists; it thus continues to serve as a means for state fantasy work to shape Americans’ perception of the War on Terror. We hear frequent use of the word “transparency” in contemporary American politics, almost always marking a lack thereof, but few politicians actually hope for such a thing to become real. This lack of transparency is also part of a far larger issue about the inability of many Americans to reflect critically upon their own nation. How can American foreign policy be reshaped without an acknowledgment of the nation’s imperial legacy and a willingness to confront the term “Empire” in an American context? A national self-reflexivity is necessary for any real change, but neither President Obama nor any other presidential candidate is going to risk their entire political career by drawing into question the American nation they are charged to support and defend. In this manner, both American exceptionalism and the state of exception, which exist symbiotically, are granted a perpetual life. In turn, much of the political maneuvering after 9/11 has helped to assure that their symbiotic relationship, in which the state of exception is always inaugurated as the current manifestation of the grand narrative of American exceptionalism, will remain unquestioned by the bulk of American citizens, even if events within a given state of exception, like Abu Ghraib, are drawn into scrutiny. However, the decade after 9/11 is an era in which the state fantasy has become the subject of near constant challenge and, therefore, requires almost constant maintenance. 288 The rate at which the fantasy is made to be refreshed or reframed creates both a hope for change in the present, as a barrage of potential critical ruptures present themselves, and an even greater hope that the cycle of doubt and regeneration will accelerate to the point of deconstruction in the future. Much has happened in the past few years to reshape the state fantasy and a number of events deserve specific attention. Starting in 2006, Wikileaks challenged the level of control the American government can exert over information. The release of materials that had been deemed “sensitive” or “classified” restored, if only briefly, a sense of accountability to American politics. Rep. Peter King even sought to have Wikileaks designated as a foreign terrorist organization in November, 2010, which only serves to demonstrate the manner in which the term “terrorist” has continued to evolve. However, the introduction of accountability into American politics was not without an extreme price. Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, acts in the name of “open governance,” a governmental structure not based in fantasy work, which American politicians find incredibly threatening. Assange has been transformed into a hybrid of hero and outlaw around the globe, while Bradley Manning has paid a far greater price for his contribution to the fight for political accountability. While Assange is at least granted some immunity by his status as an Australian, Bradley Manning remains in a military stockade near Fort Meade, where his trial continues. After providing Wikileaks with a variety of diplomatic cables and video footage of American air strikes in 2010, which Manning considered to be a patriotic duty, Manning was charged with a variety of offenses, including “aiding the enemy,” a charge that is a capital offense. Manning, an Army Intelligence Officer from Oklahoma, has been described as linked to a terrorist 289 organization (Wikileaks) and being a terrorist in his own right. If Manning’s example can teach us anything, it is that political “transparency” is something American politicians see as a threat to their ability to engage in successful state fantasy work. Manning has followed in the tradition of Daniel Ellsberg, who originally leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times in 1971, but the consequences are far more dire. Unlike Ellsberg, who had the charges against him dismissed, Manning suffers a fate more on par with the Rosenbergs. He may not be executed, but he has become an example used to discourage other Americans from taking action toward questioning an unjust war. In 2011, forty years after they were originally released, the Pentagon papers were declassified, which sets the standard for transparency to remain an option that is only viable in hindsight. Wikileaks provides a counterpoint for the legacy of discursive violence I have addressed, a counterpoint that demonstrates the fear produced when the very existence of the state fantasy is drawn into question, but not all moments of rupture announce themselves so clearly. Osama bin Laden’s death was met with some critique from those concerned with American politics of vengeful violence, but the day was largely celebrated with a vigor usually reserved for Super Bowl victories. The celebration of biopolitical violence after Bin Laden’s death failed to incite Americans to question our national legacy of violence, yet after Jared L. Loughner attempted to assassinate Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, historical theorist Glenn Lafantasie was among a number of critics who attributed the attempt to a “permanent culture of political violence” in the United States. Lafantasie looks to the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, and from our frontier heritage to modern class inequality as emblematic of the American legacy of violence. He argues that “America has a long history of political violence — a dark river of brutality, 290 even savagery, that runs through our entire national experience.” My project has explored how this violence shapes and is shaped by the state fantasy, as well as how that fantasy can be drawn into question, but the questioning cannot commence unless the legacy of violence is acknowledged. However, as Lafantasie argues, Americans “don’t like facing up to that fact as a people or as a nation. Americans prefer instead to see each outburst of violence — whether in physical attacks on political figures or in blasts of gunfire in our schools and shopping malls — as aberrations, isolated incidents committed by deranged individuals who cause mayhem and slaughter like human whirlwinds.” Events like the shooting of Giffords are treated as “isolated” because they cannot be accommodated by the American grand narrative that state fantasy work seeks to preserve. Until the American public can openly recognize that “violence has actually formed a seamless web in our history” (Lafantasie), the subject of violence will continue to be suppressed in our national consciousness and inexplicable acts of violence will continue to haunt America’s past and future. As Obama’s term as President comes to a close, we are forced to question what the American state fantasy looks like today. Despite the recent decision to exclude American citizens from legalized indefinite detainment and the removal of troops from Iraq, the War on Terror is far from over, as can be seen in discussions of pushing American forces into Iran. Sadly, that invasion seems primed for launch and the same rhetoric of “foreign intervention” in the spirit of “Democracy” will most likely be deployed once more, but within the past few years we have also seen an increase in the politics of dissent. Pease argues that Obama personified “revolutionary violence” and that he “worked with and through the fantasy of American exceptionalism” (Pease 209), but 291 in 2011, Arab Spring provided a model for “revolutionary violence” that highlighted President Obama’s inability to embody the term. As the revolutionary spirit moved through Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen during late 2010 and early 2011, we saw a new imaging of “democracy” sweep through an area that had long been the subject of US attempts to spread “freedom” in the spirit of the same term. However, the democracy at the heart of the Arab Spring, especially as embodied in the protests at Tahrir Square in Egypt, called for a politics of accountability and an end to corrupt governments that stifled the people’s place in the political process. The dispossessed took back their voice and reclaimed the term “democracy,” even as President Obama attempted to claim that the revolution in Egypt was representative of a global desire for the brand of democracy the US was selling. For many Americans the revolutions across Northern Africa and the Middle East were a symbol of triumph for democracy, while others questioned why American citizens were so reluctant to reinvigorate the same democratic values. American citizens remain docile because they want to believe they are members of a chosen nation, or because they do not think the violence perpetrated by the United States is bad enough to merit action or, perhaps, the culture of consumption keeps them docile. Maybe Americans are not driven to revolutionary violence because they simply do not see the need, but each moment of critical rupture provides the potential for this to change. In recent months, the spirit of dissent has arisen in the United State as well and the Occupy Wall Street Movement has given voice to a mass of aggrieved Americans, as well as countless human beings around the globe. In her discussion of coalitions comprised of groups of queers and “illegal” aliens, Butler argues that “when such 292 networks form the basis of political coalitions, they are bound together less by matters of ‘identity’ or commonly accepted terms of recognition than by forms of political opposition to certain state and other regulatory policies that effect exclusions, abjections, partially or fully suspended citizenship, subordination, debasement, and the like” (147). As a “political coalition,” Occupy Wall Street is an unprecedented collection of the dispossessed, which serves as both a strength and a weakness. Occupy Wall Street is unique not only because of its diverse composition, but also because those involved in the movement seem outraged that today we see “capitalists no longer rushing for gold, but for the totality of the world’s images” (Virilio 59). Virilio’s claim is important because it marks the focus of the movement on reclaiming the power of representation, beginning with the word “occupy.” Arundhati Roy, who has frequently spoken in support of the movement, argues that Occupy Wall Street “seems to me to be introducing a new political language into the United States, a language that would be considered blasphemous only a while ago” (Roy). It is about “reigniting a new political imagination” (Roy) in contrast with the rhetoric of global capitalism. Roy argues that “among the other things that we need to reclaim, other than the obscene wealth of billionaires, is language. Language has been deployed to mean the exact opposite of what it really means when they talk about democracy or freedom.” Both of the words she discusses are central to American state fantasy work; they both justify and explain American foreign policy. Roy’s discussion of the need to reclaim language and meaning was mirrored in December, 2011, when one of the Occupy DC supporters in McPherson Square claimed that their move to build a “Freedom Pavilion” was an attempt to “reclaim the geometry” used by the Department of Defense Headquarters (“Occupy DC Arrests”). 293 The protestor’s claim may seem a bit forced, but it simultaneously demonstrates the flexibility that the logic of reclamation brings to the Occupy Wall Street movement. To reclaim language and meaning requires a Foucauldian genealogist’s understanding of what is at stake in the use of language. If language is to be the means of reclaiming the power of language, then we must be careful to avoid the replication or adaptation of the discursive violence that led us here. When Roy argues that Occupy Wall Street must “keep re-imagining itself, because holding territory may not be something the movement will be allowed to do in a state as powerful and violent as the United States” (Roy), she highlights the need for any challenge to the state fantasy to evolve in a fashion that prevents it from being framed as yet another isolated incident, or a momentary attempt at political dissent that is readily forgotten, like Cindy Sheehan’s protest of her son’s death in 2004. Staying the course will be a challenge for the movement as it moves forward, especially in the coming months, because “Election campaigns seem to siphon away political anger and even basic political intelligence into this great vaudeville, after which we all end up in exactly the same place” (Roy), but if Occupy Wall Street can stay the course and continue to attract more of the voiceless to speak up, then the United States may encounter a form of “revolutionary violence” more in line with the events in Egypt. However, the task is of herculean proportions and Occupy Wall Street currently seems to lack the infrastructure necessary to expand. One could even argue that the movement would have fizzled out or at least been forced to redefine itself months ago if 2012 had not provided one of the mildest winters in recent American history. I would like to close this with a discussion of the staff sergeant who went on a “rampage” and killed sixteen Afghani civilians, including nine children, in March, 2012. 294 When we speak of a politics of accountability or of a political imagination that seeks to do more than simply frame events, we must speak of events like these. The press and the American government have called him a “rogue” and insisted he must have been “deranged.” They have told us this was an isolated incident unrelated to the war, but how can it be? Serving on his fourth tour of duty, Robert Bales is the product of the American military system. He is not only a soldier, but also representative of the way the United States embodies the violence humans enact to create a sense of security amidst chaos. The United States believes that it is able to control the world in the same way that humans act to defy death by blocking out the nothingness of their own being, but the price of such violence is catastrophic. In the second decade of the twenty-first century Americans find themselves, even unknowingly, on a precipice, a threshold as Spanos might say, where both the means of dissent and the means of control seem to be more fluid than ever before. In its constant need for maintenance, the ever-changing American state fantasy provides more and more moments of potential rupture, but it is also operating on a rapidly evolving playing field. Technology increases the potential for government transparency just as much as it provides a means for the government to frame events in real-time. As Nadel points out, “As a culture, contemporary Americans have acquired an exponentially increased access to the performance of narratives” (298), and these narratives work both for and against the pursuit of truth. The digital age provides an immediate means of both questioning and framing, but that is not the only role technology has to play. Soldiers in Iraq may have been forced to question the treatment of life as ungrievable, but drone strikes fully separate humans from the physical act of violence and provide a means of distancing the 295 American public from the violence as well. What comes next may be uncertain, but as long as Americans, particularly authors like those discussed here, continue to question how the world is presented to them, then hope remains. For the time being, simply understanding how state fantasy functions is an important step in moving toward a political system that is both transparent and accountable. American exceptionalism is alive, it may be weakened, but the War on Terror is far from over and will continue to provide a new American errand for the foreseeable future. However, we can hope that future violence will provide the same potential for critical rupture we have seen in the literary representation of the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the events of 9/11. We must also continue to hope that this legacy of violence will someday be deemed obsolete as humans embrace Arendt’s suggestion to rethink thought itself. Unfortunately, it seems as if the point at which violence evolves from discursive to physical provides one of the few opportunities when American citizens are willing to reflect on the way morally unjustifiable violence is inseparable from the legacy of American exceptionalism.

## Notes

### Ad if time

#### The 1AC harms claims are manufactured – the threat industry fabricates danger to justify military expansion.

Pieterse 7 [Jan Nederveen, professor of sociology at the University of Illinois, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 14, No. 3, Aug., “Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” p. 473-4]

Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and rep resents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of 'deniability' the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote 'stuff happens'. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning. The military stages phirric victories that come at a price of lasting instability. In Afghanistan the US staged a swift settlement by backing and funding the Northern Alliance, which brought warlords and drug lords to power and a corrupt power structure that eventually precipitated the comeback of the Taliban. In Iraq the US backed the Kurds and permitted Shiite militias to operate (until the Samarra bombing of April 2006) and thus created conditions for lasting instability. The American rules of engagement are self-serving. But because the military inhabits a parallel universe and the media are clogged with 'defense experts', discussion of these tactics and hence the capacity for self-correction is limited. Part of the backdrop is the trend of the gradual erosion of state capacities because of 25 years, since the Reagan era, of cutting government services except the military and security. The laissez-faire state in the US has created an imbalance in which the military remains the major growing state capability, which leaves military power increasingly unchecked because monitoring institutions have been downsized or dismantled too. When recently the Pentagon wanted to review all the subcontracts it has outsourced this task was outsourced too. This redistribution of power within the US government played a key part leading up to the war and in the massive failure in Iraq. Diplomacy was under resourced, intelligence was manipulated and the Pentagon and the Office of Strategic Planning ignored experts' advice and State Department warnings on the need for postwar planning (Packer, 2005; Lang, 2004).

#### Focus on security threats to the U.S. are hyped and result in failed foreign policy. We must shift our focus away from low probability threats and focus on systemic threats to human security.

Zenko and Cohen 12—Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Michael A. Cohen is a Fellow at the Century Foundation [March/April 2012, “Clear and Present Safety,” Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety?page=show]

Last August, the Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney performed what has become a quadrennial rite of passage in American presidential politics: he delivered a speech to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. His message was rooted in another grand American tradition: hyping foreign threats to the United States. It is “wishful thinking,” Romney declared, “that the world is becoming a safer place. The opposite is true. Consider simply the jihadists, a near-nuclear Iran, a turbulent Middle East, an unstable Pakistan, a delusional North Korea, an assertive Russia, and an emerging global power called China. No, the world is not becoming safer.”

Not long after, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta echoed Romney’s statement. In a lecture last October, Panetta warned of threats arising “from terrorism to nuclear proliferation; from rogue states to cyber attacks; from revolutions in the Middle East, to economic crisis in Europe, to the rise of new powers such as China and India. All of these changes represent security, geopolitical, economic, and demographic shifts in the international order that make the world more unpredictable, more volatile and, yes, more dangerous.” General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in a recent speech, arguing that “the number and kinds of threats we face have increased significantly.” And U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reinforced the point by claiming that America resides today in a “very complex, dangerous world.”

Within the foreign policy elite, there exists a pervasive belief that the post–Cold War world is a treacherous place, full of great uncertainty and grave risks. A 2009 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that 69 percent of members of the Council on Foreign Relations believed that for the United States at that moment, the world was either as dangerous as or more dangerous than it was during the Cold War. Similarly, in 2008, the Center for American Progress surveyed more than 100 foreign policy experts and found that 70 percent of them believed that the world was becoming more dangerous. Perhaps more than any other idea, this belief shapes debates on U.S. foreign policy and frames the public’s understanding of international affairs.

There is just one problem. It is simply wrong. The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place. It is a world with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history. All over the world, people enjoy longer life expectancy and greater economic opportunity than ever before. The United States faces no plausible existential threats, no great-power rival, and no near-term competition for the role of global hegemon. The U.S. military is the world’s most powerful, and even in the middle of a sustained downturn, the U.S. economy remains among one of the world’s most vibrant and adaptive. Although the United States faces a host of international challenges, they pose little risk to the overwhelming majority of American citizens and can be managed with existing diplomatic, economic, and, to a much lesser extent, military tools.

This reality is barely reflected in U.S. national security strategy or in American foreign policy debates. President Barack Obama’s most recent National Security Strategy aspires to “a world in which America is stronger, more secure, and is able to overcome our challenges while appealing to the aspirations of people around the world.” Yet that is basically the world that exists today. The United States is the world’s most powerful nation, unchallenged and secure. But the country’s political and policy elite seems unwilling to recognize this fact, much less integrate it into foreign policy and national security decision-making.

The disparity between foreign threats and domestic threat-mongering results from a confluence of factors. The most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hyping dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For Republicans, who have long benefited from attacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their greatest political advantage. For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough is a shield against GOP attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into a genuine threat. Warnings about a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucratic interests. The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government -- defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments.

There is also a pernicious feedback loop at work. Because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats facing the United States, Washington overemphasizes military approaches to problems (including many that could best be solved by nonmilitary means). The militarization of foreign policy leads, in turn, to further dark warnings about the potentially harmful effects of any effort to rebalance U.S. national security spending or trim the massive military budget -- warnings that are inevitably bolstered by more threat exaggeration. Last fall, General Norton Schwartz, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff, said that defense cuts that would return military spending to its 2007 level would undermine the military’s “ability to protect the nation” and could create “dire consequences.” Along the same lines, Panetta warned that the same reductions would “invite aggression” from enemies. These are a puzzling statements given that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the next 14 countries’ defense budgets combined and that the United States still maintains weapons systems designed to fight an enemy that disappeared 20 years ago.

Of course, threat inflation is not new. During the Cold War, although the United States faced genuine existential threats, American political leaders nevertheless hyped smaller threats or conflated them with larger ones. Today, there are no dangers to the United States remotely resembling those of the Cold War era, yet policymakers routinely talk in the alarmist terms once used to describe superpower conflict. Indeed, the mindset of the United States in the post-9/11 world was best (albeit crudely) captured by former Vice President Dick Cheney. While in office, Cheney promoted the idea that the United States must prepare for even the most remote threat as though it were certain to occur. The journalist Ron Suskind termed this belief “the one percent doctrine,” a reference to what Cheney called the “one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon.” According to Suskind, Cheney insisted that the United States must treat such a remote potential threat “as a certainty in terms of our response.”

Such hair-trigger responsiveness is rarely replicated outside the realm of national security, even when the government confronts problems that cause Americans far more harm than any foreign threat. According to an analysis by the budget expert Linda Bilmes and the economist Joseph Stiglitz, in the ten years since 9/11, the combined direct and indirect costs of the U.S. response to the murder of almost 3,000 of its citizens have totaled more than $3 trillion. A study by the Urban Institute, a nonpartisan think tank, estimated that during an overlapping period, from 2000 to 2006, 137,000 Americans died prematurely because they lacked health insurance. Although the federal government maintains robust health insurance programs for older and poor Americans, its response to a national crisis in health care during that time paled in comparison to its response to the far less deadly terrorist attacks.

Rather than Cheney’s one percent doctrine, what the United States actually needs is a 99 percent doctrine: a national security strategy based on the fact that the United States is a safe and well-protected country and grounded in the reality that the opportunities for furthering U.S. interests far exceed the threats to them. Fully comprehending the world as it is today is the best way to keep the United States secure and resistant to the overreactions that have defined its foreign policy for far too long.

BETTER THAN EVER

The United States, along with the rest of the world, currently faces a period of economic and political uncertainty. But consider four long-term global trends that underscore just how misguided the constant fear-mongering in U.S. politics is: the falling prevalence of violent conflict, the declining incidence of terrorism, the spread of political freedom and prosperity, and the global improvement in public health. In 1992, there were 53 armed conflicts raging in 39 countries around the world; in 2010, there were 30 armed conflicts in 25 countries. Of the latter, only four have resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths and can therefore be classified as wars, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program: the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia, two of which were started by the United States.

Today, wars tend to be low-intensity conflicts that, on average, kill about 90 percent fewer people than did violent struggles in the 1950s. Indeed, the first decade of this century witnessed fewer deaths from war than any decade in the last century. Meanwhile, the world’s great powers have not fought a direct conflict in more than 60 years -- “the longest period of major power peace in centuries,” as the Human Security Report Project puts it. Nor is there much reason for the United States to fear such a war in the near future: no state currently has the capabilities or the inclination to confront the United States militarily.

Much of the fear that suffuses U.S. foreign policy stems from the trauma of 9/11. Yet although the tactic of terrorism remains a scourge in localized conflicts, between 2006 and 2010, the total number of terrorist attacks declined by almost 20 percent, and the number of deaths caused by terrorism fell by 35 percent, according to the U.S. State Department. In 2010, more than three-quarters of all victims of terrorism -- meaning deliberate, politically motivated violence by nonstate groups against noncombatant targets -- were injured or killed in the war zones of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia. Of the 13,186 people killed by terrorist attacks in 2010, only 15, or 0.1 percent, were U.S. citizens. In most places today -- and especially in the United States -- the chances of dying from a terrorist attack or in a military conflict have fallen almost to zero.

As violence and war have abated, freedom and democratic governance have made great gains. According to Freedom House, there were 69 electoral democracies at the end of the Cold War; today, there are 117. And during that time, the number of autocracies declined from 62 to 48. To be sure, in the process of democratizing, states with weak political institutions can be more prone to near-term instability, civil wars, and interstate conflict. Nevertheless, over time, democracies tend to have healthier and better-educated citizens, almost never go to war with other democracies, and are less likely to fight nondemocracies.

Economic bonds among states are also accelerating, even in the face of a sustained global economic downturn. Today, 153 countries belong to the World Trade Organization and are bound by its dispute-resolution mechanisms. Thanks to lowered trade barriers, exports now make up more than 30 percent of gross world product, a proportion that has tripled in the past 40 years. The United States has seen its exports to the world’s fastest-growing economies increase by approximately 500 percent over the past decade. Currency flows have exploded as well, with $4 trillion moving around the world in foreign exchange markets every day. Remittances, an essential instrument for reducing poverty in developing countries, have more than tripled in the past decade, to more than $440 billion each year. Partly as a result of these trends, poverty is on the decline: in 1981, half the people living in the developing world survived on less than $1.25 a day; today, that figure is about one-sixth. Like democratization, economic development occasionally brings with it significant costs. In particular, economic liberalization can strain the social safety net that supports a society’s most vulnerable populations and can exacerbate inequalities. Still, from the perspective of the United States, increasing economic interdependence is a net positive because trade and foreign direct investment between countries generally correlate with long-term economic growth and a reduced likelihood of war.

A final trend contributing to the relative security of the United States is the improvement in global health and well-being. People in virtually all countries, and certainly in the United States, are living longer and healthier lives. In 2010, the number of people who died from AIDS-related causes declined for the third year in a row. Tuberculosis rates continue to fall, as do the rates of polio and malaria. Child mortality has plummeted worldwide, thanks in part to expanded access to health care, sanitation, and vaccines. In 1970, the global child mortality rate (deaths of children under five per 1,000) was 141; in 2010, it was 57. In 1970, global average life expectancy was 59, and U.S. life expectancy was 70. Today, the global figure is just under 70, and the U.S. figure is 79. These vast improvements in health and well-being contribute to the global trend toward security and safety because countries with poor human development are more war-prone.

PHANTOM MENACE

None of this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.

Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States’ vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.

According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda’s leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is “within reach.” The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China’s rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China’s proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China’s senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military.

While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China’s military ambitions remain dominated by “regional contingencies” and that the People’s Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that “extend global reach or power projection.” In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China’s legitimate regional interests. It is true that China’s neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China’s room to maneuver.

The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China’s export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one.

NUCLEAR FEAR

It is a matter of faith among many American politicians that Iran is the greatest danger now facing the country. But if that is true, then the United States can breathe easy: Iran is a weak military power. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s “military forces have almost no modern armor, artillery, aircraft or major combat ships, and UN sanctions will likely obstruct the purchase of high-technology weapons for the foreseeable future.”

Tehran’s stated intention to project its interests regionally through military or paramilitary forces has made Iran its own worst enemy. Iran’s neighbors are choosing to balance against the Islamic Republic rather than fall in line behind its leadership. In 2006, Iran’s favorability rating in Arab countries stood at nearly 80 percent; today, it is under 30 percent. Like China’s neighbors in East Asia, the Gulf states have responded to Iran’s belligerence by participating in an emerging regional security arrangement with the United States, which includes advanced conventional weapons sales, missile defenses, intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises, all of which have further isolated Iran.

Of course, the gravest concerns about Iran focus on its nuclear activities. Those fears have led to some of the most egregiously alarmist rhetoric: at a Republican national security debate in November, Romney claimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon is “the greatest threat the world faces.” But it remains unclear whether Tehran has even decided to pursue a bomb or has merely decided to develop a turnkey capability. Either way, Iran’s leaders have been sufficiently warned that the United States would respond with overwhelming force to the use or transfer of nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear Iran would be troubling to the region, the United States and its allies would be able to contain Tehran and deter its aggression -- and the threat to the U.S. homeland would continue to be minimal.

Overblown fears of a nuclear Iran are part of a more generalized American anxiety about the continued potential of nuclear attacks. Obama’s National Security Strategy claims that “the American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon.” According to the document, “international peace and security is threatened by proliferation that could lead to a nuclear exchange. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk of a nuclear attack has increased.”

If the context is a state-against-state nuclear conflict, the latter assertion is patently false. The demise of the Soviet Union ended the greatest potential for international nuclear conflict. China, with only 72 intercontinental nuclear missiles, is eminently deterrable and not a credible nuclear threat; it has no answer for the United States’ second-strike capability and the more than 2,000 nuclear weapons with which the United States could strike China.

In the past decade, Cheney and other one-percenters have frequently warned of the danger posed by loose nukes or uncontrolled fissile material. In fact, the threat of a nuclear device ending up in the hands of a terrorist group has diminished markedly since the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was dispersed across all of Russia’s 11 time zones, all 15 former Soviet republics, and much of eastern Europe. Since then, cooperative U.S.-Russian efforts have resulted in the substantial consolidation of those weapons at far fewer sites and in comprehensive security upgrades at almost all the facilities that still possess nuclear material or warheads, making the possibility of theft or diversion unlikely. Moreover, the lessons learned from securing Russia’s nuclear arsenal are now being applied in other countries, under the framework of Obama’s April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, which produced a global plan to secure all nuclear materials within four years. Since then, participants in the plan, including Chile, Mexico, Ukraine, and Vietnam, have fulfilled more than 70 percent of the commitments they made at the summit.

Pakistan represents another potential source of loose nukes. The United States’ military strategy in Afghanistan, with its reliance on drone strikes and cross-border raids, has actually contributed to instability in Pakistan, worsened U.S. relations with Islamabad, and potentially increased the possibility of a weapon falling into the wrong hands. Indeed, Pakistani fears of a U.S. raid on its nuclear arsenal have reportedly led Islamabad to disperse its weapons to multiple sites, transporting them in unsecured civilian vehicles. But even in Pakistan, the chances of a terrorist organization procuring a nuclear weapon are infinitesimally small. The U.S. Department of Energy has provided assistance to improve the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and successive senior U.S. government officials have repeated what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in January 2010: that the United States is “very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”

A more recent bogeyman in national security debates is the threat of so-called cyberwar. Policymakers and pundits have been warning for more than a decade about an imminent “cyber–Pearl Harbor” or “cyber-9/11.” In June 2011, then Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said that “bits and bytes can be as threatening as bullets and bombs.” And in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described cyberattacks as an “existential” threat that “actually can bring us to our knees.”

Although the potential vulnerability of private businesses and government agencies to cyberattacks has increased, the alleged threat of cyberwarfare crumbles under scrutiny. No cyberattack has resulted in the loss of a single U.S. citizen’s life. Reports of “kinetic-like” cyberattacks, such as one on an Illinois water plant and a North Korean attack on U.S. government servers, have proved baseless. Pentagon networks are attacked thousands of times a day by individuals and foreign intelligence agencies; so, too, are servers in the private sector. But the vast majority of these attacks fail wherever adequate safeguards have been put in place. Certainly, none is even vaguely comparable to Pearl Harbor or 9/11, and most can be offset by commonsense prevention and mitigation efforts.

A NEW APPROACH

Defenders of the status quo might contend that chronic threat inflation and an overmilitarized foreign policy have not prevented the United States from preserving a high degree of safety and security and therefore are not pressing problems. Others might argue that although the world might not be dangerous now, it could quickly become so if the United States grows too sanguine about global risks and reduces its military strength. Both positions underestimate the costs and risks of the status quo and overestimate the need for the United States to rely on an aggressive military posture driven by outsized fears.

Since the end of the Cold War, most improvements in U.S. security have not depended primarily on the country’s massive military, nor have they resulted from the constantly expanding definition of U.S. national security interests. The United States deserves praise for promoting greater international economic interdependence and open markets and, along with a host of international and regional organizations and private actors, more limited credit for improving global public health and assisting in the development of democratic governance. But although U.S. military strength has occasionally contributed to creating a conducive environment for positive change, those improvements were achieved mostly through the work of civilian agencies and nongovernmental actors in the private and nonprofit sectors. The record of an overgrown post–Cold War U.S. military is far more mixed. Although some U.S.-led military efforts, such as the NATO intervention in the Balkans, have contributed to safer regional environments, the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened regional and global security, leading to hundreds of thousands of casualties and refugee crises (according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 45 percent of all refugees today are fleeing the violence provoked by those two wars). Indeed, overreactions to perceived security threats, mainly from terrorism, have done significant damage to U.S. interests and threaten to weaken the global norms and institutions that helped create and sustain the current era of peace and security. None of this is to suggest that the United States should stop playing a global role; rather, it should play a different role, one that emphasizes soft power over hard power and inexpensive diplomacy and development assistance over expensive military buildups.

Indeed, the most lamentable cost of unceasing threat exaggeration and a focus on military force is that the main global challenges facing the United States today are poorly resourced and given far less attention than “sexier” problems, such as war and terrorism. These include climate change, pandemic diseases, global economic instability, and transnational criminal networks -- all of which could serve as catalysts to severe and direct challenges to U.S. security interests. But these concerns are less visceral than alleged threats from terrorism and rogue nuclear states. They require long-term planning and occasionally painful solutions, and they are not constantly hyped by well-financed interest groups. As a result, they are given short shrift in national security discourse and policymaking.

#### Don’t multiply probability times magnitude – methodological black-mail that causes error replication and serial policy failure

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Risk registers’ adoption of conventional risk-assessment methodology – the formula that defines risk as likelihood multiplied by impact – also has a distinct influence on how insecurity is to be understood and handled. On the one hand, the emphasis on ‘likelihood’ initiates a consequential rationalization of danger occurrence. This rationalization, of course, is geared towards forecasting future developments. It is methodologically grounded in an in-depth analysis of danger’s ‘natural’ patterns of manifestation. As already mentioned, existing datasets and historical case studies are central elements in the identification of these patterns. The rationalization of risks based on past events is analytically efficacious, given that it empowers a projection of the past into the future. There is an implicit argument in the methodological measurement of ‘likelihood’ to the effect that the future essentially emulates history – the risk themes described in risk registers are extrapolations of misfortunes already experienced (Bigo, 2007; Jasanoff, 2009). Focusing on these risk themes, then, not only means focusing on past insecurities. It also means that, as technologies, risk registers project the very same insecurities into the future. With this, the very variable of ‘likelihood’ empowers an inert view of reality. This is problematic in the case of those risks that openly rely on, or are mediated by, social actors. Social actors are capable of adopting new types of behaviour over time. The risk of terrorism, for instance, can only be regarded as a persistent one under the assumption that terrorists will never cease, or be induced to cease, their activities. Given their commitment to engineering and econometric risk-assessment methodology, then, risk registers advance a regularized assessment of future practices. They leave little room for contingency, change and alternative trajectories, and so they tend to project a rather fatalist account of public insecurity. Another effect then adds to this projection. The reliance on past experiences as proof of the existence of risks negates the need to test their current viability. There is no requirement to prove that these issues will ever ‘actually’ become relevant in the future. Together with risk registers’ reliance on probability syllogisms, this causes these projected risks to gain a very specific kind of traction in the present. As risks are claimed to exist, but their date and place of materialization are held impossible to predict, a sense of comprehensive and ever-present insecurity is created. Insecurity comes to be regarded as substantial if not all-encompassing, always present and always possible – an understanding that directly caters to the permanent mobilization of a comprehensive kind of security dispositif. On the other hand, the focus on ‘impact’ as a determinant of risks also implies larger analytical claims. The problem here is the intimate focus of risk registers on damaging effects as such. The focus on material damage and financial costs in particular raises difficult questions as to what kinds of harmful effects can be claimed to be relevant to human beings and political collectives. In the risk registers, this question is simply delegated to the underlying risk formula. There are no selection criteria underlying risk registers other than a cost–benefit rationale, which comes into play when everything that seemed relevant to experts is compared by its calculated magnitude in the risk matrix. Another problematic aspect is the fact that while analyses of quantities of harm reveal a lot about damage, such an approach is of limited use in understanding how public dangers are created in the first place. The classic lines of enquiry in risk assessment are: ‘What can go wrong? What is the likelihood of it going wrong? What are the consequences if it goes wrong?’ (Haimes, 1998: 54–5). This means that risk assessments do not ask why something can go wrong, or how one’s own actions might be complicit in engendering such dangers. The focus on risk as harmful ‘impact’, then, not only implies debatable assumptions about relevant measures. Its focus on the consequences of risks and ignorance of their origins also poses limits to the reflexivity with which risks are approached.